

JPRS-SSA-84-127

7 December 1984

Sub-Saharan Africa Report

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SOVIET CULTURAL ACCORDS WITH AFRICA SUMMARIZED

Paris LE MOIS EN AFRIQUE in French Apr-May, Jun-Jul 84

[Articles by Dominique Bendo-Soupou, doctor of political sociology, in charge of CNR [National Research Council] studies at the Institute of Public Law in Naples: "The USSR Cultural Accord Policy With Regard to the African Countries"]

[Apr-May 84 pp 3-34]

[Text] The following is a study made with the assistance of the National Research Council at the Institute of Public Law in Naples.

Introduction

One of the basic aspects of the international policy of the USSR is without a doubt the policy of cultural agreements with regard to Africa, which is drafted as a function of specific goals, using conventions as juridical tools. The basic goal of this policy is to establish links with the countries in the process of development (PVD) in Africa through various cultural agreements, which constitute an important part of international law. In other words, this policy makes official and regulates the relations enabling the USSR to extend its cultural influence to the Third World zone in general and to Africa in particular. In addition, it makes it possible to establish the level of willingness on the part of the African countries, with which the USSR wants to establish a system of cultural cooperation which is fraught with economic, political and military implications. It is a question indeed of general goals also sought through international policy, but officially implemented through juridical channels.

Because of their constant increase, the multilateral and bilateral agreements signed by the USSR with a view to pushing cooperation with the African nations give rise to two kinds of consequences. On the one hand, they contribute to the development of international law, upon which the Soviets are trying to impose a new juridical language and new goals linked with the country's dominant ideology. On the other hand, they establish the limits of the international responsibility accepted by the USSR in the realm of the cultural development of the African PVD.

These initial considerations lead to a focus on three main questions: 1) the drafting of the strategy of the cultural accord policy towards the African PVD since 1917; 2) the signing of accords with the African PVD; and 3) the political implications of these agreements on the international level.

I. The Drafting of Strategy

A. Initial Phase

The policy of cultural agreements between Africa and the USSR has a long tradition. In the letter addressed by Menelik II to Tsar Nicholas II of Russia on 22 October 1896, mention is made of the existence of cultural agreements between Ethiopia and Russia prior to the 19th century.¹

The revolutionary upsets of 1917 prevented the USSR from either honoring the past agreements or drafting a new policy toward the PVD and Africa. In that era the USSR was itself an isolated PVD, because of the revolution, just as Africa is now because of colonization. On the other hand, the USSR could not allow itself during this heated period in its history to enter into competition with the Western nations, which underlined the success of their policy in Africa by means of territorial conquests.²

However, as early as 1915, Lenin outlined a strategy which would lead to the implementation of the policy of cultural agreements, which in the 1920s became one of the priority long-term goals of his foreign policy.³

In fact, the reduction of the number of free African nations⁴ because of colonization, legitimized by the 26 February 1885 Berlin Convention, forced Lenin to begin by demanding self-determination for the colonized territories, although on his death, he left only general directives concerning the possibility of USSR intervention in the process of independence in Africa.

The same world geostrategic conditions and internal organization in the USSR forced Stalin to adopt Lenin's line, without making any modifications to it until World War II. Thus between 1917 and 1945, the cultural accord policy as a tool of cooperation with the peoples of Africa was nonexistent in the USSR. On the other hand, during this period, the Western powers made the best use they could of the agreements signed directly with African chieftains or the Berlin Convention (1885), which recognized their full rights over the colonies.⁵

However, these unfavorable conditions did not cause the USSR to retreat, for throughout the period between 1917 and 1945, it worked first to forge its new culture while following the relations of the West with its colonies, which were characterized by conflict. These clashes were foreign policy elements which the USSR hoped to use against the colonial powers, to justify its categorical demands for self-determination for the African peoples. It was not until after World War II that the USSR policy of cultural agreements with Africa was to experience a remarkable upsurge.

a) Drafting of Strategy After World War II

World War II was a historical turning point for Soviet policy on two levels: the almost compulsory rapprochement between the USSR and the West, and the confirmation of the conflicts between Europe and its colonies, which enabled the USSR to push the development of the basic rights of the colonized

peoples. The Brazzaville Conference in 1944, which brought together representatives of the colonized territories, and during which General De Gaulle promised improvement in the rights of African nations and their integration in the French Union, was a harbinger of self-determination in Africa.⁶ This self-determination was the primary goal the USSR planned to achieve, making use, as needed, of the international legality it proposed to forge.

The triumph of the USSR and its Western allies with the support of African troops led to a rapprochement, without tremendous difficulty, between the Western nations and the USSR, moving forward at that time toward its rightful weight in a world in the midst of change. It then decided to make its presence felt in the decision-making centers which would determine the political destiny of the colonized territories on which it had had its eye since the days of Lenin. Its first move was therefore to participate in the multi-lateral conventions which created the United Nations Organization (UN) and the United Nations Organization for Education, Science and Culture (UNESCO).

b) Support of the UN and UNESCO Constituent Conventions

Membership in the UN and UNESCO was the first strategic move of the USSR as it moved onto the world stage.

The USSR regarded these two bodies as the supreme levels for the achievement of the basic goals of its cultural accord policy. It was a question on the one hand of finding and supporting the leaders of the territories without autonomy which would raise the issue of their right to independence on the rostrums of these organizations. On the other hand, there was an effort to establish a debate and to ensure the drafting of the juridical provisions pertaining to the political and cultural decolonization of what the USSR calls "the struggling peoples."

In 1945, the Soviet Union signed the United Nations Charter in San Francisco. This charter, assuredly influenced by the USSR, makes clear mention in two separate places of the right of the peoples to determine their own fate.⁷ Article 1 says that "one of the goals of the United Nations is to develop friendly relations among the nations based on the principle of the equal rights of peoples and their right to determine their own fate." Article 55 adds: "With a view to creating the prerequisites for stability and well-being needed to guarantee peaceful and friendly relations among the nations based on respect for the principle of the equality of the rights of the peoples and their right to determine their own fate, the United Nations will promote...the conditions for progress and development in the economic and social order."⁸

Despite the general nature of these provisions, the charter clearly urges the achievement of the two goals sought by the USSR: the right of the peoples to choose their own path and the economic and social development which, in 1945, also concerned the colonized peoples of Africa.

The limitations included in the charter also revealed the resistance of the colonizing countries to the legal endorsement of these principles, and they

had to do with two statutes pertaining to "the territories in which the people do not as yet administer themselves." These were the statutes on nonautonomous territories and the protectorates, most of them in Africa. The two statutes were designed to ensure the advance of the inhabitants of these territories in all sectors under the banner of the "sacred mission" accepted by the nations and entrusted with their administration. Article 76 only refers to independence at the end of the development of the trust territories. For nonautonomous territories, the charter was more cautious, although it did not exclude the possibility that independence would culminate the "gradual development of their free political institutions."⁹

Thus in 1945, the desire of the colonized peoples to decide freely on their fate was not linked with the right to immediate independence which would have fully satisfied the USSR. In the manner of the Berlin Convention and the League of Nations Pact (SDN), the United Nations Charter referred only implicitly to the civilizing purposes of colonization, although it was set forth as the first general juridical base justifying legitimization by the USSR of its demands, pending the gradual development of a systematic juridical practice with regard to self-determination and cultural development.

In the 1950s, the new practice in international law, marked by language characteristic of the Soviet Union, was established by the USSR and its circumstantial allies, under the name "United Nations Resolutions." Although within the context of respect for the 1945 charter, the resolutions more clearly took up the question of the political, economic and cultural decolonization on which the USSR focused unremittingly.

On 27 November 1953, Resolution A/742 (VIII) provided that "the subjugation, domination or exploitation imposed on a part of a population are factors characteristic of the nonautonomous territories." This raised the issue of the artificial merger of European and African territories.¹⁰ In 1954, the UN General Assembly included two articles on the right of the peoples to choose their own path in the drafts of the international pacts on the rights of man. Encouraged by the Soviets, this principle of free determination for the peoples was also heatedly raised in a number of debates pertaining to decolonization in Tunisia and Indonesia.¹¹

The year 1960 was the most symbolic of the development of this principle which was to lead to the decline of the colonization legalized by the Berlin Convention. Resolution A/1514 (XV) dated 14 December 1960 and entitled "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonized Peoples and Countries"¹² clearly reflected the Soviet efforts with a view to self-determination for and the advancement of the development of these peoples.

Partially reiterating Resolution A/742 (VIII), this declaration emphasized in particular that "the subordination of peoples to any foreign subjugation, domination or exploitation constitutes a denial of the basic rights of man, is contrary to the United Nations Charter and threatens the cause of peace and world cooperation."

All peoples have the right to free self-determination. By virtue of that right, they may freely choose their political status and may freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

The lack of preparation in the political, economic and social sectors or in education should never be used as a pretext for delaying independence. The resolution also insists on "immediate measures to transfer all power to these peoples, without conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed desires, and without any distinction based on race, creed or color, and without any intervention in the internal affairs of these territories, etc...."

This declaration contains all of the elements in the Soviet cultural accord policy and the strategy underlying it. The most important are the world cooperation which requires the signing of agreements; the right of free self-determination which would force granting of independence and would allow these peoples freely to determine their social and cultural progress; the lack of preparation in the political, economic, social and cultural realms and education, which would lead to Soviet assistance and cooperation on the basis of agreements with Africa; the prohibition on delaying independence, to make world cooperation possible; and finally, respect for the integrity of national territory and nonintervention in domestic affairs, making it possible to safeguard formal independence without making cooperation with the USSR and the accords rendering it official impossible.

It was no accident that this statement, which imposed a new legality in the international cooperation sector and raised the issue of the policy of colonial cultural contributions in Africa, met with nine abstentions among the colonial powers and their allies.

On 15 December 1960 (the following day),¹³ the General Assembly approved Resolution A/1541 (XXV). It strengthened the 1953 Resolution A/743, and established the criteria of nonautonomy (the mentioned countries) more broadly, saying that it "would at first glance be the result of the geographically separate and ethnically or culturally distinct nature of the territories in question." These criteria implied that the groups in question had a national or special identity distinguishing them from the colonizing countries. Given such a decisive position on the part of the United Nations, the Western nations began to contemplate the need to avoid outbreaks in the colonial territories likely to interest the USSR, which was constantly searching for more effective juridical means.¹⁴

Accepted with greater or lesser willingness by the colonial powers, which would in the end grant independence beginning in the 1950s, these resolutions were supplemented by Resolution A/2625 (XXV) of 1970 entitled "Declaration on the Principles of International Law." It was based on Resolution A/1514, which the USSR demanded be strictly implemented in the 1970s with a view to the liberation of the Portuguese-speaking countries--Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, engaged in national liberation war. Resolution A/2625 (XXV) clearly emphasized that "the peoples reacting to and resisting coercive measures designed to deprive them of their right to determine their own fate have the right to seek and receive support consistent with the goals and principles of the UN Charter."¹⁵

Unlike the United Nations Charter, this declaration did not require extensive interpretation by the USSR, which derived therefrom the right to aid

the national liberation movements in Africa. The purpose of the exercise of this right to provide aid, which can still be seen today, was to prepare the regimes resulting from the liberation movements for the signing of agreements as soon as independence was won. It was also on this basis, which was on the contrary extensively interpreted, that the USSR supported the aggressive Angolan, Congolese, Ethiopian, Libyan, Guinean and Cape Verdian, Malagasy and Mozambican nations which asked for its support in order to block the subversive actions in which it feared the so-called imperialist states would engage. Moreover, this support found its confirming legal force in the treaties and declarations of friendship and cooperation signed by Angola (1976), Congo (1981), Egypt (1971), Mozambique (1977), Sao Tome and Principe (1976) and Somalia (1974), and that which Libya planned to sign with the USSR.¹⁶

Finally, it was also on the basis of the 1970 declaration that Nigeria justified, demanded and immediately obtained Soviet assistance in reestablishing its territorial integrity and national unity, which were also protected by Resolution A/1514 (XV).

However, the process of the liberation of the African territories undertaken under the vigilant eye of the USSR beginning in the 1950s did not provide complete satisfaction. After 1970 and the winning of its independence by Zimbabwe, the USSR liberation campaign in the UN focused on the liberation of South Africa and its rampart, Namibia, where the USSR was already training civilian and military cadres. The USSR regarded these colonies as one of the factors threatening the international cooperation and understanding urged by the United Nations Charter and Resolution 1514 (XV).

Without impugning Soviet intentions, let us note in passing a situation which already existed at that time. The liberation of Africa in the "Western direction" did not prevent the USSR from invoking these resolutions and the United Nations Charter to justify its continued support of the revolutionary PVD and the antigovernmental mass movements. The sufficiently well-founded reason invoked by the USSR in the various agreements with these PVD and at United Nations conferences was the implementation by these countries of the socioeconomic and cultural policies drafted and imposed by the Western powers. The implementation of these policies represented a hindrance to the free self-determination of these peoples, who could not freely achieve the goal of cultural development as conceived by the USSR and the UNESCO, through which the Soviet Union had decided, as of 1954, to achieve it.

In fact, in 1954 the USSR assessed the importance of its achievements in the UN since 1945. As of that date, the inadequacy of the results obtained in the UN and the transfer to the UNESCO of the authority in the field of cultural development for which the charter and the resolutions of the United Nations provided underlay the Soviet decision to join UNESCO.

In the UNESCO, which it joined with great fanfare, the USSR intended to pursue the same goal of political and cultural decolonization. As in the UN, its presence there gave it a strategic position in the West. It was in Paris that it was able to take a stand in favor of the colonial territories the political rights of which had been somewhat improved after they became a part

of the French Union pursuant to the decisions of the 1944 Brazzaville Conference. Aspiring to independence, these territories were of great interest to the USSR, which was aware that their representatives were attending the Assembly of the French Union in Paris, where they were also following the UNESCO discussions of the political and cultural issues affecting them. Thus in the 1950s, the UNESCO and Paris were viewed by the USSR as the proper centers for seeking and finding the future leaders of these territories. Believing that the higher goal of UNESCO was to encourage cultural cooperation, the USSR decided that this body was the place where it would begin to propose cultural agreements with the African PVD involved in the first wave of independence. Turning away from the Latin American countries linked with Western culture and the anticommunist Asiatic nations, the USSR focused on Egypt, Liberia and Libya, which had been liberated in 1922, 1847, and 1951, respectively, and on noncolonized Ethiopia, with which Russia had had conventional relations, and where it had already established a very active embassy in the 1950s.

The Soviet entry into UNESCO later had a notable effect on the general policy of that body, which was initially conceived as a center for gatherings of educators, men of letters, scholars and artists with a view to basic research. Beginning in 1958, when the number of African PVD asserting their cultural personalities was multiplying on the international scene, the USSR undertook to push the thesis of a "UNESCO for the cultural development of the masses." This theme was enthusiastically endorsed by the new nations as opposed to the so-called "high culture" theme urged by the Western countries, which in fact excluded the cultures of the PVD.

This Soviet support was in reality an insidious example of the analogy existing between the USSR goals of cultural development and the African PVD which the Soviet Union wanted to draw into the cultural accord game, making it possible to organize the spread of a mass culture consistent with the cultural revolution it hoped for in the Africa in the midst of change at the end of the 1950s.

Finally, the other goal achieved by the USSR in the UN, the UNESCO and in particular in Geneva, New York and Paris was the preparation of Western public thinking to accept the need for the political and cultural decolonization which the Soviet Union immediately adopted as one of the priority goals of the policy drafted in the 1950s.

B. Systematic Development

In view of the multiplication of the African PVD on which it had focused between the end of the 1950s and the 1960s, the 1956 CPSU Congress urged systematizing of the foreign policy which was to characterize the second phase of the Soviet advance toward the Western world and the PVD. But these recommendations, which were very vague, did not specifically designate the institutions which should draft an international cultural policy worthy of the name, on which the congress insisted. The African policy of cultural accord was not even clearly specified as one of the aspects of the new international cultural policy, difficult to conceive in view of the profound understanding of African problems it demanded.

However, these difficulties pertaining to an understanding of African cultural problems were to be partially overcome a year later. The establishment of an institution to deal with cultural agreements in 1957 was a historical preliminary marking the beginning of the systematization of the Soviet cultural accord policy, in which connection authority was redistributed in favor of the higher organs, including the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the State Committee of the Council of Ministers for Foreign Relations.¹⁷

a) The Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Because of the importance of Africa in the policy for the development and expansion of Soviet power, the drafting of the cultural accord policy, as a means of establishing links with Africa, fell to the CPSU as the supreme organ in the USSR.

After the winning of independence in Africa, the CPSU organized and pursued contacts with the highest African authorities and those of the socialist countries participating in the achievement of joint cultural goals in Africa. This position of overwhelming importance was confirmed by the fact that every body dealing with Africa was headed by a party member.¹⁸ Similarly, it revealed the need felt by the Soviet authorities to control the process of drafting this important policy pertaining to a continent still implementing the cultural policies inherited from the colonial era. The ups and downs during the trips Mr Podgornyy made to Africa between 1974 and 1977 sharply underlined the leading role played by the CPSU in the conclusion of the cultural agreements, without any need for the slightest infringement on the authority of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the State Committee of the Council of Ministers for Foreign Cultural Relations.

b) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its diplomatic departments were responsible for drafting and implementing the Soviet cultural accord policy in Africa, taking the requirements of the USSR and the African countries more or less linked with the Soviet Union and the competition provided by the Western nations into account.

In Africa, these diplomatic departments were authorized to conclude cultural agreements, pursuant to which they chose the best candidates to go to the USSR for study. In the UN and the UNESCO in particular, they have pursued a policy since 1945 allowing encouragement of the signing of these agreements, without failing to conclude those which seem of less strategic value.¹⁹

Where the signing of agreements is concerned, the sector reserved for this ministry is technical and military cooperation, which also involves cultural aspects.

The State Committee of the Council of Ministers for Foreign Relations (CECMRE)

The creation of this body on 21 May 1957 grew out of the desire of the USSR to establish a systematic policy and an institution specializing in the realm

of cultural agreements, of which there are a greater number than of any other kind of agreement. This state committee is a government body but not a ministry. Its status is such that it is not clearly isolated from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Culture and Higher Education, which are interlinked by the agreements it arranges. The CECMRE is headed by a president.

It has very specific jurisdiction. It negotiates only cultural agreements and sees to their implementation. It is divided into geographic sections, one of them being Africa. The multiplicity of the African regional sections is an outgrowth of the desire to draft, supervise and implement the cultural accord policy more efficiently on a continent facing numerous developmental problems, due in large part to the clash of local cultures and to hierarchic subordinations little understood abroad.

The numerous cultural accords signed with Africa since 1959 reveal the importance of this institution, which appears as one of the aspects of this policy, which was subsequently enriched by Soviet political and juridical recognition of the African PVD.

C. Recognition

After this body was created, the Soviet cultural accord policy took another direction. Believing that these institutions would not suffice to attract the emerging PVD, the USSR decided to recognize the African peoples aspiring to self-determination.

This recognition, to which one cannot immediately assign a political or juridical nature, sometimes predated the independence giving the colonized territories national status.²¹ This policy of recognition began in 1924 with Liberia, and continued in 1943 with Egypt, and then multiplied in the years between the 1950s and the present, as the USSR has recognized the existence of the Namibian peoples and the Bantus of South Africa. Beginning in 1945, such recognition was granted in accordance with the United Nations Charter and Resolutions 742 (VIII) and 1514 (XV). It is now, therefore, of a juridical nature.

This recognition on a mass basis apparently has specific goals. On the one hand it catches the attention of the future African PVD with which the USSR hopes to sign agreements favoring the expansion of Soviet culture and reducing the isolation of the USSR in the world. On the other hand, the haste of the USSR is also explained by the need to forestall the competing Western powers, the United States in particular, which had already put cultural policies into operation during the colonial era.²² Finally, it reminds the African peoples that the time has come to remember Soviet efforts with a view to their liberation, and also that the USSR expects of them a minimum of gratitude, expressed in conventional cultural cooperation, which at the same time renders the informal relations official.

The following table lists the African peoples and countries recognized by the Soviets since 1924.

1. Not recognized--permanently independent	Ethiopia
2. 5 August 1924	Liberia
3. 6 August 1943	Egypt
4. 3 January 1956	Sudan
5. 2 June 1956	Morocco
6. 11 June 1956	Tunisia
7. 6 March 1957	Ghana
8. 3 October 1958	Guinea
9. 31 December 1959	Cameroon ²³
10. 26 April 1960	Togo
11. 29 June 1960	Congo Kinshasa ²⁴
12. 1 July 1960	Somalia
13. 29 July 1960	Madagascar
14. 31 July 1960	Benin
15. 2 August 1960	Niger
16. 4 August 1960	Upper Volta
17. 6 August 1960	Ivory Coast
18. 12 August 1960	Central African Republic
19. 12 August 1960	Chad
20. 14 August 1960	Congo Brazzaville ²⁵
21. 17 August 1960	Gabon
22. 1 October 1960	Nigeria
23. 8 October 1960	Mali
24. 8 October 1960	Senegal
25. 20 November 1960	Mauritania
26. 26 April 1961	Sierra Leone
27. 9 December 1961	Tanganyika
28. 19 March 1962	Algeria
29. 30 June 1962	Burundi
30. 30 June 1962	Rwanda
31. 9 October 1962	Uganda
32. 2 December 1963	Kenya
33. 10 December 1963	Zanzibar
34. 5 July 1964	Malawi
35. 24 October 1964	Zambia
36. 17 February 1965	Gambia
37. 30 September 1966	Botswana
38. 4 October 1966	Lesotho ²⁶
39. 12 March 1968	Mauritius
40. 6 September 1968	Swaziland ²⁷
41. 12 October 1968	Equatorial Guinea
42. 1 October 1973	Guinea-Bissau
43. 25 June 1975	Mozambique
44. 5 July 1975	Cape Verde
45. 14 July 1975	Sao Tome and Principe
46. 2 November 1975	Angola ²⁸
47. 29 June	Seychelles
48. April 1980	Zimbabwe

In the light of the above, a sensible question arises. Did the intelligent and successful use by the USSR of its isolation, to develop its persuasive force abroad and the world war to move closer to the West, the UN and UNESCO

with a view to the decolonization of Africa, and recognition of the existence of these peoples make it possible to sign cultural accords with the African nations? Without a doubt, if the major strategy pursued by the USSR to achieve the implementation phase of this policy of cultural agreements concluded with great difficulty is assessed at its just value.

II. Conclusion of Cultural Accords

The USSR cultural accord policy with regard to Africa and the strategy underlying it have assuredly encountered difficulties, as seen in the time required and the paths pursued by the Soviet Union since the days of Lenin. Among these paths is the conclusion of cultural agreements with the Western nations, which the USSR had to pursue beginning in 1954.

A. Conclusion of Accords With the Western Nations

Without abandoning its battle in the UN and the UNESCO, and strengthened by its early success in its goal of liberation for the African territories, the USSR decided to establish a second front. This undertaking was dictated by the imminent emergence on the world scene of formerly colonized territories. Their emergence obsessed the USSR, and in addition was the focus of world attention. The stubborn reluctance of Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia and Libya, which had stronger links with the West, led the USSR to adopt a strategy comparable to that which led it into the UN.

Profiting therefore from the steps taken by France, which made contact with it in 1954 through performing tours,² the Soviet Union decided to establish agreements first with the Western countries.

On 6 March 1956, France and the USSR drafted a joint declaration. On 9 October 1957, the first regularly renewed cultural protocol was signed with a view to expanded cultural relations. It was to stimulate the desire of the two states which on 30 June 1966 signed a veritable scientific, technical and economic cooperation agreement covering all sectors of education, culture, science and sports.

Without going any farther than France, the other nations were to conclude a series of cultural agreements to which the USSR assigned a certain importance based on the fact that the Western countries were still colonizing Africa in the 1950s. Didn't the acceptance of these agreements by the USSR, which was continuing to pursue its campaign for African decolonization, appear to be a means of humoring the nations controlling these colonies?

Whatever the case, these agreements were purely strategic, because the USSR still believed that the volume of conventional cultural exchange with the PVD would be greater than that seen with the West.³⁰ These agreements pursued two sublime ends. On the one hand, the USSR wanted to prove to the PVD which already existed and those just emerging that they had nothing to fear from it, since the colonial powers, that is to say their mother countries, had signed agreements with it. In other words, it was a question of blocking the hesitation and the hostility of countries which had been psychologically programmed by the colonial powers against the USSR and its culture. It is useful to remember in this connection that the first African leaders to take

seats at the Assembly of the French Union in Paris were very well-informed of what was happening in the USSR by the French government.

On the other hand, and similar to the United Nations Charter, the bilateral agreements with the West were designed to allow a transition from detente to entente between the USSR and the Western nations, which in the 1950s were beginning to lose control over a number of colonial citizens who were going to the Soviet Union to study on the basis of extraconventional arrangements.

In the light of these last remarks, one could well stress that these agreements also launched the USSR on the winding path toward the African PVD. This first phase of concluding accords, which was already marked by the instances of recognition mentioned above, was followed by the phase involving establishment of diplomatic relations with the African countries, the number of which multiplied beginning in the 1950s.

B. Establishing of Diplomatic Relations

Though they may have been particularly effective and necessary to the Soviet strategy, the recognition of and the agreements previously signed with the Western-oriented nations did not lead immediately to the conclusion of Soviet-African cultural agreements. Faced with this frustrating impasse resulting from the inaction on the part of Egypt, Ethiopia and Liberia, which were free prior to the 1950s, the USSR began to attempt to provide the best conditions allowing establishing of diplomatic relations, which still today constitutes another important aspect of its cultural accord policy in Africa.

The launching of diplomatic relations with Africa occurred in the 1940s. Such relations were established first of all in 1943 with Egypt, with the neutrality it had proclaimed in 1942 as a stimulus, and then in 1948 with Ethiopia, whose relations with the Russia of the tsars are well-known. The establishment of a very active Soviet embassy in Addis Ababa in the 1950s did not produce the results for which the USSR hoped in the realm of cultural agreements. The apathy of these two countries doubtless contributed to the urgency with which, since 1958, the USSR has been establishing diplomatic relations, even with African nations which are not progressive.

The situation thus created by the USSR between 1945 and the end of the 1970s, in the UN in particular, underlay the establishment of these diplomatic relations. They represented the preliminary phase to the signing of agreements which would remain at the heart of the political discussions between the USSR and its presumed new partners. The fact that these cultural agreements enjoyed a privileged position in Soviet-African discussions in the early years of African independence is readily explained. The preference of the USSR for these accords was justified by its desire to extend its culture throughout Africa. The African nations which were not experiencing economic and financial crises in that era had as their only main concern advancing the development and training of the cadres, which also depended on the quality of their relations with the USSR.

The following table shows the extent of the long process of establishing diplomatic relations which would favor the signing of Soviet-African cultural agreements.

<u>Diplomatic Relations Established</u>	<u>Independence Achieved</u>	<u>Country</u>
1. 26 August 1943	28 February 1922	Egypt
2. 21 April 1948	not colonized	Ethiopia
3. 4 September 1955	24 December 1951	Libya
4. 2 January 1956	26 July 1847	Liberia
5. 5 January 1956	1 January 1956	Sudan
6. 11 July 1956	20 March 1956	Tunisia
7. 1 October 1958	20 March 1956	Morocco
8. 14 January 1958	6 March 1957	Ghana
9. 4 October 1958	2 October 1958	Guinea
10. 8 August 1960	30 June 1960	Congo Kinshasa
11. 14 October 1960	22 September 1960	Mali
12. 2 September 1960 or November 1960	1 July 1960	Somalia
13. 1 May 1960	27 April 1960	Togo
14. 7 December 1960	13 August 1960	Central African Republic
15. 11 December 1961	9 September 1961	Tanganyika
16. 18 January 1962	27 April 1961	Sierra Leone
17. 23 March 1962	3 July 1962	Algeria
18. 4 June 1962	1 August 1960	Benin
19. 14 July 1962	20 August 1960	Senegal
20. 1 October 1962	1 July 1962	Burundi
21. 2 December 1963	12 September 1963	Kenya
22. 13 October 1963	9 October 1962	Uganda
23. 17 October 1963	1 July 1962	Rwanda
24. 18 January 1964	10 December 1961	Zanzibar
25. 20 February 1964	1 January 1960	Cameroon
26. 16 March 1964	15 August 1960	Congo Brazzaville
27. 12 July 1964	28 November 1960	Mauritania
28. 30 October 1964	24 October 1964	Zambia
29. 24 November 1964	11 August 1960	Chad
30. 17 July 1965	18 February 1964	Gambia
31. 13 February 1967	5 August 1960	Upper Volta
32. 19 July 1967	7 August 1960	Ivory Coast ³¹
33. 17 March 1968	12 March 1968	Mauritius
34. 7 December 1968	12 October 1968	Equatorial Guinea
35. 6 March 1970	30 September	Botswana
36. 17 February 1972	3 August 1960	Niger
37. 29 September 1972	26 June 1960	Madagascar
38. 1 October 1973	24 September 1973	Guinea-Bissau
39. 15 October 1973	7 August 1960	Gabon
40. 25 June 1975	25 June 1976	Mozambique
41. 14 July 1975	5 July 1975	Cape Verde
42. 9 August 1975	12 July 1975	Sao Tome and Principe
43. 2 November 1975	11 November 1975	Angola ³²
44. 30 June 1976	28 June 1976	Seychelles
45. 1980	18 April 1980	Zimbabwe
46. Not established	6 July 1964	Malawi ³³
47. Not established	4 October 1966	Lesotho ³⁴
48. Not established	6 September 1968	Swaziland ³⁵

C. Conclusions of Cultural Accords With African Countries

The establishment of Soviet-African cultural accords have been marked by two phases, first, the arrangement of accords in a kind of euphoric mood, between 1958 and 1963, and then the phase which began in 1964, with the era of rationalization of the African cultural accord policies.

a) Conclusion of Accords in the Euphoric Phase (1958-1963)

Beginning in 1958, the political development of the African countries was to have a remarkable influence on the development of the Soviet policy of cultural accords with Africa. Prior to that date, the persistent reluctance of Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia and Libya, which had established diplomatic relations with the USSR earlier, and the confusion in Ghana, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia due to their recent winning of independence, had not immediately worked to the benefit of the Soviet designs.

The Soviet-Egyptian communiques of 21-29 January 1958 announcing the signing of an economic and technical cooperation agreement were an early sign of the beginning of the process of signing cultural agreements between the USSR and the African countries. Without a doubt they had a "snowball" effect on the African situation, and in particular on that created by France in Guinea as a result of the 1958 referendum.

These communiques led to two types of consequences. On the one hand, they reflected the failure of the American-Egyptian negotiations on a loan agreement which would have made the building of the Aswan Dam possible.³⁶ On the other hand, they brought to the fore the steps taken by Egypt, which appeared to be a first positive point gained by the USSR, when Egypt abandoned its so-called positive neutrality³⁷ and turned to the Soviet Union alone.³⁸ Wasn't this Egyptian move a major precedent for the other African countries with more of an inclination to assume international responsibilities?

In any case, the event marking the historic beginning of the conclusion of cultural agreements was the effective penetration of Guinea by the USSR in 1958.

Overcoming the discouraging indecision on the part of the countries mentioned above, the USSR chose Guinea, which had rejected the cultural agreements proposed by France within the framework of the French community. The unexpected appeal addressed to it by Guinea convinced it of the need to conclude various agreements in order to compensate for the withdrawal of France from the various sectors of education and culture and thus to consolidate its choice of Guinea. The first cultural agreement was therefore signed on 26 November 1959 during the trip President Sekou Toure made to the USSR.

These Egyptian and Guinean precedents had no less impact on the Soviet and African policies in the period between 1958 and 1960. This was a period during which, under the effect of the pan-African movement, Africa saw the emergence of statesmen who developed a charisma extending beyond national frontiers, in their effort to represent greater Africa.

The competition between the presidents of Ghana and Guinea, who regarded themselves as the pioneers of African socialism, was viewed by the USSR as the outcome of the prolific cultural accords making it possible to link Ghana and Guinea. Forced by the Guinean move on 26 November 1959, Ghana, which for its part had preceded Guinea in establishing diplomatic relations on 14 January 1958, signed a cultural and scientific cooperation agreement with the USSR on 25 August 1960.

That was the year which saw the birth of 20 states on a probationary basis,³⁹ since cultural agreements and foreign policy were subtly imposed upon them by the colonial powers. In 1960 and 1961, only the so-called progressive or nonaligned nations--Congo Kinshasa, Ethiopia, Mali and Somalia, which had decided to balance their accord policies, established links with the USSR. They were subsequently timidly followed by Cameroon and Senegal in 1962 and by Algeria, Cameroon again, Niger and Tanzania, which were making an effort to rationalize their policies, in 1963.

b) Conclusion of Accords After Rationalization of Cultural Convention Policies

After 1963, the majority of the African countries began to believe that the precedents established by Guinea and the other nations were designed to conform with the policy of France and England, which had signed accords with the USSR. In their view, the French example in particular could be followed without political risk. In addition, the flow of Africans to the USSR, where they engaged in studies outside the cultural agreements, and the limited resources of the Western countries, which were insufficient to meet Africans' needs, forced these PVD to diversify their conventional cultural relations. This diversification meant the adoption of the principle of rationalization of foreign policies, allowing the African nations to regain a certain autonomy with regard to the Western powers, which they no longer consulted before signing agreements with the USSR, whose increasing importance in the world they recognized.

Congo Brazzaville, after its 3 days of revolution in August of 1963, was the first French-speaking nation to decide to rationalize its cultural accord policy, which had up until then been supervised by France, pursuant to the 15 August 1960 agreement and Article 78 governing the French community. This article in the present French constitution justified the signing of the 15 August 1960 convention, and provided that "the realm of community authority includes foreign policy..., higher education."

Prior to 1964, in the Congo and in the other countries subject to similar provisions, cultural development was one of the major goals of foreign policy completely oriented to the benefit of France and England, which made use of the Commonwealth. The signing of the first Soviet-Congolese cultural accord on 19 March 1964 represented a definite sign for Congo Brazzaville of the conquest of the power to negotiate and conclude these agreements, while for the United States it was a means of penetrating Central Africa, where Congo Kinshasa had suspended the protocols signed by the Lumumba government in 1960-1961. This sign of balance which emerged a little later in the foreign policies of the other recalcitrant countries doubtless symbolized the condemnation of the accord practice imposed by the powerful Western "mother countries."

In that same year, after Congo Brazzaville had given impetus to this Soviet cultural accord policy, the USSR turned to Burundi, Kenya and Chad (1964), the Central African Republic, Uganda and Sierra Leone (1965), Zambia (1966), Upper Volta (1967), Togo (1975) and Sao Tome and Principe (1976), and also toward the nations in the first wave of African independence--Morocco (1966) and Sudan, whose hesitation was transitory (1967).

During this second phase in the conclusion of accords with the PVD, the Soviets achieved partial success. The nations overseen by South Africa--Botswana and Malawi; the South African Bantustan nations--Lesotho and Swaziland; and the French-speaking nations--Ivory Coast, Gabon refused to sign such accords, which they were however willing to sign with the allies of the USSR. This situation remained unchanged until 1983, and explains, at least in part, the continuation by the USSR of its extraconventional cultural relations policy, in order to attract the citizens of such difficult countries as the South Africa "of the Boers."

It was thanks to the secession of Biafra in 1965 that the USSR immediately responded to the appeal from the giant Nigeria (still a member of the Commonwealth), on which it had had its eye since 1960, because of its strategic importance in Africa. The first Soviet-Nigerian cultural accord, preceded by protocols on aid and military cadre training, was signed in August of 1967.

In the 1970s, the USSR completed the process of signing cultural agreements with Libya (1975), after Colonel Qadhafi came to power, and with Togo (1975), which had gradually become more realistic in its foreign relations. The same process ensued with the Portuguese-speaking nations--Guinea-Bissau (1975), Mozambique (1975 and 1976), and Angola, Cape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe, which were not reluctant to sign these agreements because of the aid granted to them during their campaigns for national liberation. Except for the personal incompatibility between Mr Brezhnev and Mr Mugabe, the prime minister of Zimbabwe, concerning the Soviet aid granted only to Mr Nkomo's movement, Zimbabwe was the country which was to sign such agreements under conditions reminiscent of those pertaining to the Portuguese-speaking nations.

Despite the above-mentioned difficulties, due in some cases to the competition from the Western countries, which persuaded Egypt (1976) and Somalia (1977) to abrogate, with considerable publicity, treaties also pertaining to cultural matters, the USSR persevered along this path of international legality.

In its statement to the UN on 30 September 1976, the Soviet government insisted on its role in guaranteeing the peoples in the PVD the right to choose their path of development, freedom and independence freely, in the already completed training of 500,000 specialists and skilled workers, and in the ongoing training of numerous PVD cadres.⁴⁰

After emphasizing the difficulties hindering the exchanges between the USSR and the PVD, this statement also stressed the Soviet orientation toward expanded cooperation based on the principles of equality and respect for the specific characteristics and particular needs of these nations. In order to respond to these requirements, the statement stressed that the USSR was prepared to:

"Develop cooperation with them...and strengthen economic, scientific and technical exchange...; to increase the number of cooperation agreements...; to increase the volume of technical aid, with the effort being oriented toward the development...of scientific research and education."

The above observations clearly indicate the determination of the USSR to develop scientific and cultural cooperation through the multiplication of agreements. But they implicitly show that the numerous agreements already established represented an initial goal. The second goal to be achieved at all costs was the signing of treaties of friendship and cooperation with military implications of a limited cultural nature. Accomplishing this objective would depend on the confidence or mutual understanding forming the main basis for the adoption of Soviet political and ideological principles by the African countries which would sign the agreements through which the USSR hoped to achieve its immediate goals.

c) The Immediate Goals

After 1958, when the agreements had been signed, the USSR worked to achieve its immediate goals, which did not automatically fit in with the ordinary dictates of international cooperation.

The first step the USSR took involved rapprochement with the African nations. Because of the large number of these PVD, it organized official visits to its own territory, in order to reduce the expense of sending missions to Africa and to show off the achievements of the legendary "cultural revolution," a subject arousing the curiosity of the Africans.

The presence of high-ranking African authorities in the USSR worked toward the achievement of three goals. First of all, it demonstrated the effectiveness of the Soviet-African rapprochement and proved that Soviet isolation could only be the deliberate choice of the USSR with a view to protecting the gains of the revolution, or the product of the Western political imagination. In addition, it made it possible to make an assessment of the desire of the African countries to sign agreements, and to diminish the famous myth of the "impossible cooperation" between the USSR and the PVD. Finally, it demonstrated that in the realm of cooperation, the USSR was equal to the Western powers, which it charged with wanting to monopolize these PVD in order to impose unjust agreements upon them.

The fourth goal often achieved by the USSR involved the delivery of speeches during which, when a cultural accord was on the horizon, it stated the anti-Western Soviet political positions it would like to share fully with the progressive countries, and to a moderate extent with the moderate nations linked with the West. This moderation has its basis in the desire to prevent any break, even temporary, with the moderate countries, which with greater or lesser enthusiasm, the USSR wants to count among its partners in cultural accords.

The speeches and the talks behind closed doors represent a basic element in Soviet-African meetings, revealing the high level of the awareness of the

Soviet and African authorities of the real problems affecting the world, the PVD and the USSR. They have to do with colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism and racism as forms of cultural domination and exploitation which are forcefully condemned.⁴¹

With or without reference to the triumph of Lenin's ideas, the various popular struggles in the African countries are represented as irreversible situations directed against "world capitalism." Respect for all nations and the development of world cooperation, ill-directed by the capitalist countries, are also urged. Social, economic, political and cultural development is set forth as a means of achieving the peace and the equality to which the USSR and its partners should contribute. The intention or the desire to sign often specific accords is also bluntly stressed. Thus the speeches and the talks can be seen as the phase of clarification of ideas, development of the convergence of political positions and the statement of the decision to conclude the various conventions, generally called declarations of principles for friendly relations and cooperation, treaties of friendship and cooperation, cultural and scientific cooperation agreements, economic and technical cooperation agreements or cooperation accords among the parties.

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[Text] d) Declarations on the Principles of Friendly Relations and Cooperation (DPRAC)⁴²

The DPRAC precede and govern the conclusion of accords or treaties of special importance, such as treaties of friendship and cooperation. For this reason, they represent special international documents which may have cultural implications, among others, the importance of which should not be underestimated.

Established in a series of numbered items, which differentiates them from joint statements, accords and treaties, their juridical nature is beyond challenge. On this last point, they differ from joint declarations, which are high-level policy documents outlining a summary of the steps taken toward the signing of Soviet-African agreements. Their compulsory force is confirmed by the final provisions calling for strict adherence to them.

Despite their juridical value, the DPRAC contain only the simple signatures of the partners involved. They go into effect immediately and do not have an established duration in time. Is this extended validity linked with a certain logic in the Soviet policy of cultural accords and the strategy underlying them? Without a doubt, if it is realized that the USSR is not unaware that it is dealing with nations which still maintain traditional relations with the Western countries. Through the DPRAC, it believes it can block the suspension and expiration without possibility of renewal of the Soviet-African accords and treaties with clearly specified terms of validity.

The fact that the DPRAC provide for regular consultations is explained by the desire to modify the rule of indefinite validity and to find, if such prove necessary, the terms in time and means of correcting the conditions under which these declarations, treaties and accords were established, if they are

subsequently threatened by difficult relations. The name of these documents clearly explains their role, moreover, in the maintenance of good relations on which the whole complex of the conventional relations of the USSR with its African partners depends. This role cannot be explained otherwise, if it is realized that the DPRAC could be replaced by treaties of friendship and cooperation. The Soviet choice, which is limited to the progressive nations--Angola, Congo Brazzaville, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Sao Tome and Principe--which have signed⁴³ or might accept DPRAC, since they have directly concluded treaties of friendship and cooperation, definitively underlines the role they play in the protection of the special relations maintained by the USSR with these countries on converging political and ideological bases.⁴⁴

These declarations tend faithfully to reproduce considerations set forth in the speeches and joint statements, although they particularly stress the support of progressive forces, the safeguarding of the gains in the social advance and the strengthening of friendship and cooperation in the various sectors, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, which is regularly mentioned. The scope of the cultural exchange urged involves basically scientific research, art, literature, education, health, the press and television, tourism and athletics.

These realms of activity are set forth in the declarations as channels of mutual understanding between the peoples of the two countries. The emphasis on general cultural questions makes it possible to conceal the points oriented toward military objectives, which are broadly paralleled by provisions in the treaties of friendship and cooperation which act as documents confirming the DPRAC.

e) Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation (TAC)⁴⁵

Like the DPRAC, the TAC are general agreements routinely concluded with the African nations which support political and ideological viewpoints close to those of the USSR.

According to the procedure followed and proposed by the USSR, and unless they are concluded directly, the treaties are documents which are subsequent to the DPRAC, and sometimes clearly announce the conclusion thereof.

The treaties reiterate the provisions of the DPRAC, the importance of which they confirm. But if the classic logic of the categories of international agreements is applied, the DPRAC appear to be a superfluous element which could be replaced by the TAC, which play a useful role on two levels in connection with Soviet-African relations.

On the one hand, the TAC resolve the problem of linking the African nations juridically. On the other hand, they serve to resolve the psychological problems provoked both by the TAC and DPRAC and by all the other problem accords in connection with which the USSR wants to be sure that the African cosignatories with economic, political and cultural links to the Western pole are persuaded of the sound basis for the measures undertaken with the Soviet Union. The treaties stress this psychological aspect in rather veiled terms,

moreover, saying that "the interpretation of any item in this treaty will be resolved on both sides in a spirit of friendship, mutual respect and understanding."⁴⁶

The Soviet-African TAC differ from the DPRAC in the structure of their texts, which are dominated by articles and by subjection to the traditional rules of ratification, implementation, confirmation and registry with the United Nations, the norms of which are invoked, as well as abrogation and validity in time. The treaties are effective for 20 years and are renewed every 5 years, unless notice of termination is given a year prior to the expiration of the current 5-year period.

If it is realized that the term of validity for cultural and technical accords ranges between 1 and 5 years, that of the TAC seems long enough for the African countries which are not bound by DPRAC, the term of which is indefinite. Doesn't this long effective period of the TAC reflect the desire of the USSR to commit the so-called friendly nations as much as possible, as well as the importance the Soviet state assigns to these treaties?

The importance assigned to these particular treaties by the USSR explains the limited number of African co-signatories: Egypt (1971), Somalia (1974), Angola (1976), Mozambique (1977), Ethiopia (1978) and Congo (1981). In view of the current limitations on the strategy in the Mediterranean and Africa, Libya does not exclude the possibility of signing such a treaty.⁴⁷

Since 1971, the increasing number of these treaties has provided an effective tool for spreading the Soviet influence in the Third World, and has become a subject of concern in the West. The right of inspection they implicitly allow the USSR through the inclusion of the "mutual assistance clause" would probably be the basis, in part, of the "Brezhnev Doctrine" with regard to the African countries.⁴⁸

These treaties have a very great political weight, without a doubt. The signing of them confirms situations gradually but solidly established, and not strategic points in an automatic transition.

The difficulties encountered by the USSR because of the abrogation of these treaties in Egypt on 15 May 1976 and in Somalia on 13 November 1977 and the reservations of the Congo concerning the provisions with military implications (the presence of bases and Soviet officers for the coordination of troops and military training of Africans) and the reticence of nations already linked with the USSR by DPRAC or having political views close to those of that nation confirm the importance of these treaties which, a priori, provoke profound thought and a certain fear on the part of the African nations. The fear has to do with the possible future establishment of Soviet military bases which could threaten the security of their political regimes and the nonalignment they assert in a bipolar world which, as Brezhnev said at the 25th CPSU Congress in 1976, does not tolerate neutrality, even if positive.

Whatever the circumstances leading to the change in these treaties, the historic experience with regard to Egypt and Somalia shows that in our day, the

importance of the TAC, involving above all the more or less important African nations, should not be underestimated. These treaties, general in nature, organize global relations, including those in the educational, cultural and scientific research sectors covered by agreements the existence or future certainty of which they confirm.

f) Cultural and Scientific Cooperation Accords

At first glance, these agreements seem to be those most sought by the USSR and the African nations. The reasons for this interest are simple.

For the USSR, it is a matter of extending its culture to the African PVD. This is the basic goal to be achieved, even by the most insidious means. The African countries, for their part, have serious cultural development problems which they believe they can resolve with the aid, even if only partial, of the USSR. In other words, the steps taken by these PVD are not dictated solely by the constraints of international cooperation, but also by their domestic economic and financial difficulties, and by the limits on the cultural aid from the Western countries. Because of these difficulties, they cannot keep the numerous citizens for whom there is neither room in the schools and universities nor the scholarships that they need from the nation, at home.

The conclusion of these accords is also motivated by the departure of these citizens, after encountering this lack of any help from their countries. Their presence in the Soviet Union outside conventional arrangements forces the African nations to conclude accords in order to make cultural relations official and thus to be free, for a relatively long period, of a considerable number of potential challengers.

The USSR is aware of all of these reasons, often reported in the media.⁴⁹ But its avowed adherence to the rules of international cooperation is the reason for the massive negotiation of such agreements with the African countries which, even if anticommunist, unconsciously contribute to the expansion of Soviet culture.

Depending on the type of African partner, the preambles to the cultural agreements signed include one or more of the TAC or DPRAC provisions calling for social, cultural and other development as a means of combatting the harmful actions of the capitalist powers. These accords focus particularly on Soviet-African exchange for the training of African cadres, and because of this, impose special obligations on the co-signatories.

For example, the costs are borne by the PVD, which must provide the USSR with a counterpart in raw materials equal in value to the cost of maintaining the students and trainees, for one thing. For another, there is a system of total USSR coverage of the costs of scholarship stays in the Soviet Union. In this case it may be a question of "humanitarian aid" in the Soviet sense. Finally, there is a system similar to that for cooperation: the USSR assigns a given number of cooperative workers who are paid by the PVD, which in turn must dispatch a given number of students whose costs are covered by the

Soviet state. In this latter case, it would also be difficult to think in terms of Soviet humanitarian aid to the country involved.

The cultural exchange sectors organized under these agreements vary widely. Those currently being mentioned are higher and classic secondary education. Secondary education was the particular focus of these agreements during the 1950s and 1960s, because of the low number of secondary school graduates. The agreements of the 1970s and 1980s were oriented toward the training of Africans who had earned at least high school-level diplomas.

The other sectors mainly covered by the special cultural accords are the press, radio and television broadcasting, trade unionism, athletics and art, not to overlook the establishment of schools and institutes for the party (Congo), agriculture (Cameroon, Uganda) and industry (Ethiopia, Nigeria).⁵⁰ The establishment of these schools is often financed on the basis of economic and technical cooperation accords providing for the training of Africans to see to the functioning of these public institutions in the USSR or in the country itself, by Soviet cooperative workers. Thus for the media, trade union and art sectors, the individuals involved are trainees who already have some experience in these sectors covered by the Soviet-African accords since the 1970s.

These accords are in effect for 2-5 years and can be renewed without difficulty if the spirit inspiring the DPRAC, TAC and cooperation accords between the political parties in Africa and the USSR has remained intact.

g) Cooperation Accords Between Political Parties

Like the DPRAC and TAC, the cooperation accords between the CPSU and the fraternal parties in Africa represent a recent category of international documents linking the USSR with the African PVD. They are in fact the product of solid relations of friendship and perfect mutual understanding strengthened by accords, DPRAC and TAC concluded previously.

The existence of this type of agreement clearly points to the preponderant role played by the political parties in the USSR and in the African countries in controlling the policy for the cultural accords they can conclude, taking the place of the competent bodies--the CECMRE and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, etc.

Although the number of these accords is very limited because of the confidence between the parties and particularly between their authorities which they demand, the CPSU works intensively to conclude such accords, the existence of which is set forth in the joint declarations. The trips made by Mr Podgorny to Africa in 1974 and 1976 were memorable occasions during which Somalia (1974), Tanzania and Zambia (1976) accepted the principle of cooperation between the brotherly parties with a view to achieving the goals set forth in the accords as such, as well as that involving the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the CPSU.⁵² In passing, it should be stressed that the limited number of these agreements is in the main explained by the existence of treaties and declarations more securely binding the African nations with which the USSR wants to establish a system of cooperation and specific, solid and enduring agreement.

Unlike the TAC and DPRAC, which impose heavy political and juridical obligations, including the alignment of the African countries on which the USSR relies, these accords between parties may lead to success for the chiefs of state involved, in particular an increase in the popularity of their single parties which have been trying for long years to remain in power.

Suspicious that it might be the victim of this demagogy, particularly following the difficulties (with Egypt) in the Soviet state-to-state policy in the 1970s, the CPSU began to move toward the establishment of cooperation agreements with the African parties with confirmed political and ideological options. But because of the TAC and DPRAC, which also have their role to play in terms of the final goals to be achieved, these accords serve to bind the African nations in subtle fashion through the political parties which are the highest organs therein.

The preambles to these very short accords set forth the goals sought in verbose fashion. They begin with a mention of the relations which existed at the time of the struggle against the "colonizers, interventionists and imperialists." They then stress the adherence of the two partners to their identical views on international issues, scientific socialism,⁵³ peace, national liberation, democracy, the principles of internationalism and fraternal equality, thanks to which the two parties announced their intention to "cooperate with a view to the training of party cadres, the pursuit of joint research on social development and the strengthening of contacts among the organs of the press and other mass communications agencies, etc...."⁵⁴

The above-mentioned requirements clearly confirm the orientation of these accords toward the basically cultural goals with which the DPRAC and the TAC deal in only limited fashion. Doesn't this insistence on the cultural issues, contained even in the preambles to these accords, reveal the determination of the Soviet Union and its African partners to develop a culture of political communication between the parties and of struggle against said imperialists, as well? In any case, the doubts one might have as to intentions or said determination fade in the light of the fact that the insistence on these cultural issues in the accords has had none of the results on which the parties involved were counting other than the birth of a political communication culture.

However, these accords do not provide for any term of validity or effective date, and are without a doubt in effect immediately after their signing. This omission of the substantive formalities of international conventions seems to indicate a desire to forge enduring cultural relations with countries which are not yet easy to bring into line. The multiplicity of types of agreements often designed to achieve the same cultural goals validly confirms this Soviet intention, inherent in these interparty agreements.

The following table makes it possible to assess the effort put forth by the USSR to arrive at the cultural agreements, invoked in part by the Soviet concept of international law.

Cultural and Scientific Cooperation Accords (ACCS)
Economic and Technical Cooperation Accords (ACET) and Various Others

(1) Pays et date d'indépendance	A.C.C.S. Date	A.C.E.T. Date	Divers (2)	(1) Pays et date d'indépendance	A.C.C.S. Date	A.C.E.T. Date	Divers (2)
(3) 1 - Algérie 01-07-1962	10-12-1963 04-12-1973	24-10-1969 ACEST (55)	03-06-1964 (56) 07-03-1969 (57) 20-10-1969 (58) 15-12-1970 (59) 31-07-1973 (60)	22 - Liberia 26-07-1847	19-05-1976		
2 - Angola 11-11-1975	26-05-1976 ACESTC (61)	26-05-1976 ACESTC (62) Avril 1977 AP (63) (4)	26-05-1976 DPRAC 08-10-1976 TAC AC-PCUS-MPLA (64) (5)	(28) 23 - Libye 24-12-1951	14-05-1975	04-03-1972 14-05-1975	
3 - Bénin 01-08-1960	20-03-1963 (6) Novembre 1974	1974	02-10-1967 ACRD (65)	24 - Madagascar 26-06-1960	31-01-1977	31-12-1974 (6)	Avril 1977 ACRD (86) Novembre 1978 ACCMTFMAQ (87) (4)
4 - Botswana 30-09-1966	Mai 1974 Visite ministérielle en URSS	(7)		25 - Malawi 06-07-1964	(88)		
5 - Burundi 01-07-1962	02-10-1964	(8)	Février 1967 AEI (66)	26 - Mali 22-09-1960	18-03-1961 Juin 1970 (19) AEDDP (89)	18-03-1961 10-10-1962 (24) Mai 1970 AAT (90)	05-01-1963 AC-CEA, ESA, EM (91) 20-02-1967 ACS (92) 15-03-1967 ACRD (93)
6 - Cameroun 01-01-1960 (9)	Septembre 1962 22-03-1963 (10)	12-04-1963	15-04-1966 ACENAEF (67) AEI (68)	27 - Maroc (29) 02-03-1956	27-10-1966 19-07-1974	27-10-1966	27-10-1966 ACRDT (94)
(11) 7 - Centrafrique 13-08-1960	15-03-1965 28-12-1974 Avril 1979 (4)	1970 (12) 1973 AEAP (69)	Octobre 1978 ACAP (70) ACDET (71)	28 - Mauritanie (30) 28-11-1960	29-12-1967		25-02-1966 ACI (95) 15-07-1968 ACRD (96)
8 - Congo Brazzaville 15-08-1960	19-03-1964 Août 1971 (13) 29-06-1975 Avril 1980 (4)	14-12-1964 27-03-1975	Avril 1981 (4) TAC	29 - Mozambique (31) 25-06-1975 19-05-1976 Septembre 1977 Mars 1979 ARRPEC (97)	25-06-1975 19-05-1976 Septembre 1977 Mars 1979 ARRPEC (97)	19-02-1976 Septembre 1977 (10) ARRPEC (98)	31-03-1977 TAC
9 - Congo Kinshasa 30-06-1960	1960 PC (72) 10-12-1976 APCESTC (73)		18-06-1976 AEI (74)	30 - Niger 03-08-1960	18-03-1963	02-09-1975	
(14) 10 - Côte d'Ivoire 07-08-1960	(75)			31 - Nigeria 01-10-1960	Août 1967 (13)	1968	Avril 1963 (4) AEE (99) Février 1977 (8) ARCFTB (100) Novembre 1978 (6) ACDAMN (101) Avril 1979 (4) AACCIT (102)
(15) 11 - Ethiopie Non colonisée Avril 1977 (13)	13-01-1961 06-05-1977 Avril 1977 (13)	1959 06-05-1977	08-09-1967 ACRDT (76) 06-05-1977 DPRAC Juillet 1977 (16) ACRD (77)	32 - Ouganda (32) 09-10-1962	Juillet 1965 02-07-1967	1964 ACCEA (103)	
12 - Gambie (17) 18-02-1965	05-03-1973			33 - Rwanda 01-07-1962	06-05-1966 (104)	23-06-1973	23-06-1973 ACETEFHMP (105)
13 - Ghana 06-03-1957	25-08-1960 10-06-1970 22-04-1975		Juillet 1963 (16) AE-URSS-Ghana (78) (18) Juin 1978 ACTMN (79) (19)	34 - São Tomé et Príncipe (33) 05-10-1976	05-10-1976	05-10-1976 DPRAC 05-10-1976 ACEI (106)	
14 - Guinée (20) 02-10-1958 (10)	26-11-1959 Septembre 1967 19-04-1975	26-11-1959 20-09-1967		35 - Sénégal 20-08-1960	Juin 1962 22-06-1975 1976	14-06-1962	
15 - Guinée-Bissau (21) 24-09-1973	21-02-1975	21-02-1975		36 - Seychelles 28-06-1976			
(22) 16 - Guinée Equatoriale 12-10-1968		17-12-1971		37 - Sierra Leone 27-04-1961	07-09-1965		27-06-1970 APC (107) 03-09-1971 ARDT (108)
(23) 17 - Haute-Volta 05-08-1960	13-02-1967	25-11-1975	Mai 1978 (24) APFCS (80)	38 - Somalie (34) 01-07-1960	02-06-1961 (13)	02-06-1961 Août 1963 AAT (109) 18-06-1975 1976	27-03-1962 ACHMESI (110) 05-02-1970 ACRD (111) 11-07-1974 TAC (112)
18 - Ile du Cap Vert (25) 05-07-1975	16-06-1976			39 - Soudan (35) 01-01-1956	03-10-1967	02-11-1961 21-11-1969	15-06-1968 ACRD (113)
(26) 19 - Ile Maurice 2-03-1968	28-03-1968 16-09-1969	1970 AAT (81)		40 - Tanzanie (36) 27-04-1964 (114) Tanganyika 09-12-1961 Zanzibar 10-12-1961	06-11-1963 08-04-1975 22-26-03-1977	26-05-1966 10-03-1970	28-01-1964 ACI (115) ACEI (116)
20 - Kenya 12-09-1963	02-05-1964 Juillet 1972 (16)	20-11-1964	Février 1964 (8) AEI (82) 20-11-1964 ACHMCETP (83) Mai 1968 Décembre 1972 AAM (84)	21 - Lesotho 04-10-1966	(85)		

(37)				(38)			
41 - Tchad 11-08-1960	11-06-1966	17-12-1968 (19)		43 - Tunisie 20-03-1956	12-12-1963	30-08-1961	06-03-1967 ARDT (121)
42 Togo 27-04-1960	24-07-1975 Juin 1978 (19) AGCETSC (117)	Juin 1978 AGCETSC (118)	13-10-1975 AERD (119) Juin 1978 (19) PAFC (120)	(39) 44 - Zambie 24-10-1964	25-08-1966	26-05-1967	Novembre 1974 AEI (122)
				(40) 45 - Zwaaland 06-09-1968	(123)		
46 - Zimbabwe 18-04-1980 en cours (41)							

Key:

- | | |
|-------------------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1. Country and date of independence | 22. Equatorial Guinea |
| 2. Various others | 23. Upper Volta |
| 3. Algeria | 24. May |
| 4. April | 25. Cape Verde |
| 5. CPSU | 26. Mauritius |
| 6. November | 27. December |
| 7. Ministerial visit to USSR | 28. Libya |
| 8. February | 29. Morocco |
| 9. Cameroon | 30. Mauritania |
| 10. September | 31. March |
| 11. Central African Republic | 32. Uganda |
| 12. October | 33. Sao Tome and Principe |
| 13. August | 34. Somalia |
| 14. Ivory Coast | 35. Sudan |
| 15. Ethiopia--not colonized | 36. Tanzania |
| 16. July | 37. Chad |
| 17. Gambia | 38. Tunisia |
| 18. USSR | 39. Zambia |
| 19. June | 40. Swaziland |
| 20. Guinea | 41. In progress |
| 21. Guinea-Bissau | |

III. Political Implications of the Soviet-African Agreements on the International Level

The political implications of the Soviet-African cultural agreements on the international level come down to two basic issues: the integration of these conventions in international law, and the limits imposed on them by the USSR.

A. Integration of the Soviet-African Cultural Conventions in International Law

The success of the Soviet policy of cultural accords with African nations is undeniable, but does raise a reasonable question. Can one assume straight-away that these agreements constitute proof of the automatic recognition by the USSR of the international law of which they henceforth become a part? The answer to this question derives from a study of the Soviet concept of

international law set forth by the USSR for political-ideological reasons and dating back to the Lenin era. If one were to apply the principle of the unity of international law as an interstate juridical system literally, this Soviet definition also pertains to the agreements reached, with so much difficulty, with a continent on which the concept of international law differs more or less from that of the USSR.

Dealing with the question of the cultural agreements concluded by the USSR with the Western and African nations leads to a discussion of the Soviet position with regard to international law, which is now largely represented by Soviet-African agreements. In other words, it is a question of establishing the limits of USSR observance of international rules through the agreements concluded with these African PVD.

The Soviet position with regard to international law dates back to the 1920s. It was derived from the new concept of law which still prevailed in the organization of the new Soviet society, which wanted to deal with the world on the basis of rules different from those used by the Russia of the tsars. In the 1920s and 1930s, the still-difficult drafting of the policy for cultural agreements with foreign countries was extensively characterized by Homeric discussions of the role of law against the bourgeoisie in the USSR and in the world.¹²⁴ One of the thorny questions facing the authors of the new juridical system was whether the concluding of agreements with the West and the future PVD would mean automatic adherence to the classic international law, which the Soviets regarded as an instrument for the protection of the capitalist interests of the European countries in the West.¹²⁵

The legitimization of the colonies by the Berlin Convention of 26 February 1885 was a probatory element justifying the Soviet thesis. The demand for self-determination for the colonized peoples voiced by Lenin and his successors appeared in the main to be a condemnation of the Berlin Convention and the international law which, according to the USSR, created the colonial system and perpetuated it in other forms.

The rejection of international law by the USSR beginning in the 1920s was thus fully justified by the neglect shown for the right of the African peoples to decide on their fate, in two ways: on the one hand, refusal to grant the independence won by tremendous sacrifices, and on the other, the controlled exercise of the prerogatives of the state, which prevented access by these African peoples to free self-determination.

However, the conflict between the USSR and international law was to be subtly resolved in the 1940s. The solution the USSR found involved reducing the influence of the new concept of Soviet law on its foreign policy. But basically, there was no strict division between the dictates of foreign policy and the domestic law designed to govern the new society which would serve as a model for the future African PVD.

Thus the signing of agreements--UN, UNESCO and bilateral agreements with the Western nations, did not mean automatic observance of international law. It remained the law of the capitalist countries which had to be accepted in order to turn it against them.¹²⁶ Its acceptance by the USSR as a strategic

tool against its allies in World War II was nothing but a form of "historic compromise" dictated by special circumstances, in order to make its cultural revolution known and to break out of its relative isolation, even utilizing the aid of the future African PVD. The signing of cultural agreements, with the PVD in particular, proved necessary, because it made it possible to strengthen the USSR camp with new nations which, as can be seen today, would challenge unjust conventions (international law) which continued to hinder their cultural development.¹²⁷

Thus since the 1940s, the ambiguous but hostile position of the USSR toward international law has explained its rigid manner of conceiving of it as the law of the capitalist countries, and has revealed its desire to set limits on respect for the cultural agreements signed with the African nations.

B. Limits Established by the USSR on Respect for Soviet-African Cultural Conventions

The concealed Soviet hostility toward the international law of the colonizers indirectly affects Soviet-African cultural agreements, which the USSR does not intend to violate, even though from time to time it is the victim of their violation by the African nations. The limits it tries to impose have to do basically with respect for the logic which regards the merger of these conventions into the block of rules conceived by the West as inevitable. It is a question of developing a more credible reputation for the Soviet-African agreements, in order to distinguish them from those which, linked with colonial, neocolonial or imperialist requirements, do not conform to international morality.

Thus the USSR feels the need in its approaches to the African countries for a political and ideological orientation in the accords and selection and political education of the African cosignatories, who must remove themselves from the type of morality insidiously created by the international law which serves the colonizing and capitalist powers. Doesn't this complex maneuver undertaken by the USSR require, depending on time and circumstances, a moderate position toward these suspect accords and their Western and African signatories who might oppose the Soviet Union? Without a doubt.

After World War II, the more moderate USSR position in opposition to the conventions governing the future of Africa was dictated by the desire to conclude strategic agreements with the colonizing European nations. Beginning in 1960, the USSR moved gradually away from that moderation, in order to win the African nations it wanted to educate away from the agreements unjust to them, which should be differentiated from those proposed by the Soviet Union, characterized by respect for specific African cultural aspects and the principle of equality of the peoples ignored by the colonial powers.

However, the clear condemnation of these colonial agreements and the cultural conventions offered by the Soviets to Africa were accompanied by the more specific statement of the international responsibility the USSR was willing to assume in connection with the cultural development of its partners. This Soviet responsibility was not supposed either to equal nor to exceed that of the colonizing countries which, according to the USSR, were responsible for

the backwardness which characterized Africa.¹²⁸ Nor should it be the result of the Soviet-African cultural agreements, which had their reason for being in the Charter and Resolutions of the United Nations and in the other principles of proper conduct, friendship and respect among peoples. These were principles which had never motivated the colonizing states nor the international rules they created, and the USSR continued to condemn them.

Thus in Soviet thinking, the Soviet-African agreements should not have as their goal the correction of the damage for which that nation was not responsible. These accords were instead to contribute to correcting the international morality obviously violated by the colonizing nations, which the USSR wanted to punish, refusing to share a responsibility which had its source in morally illicit acts and which was justified by the contribution of "civilization." This last comment explains why the USSR insists that the Soviet-African accords be distinguished from the Afro-Western agreements which it regards as having a bad reputation, because the African nations are challenging them.¹²⁹

Pushing this responsibility which these nations try to share with it back upon them, the USSR demands that they make reparations for the damage caused by colonization,¹³⁰ so that the Africans can overcome the underdevelopment which is to a great extent of a cultural nature. Doesn't this clearly negative position mean that the USSR is imposing limits on the cooperation and aid obligations it has also created by its endorsement of the UN Charter and Resolutions since the 1940s? The response is clearly seen in the official statements reiterated and often reported in the Soviet media: "The USSR is not responsible for the backwardness of the African countries."

These statements, which are tolerated by the African nations which are friends of the USSR, nonetheless have an effect on the agreements signed with the other African countries, which tend to assign to them the traditional goals pursuant to the principle of international responsibility rejected by the USSR. In its stead, the Soviet Union adheres to the principle of "solidarity" with the African countries. This principle, which is closely linked with the progressive political culture, is regularly incorporated in the Soviet-African agreements, which are in suitable conformity with the UN Charter and Resolutions, that is to say positive international law¹³¹ and the obligations it imposes, which the USSR respects because it helped to draft them.

From these so-called positive obligations, the USSR thus removes the principles of hypothetical international responsibility which it associates with the law of colonization. It makes its own the rules of cooperation and assistance which allow it to conclude cultural agreements by virtue of which it can establish its own norms for aid to the African countries.

The substantial aid for cultural development in particular provided to the African states and peoples thus has its reason for being in the norms which the Soviet state has forged for itself on the basis of its political and ideological principles, which it adapts as best it can to the international convention law. These norms, it is claimed, are related to moral obligations or generosity, giving the cultural aid for which the Soviet-African conventions call a humanitarian aspect.

The preceding observations raise an incisive question. Is the USSR determined to convert the international law it consciously rejects in part to its favor, in order to carry out more effective political, social and cultural colonization in Africa, utilizing its accords with that continent?

These cultural conventions constitute a part of international law which is in full development. They reflect the Soviet intentions as to the alteration of global strategy and African strategy in particular. The agreements reached with the Western nations reveal a form of Soviet tolerance toward the law of cooperation in order to force the understanding and the peace the USSR needs in order to turn its attention toward the African countries in tranquility. The accords signed by the African nations reveal the will to impose a direction on international law. The singular juridical language included in these documents clearly shows this desire to direct it toward goals favorable to the USSR and the friendly African countries.¹³² Among these goals is the struggle against all forms of colonization condemned by the USSR and its partners through these agreements. This condemnation is addressed directly to the Western countries, which, the USSR charges, constantly use cultural agreements with a view to perpetuating their domination over Africa.

Through the agency of the cultural agreements on which it attempts to impose a particular personality, the USSR demands of its African partners a political and ideological alignment, and challenges the above-mentioned East-West understanding. These agreements, which are an irreversible aspect of the Soviet and African international cultural policies, represent one of the official means of bringing about peaceful destabilization in Africa and, without a doubt, in the West, the influence of which over Africa continues.

Conclusion

The Soviet cultural accord policy with regard to Africa and the strategy underlying it are perfectly consistent with the goals sought by Lenin. The Soviet concern which this policy has for long years reflected is to create first of all a political situation in Africa which would favor the process of concluding cultural agreements in order to broaden the area for the expression of the Soviet culture.

The refusal thus far to conform to the statutes of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which the USSR accuses of pursuing policies of colonization and economic exploitation in Africa, clearly explains the situational choice of the UN and the UNESCO the goals of which corresponded to those of the USSR at a certain point in time.

The special effort put forth by the USSR to direct the policies of these bodies toward the goals of political and cultural decolonization in Africa and the worldwide spread of cooperation explain to a considerable extent the Soviet success in concluding cultural agreements enabling it to establish the strongest possible links with the capricious African nations.

The multiplication of the types of agreements, which is constantly increasing, is designed to reduce the risk of failure which lies in the use of the

classic type of agreement, which cannot meet the whole complex of the demands of the African and Soviet policies. Among these requirements is the inculturation in the African nations of the Soviet concept of law, making it possible to challenge and transform the law of international conventions, which still remains the tool by which the Western nations dominate Africa.

FOOTNOTES

1. Letter dated 22 October 1976 from Emperor Menelik II of Ethiopia to Tsar Nicholas II of Russia.
2. Before and after the Berlin Convention of 1885, the territorial conquests in Africa constituted one of the main foundations for the drafting of the cultural accord policy with Africa. After 1917, the USSR, preoccupied with its domestic revolution, lacked the military resources to intervene in Africa. This Soviet weakness explains the USSR choice of a policy of peaceful liberation for Africa.
3. Between the time of the signing of the Berlin Convention and the Russian Revolution in 1917, Africa had only two independent nations: Ethiopia, which resisted the colonization attempt by Italy with the aid of France and England, and Liberia, which won its independence in 1847 with the return to Africa of the natives who had been taken to America.
4. *ASIE ET AFRIQUE AUJOURD'HUI*, No 3, May-Jun 1980, Moscow, pp 2-5, and No 4, July 1980, Moscow, pp 2-4.
5. H. Bourges and C. Wauthier, "The 50 Africas," Vol 1, Seuil Publications, Paris, 1979, pp 505, 557, 604, 623 and 625.

1842 treaties: France-Guinea, France-Ivory Coast. Nachtigal and Plakoo Treaty, 5 July 1884 (Togo). Treaty between King Ghezo and France, 1851. Treaty between King Glele and France, 1858 (Dahomey). Op. cit., Vol 2, pp 115-116, 143, and 191-192.

Makoko and Braza Treaty, 1880. Treaty between the King of Luango and Cordier, 1883 (Congo). 1885 Berlin Convention. This convention legitimized the colonies and endorsed the artificial state regime called the "Independent State of the Congo" (Congo Leopoldville-Kinshasa).
6. *AFRIQUE*, No 39, September 1980, London, p 48.
7. United Nations Charter, published by the UN, New York.
8. H. Thierry, J. Combacau, S. Sur and C. Vallee, "International Public Law," Montchrestien Publications, Paris, 1975, pp 491-492.
9. Article 73 of the United Nations Charter.
10. Resolution A/742 (VIII) dated 27 November 1953, United Nations, New York.

11. "International Public Law," op. cit., p 494.
12. Resolution A/1514 (XV) dated 14 December 1960, United Nations, New York.
13. Resolution A/1541 (XV) dated 15 December 1960, United Nations, New York.
14. In the 1950s and 1960s, the liberation wars in Algeria and Vietnam and the rebellions in Congo Kinshasa and Kenya discouraged the colonial powers as to any need to grant even formal independence to Africa. The stubbornness of Portugal, England and South Africa in holding on to their colonies explains the liberation wars in Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Namibia.
15. Resolution A/2625 (XXV) dated 1970, United Nations, New York.
16. JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1178, 3 August 1983, Paris, p 29.
17. L. Dollot, "International Cultural Relations," PUF [French University Press], Paris, 1968, p 90.
18. AFRIQUE, No 37, July 1980, London, pp 40-41; LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, March 1957, p 3.
19. Soviet-African cultural accords are regarded as strategic elements which the Soviets are most unwilling to divulge, even if they are obliged to do so as a means of demonstrating cooperation with and aid to Africa.
20. ~~Parochial cultures are traditional and are characteristic of the local ethnic communities. The cultures of subjugation were imposed and were designed to subordinate a people and the culture serving it as a means of defense against the outside world. Colonization and the agreements legitimizing and perpetuating cultural dependence are elements in the culture of subjection experienced by Africa.~~
21. Because of the failure of the USSR to recognize the international law of colonization, instances of Soviet recognition are basically political in nature.
22. In the 1950s, the United States already had embassies in the Belgian, British and French colonies, with authority to grant scholarships to Africans on the basis of agreements signed with the colonial powers.
- 23.-25. Recognized as "peoples struggling" for self-determination. The resistance forces in Cameroon, the demands of Matsoua Andre Grenard for independence in Congo Brazzaville, and the 4 January 1959 political troubles in Kinshasa were points which led to the Soviet decision to recognize these peoples before they acquired independence.
- 26.-27. Recognized as parts of the people of Azania struggling for self-determination against the South African Boers.

28. Recognized as "people struggling" for self-determination against Portugal. This struggle was given clear military support by the USSR in November of 1975.
29. Tour made by the Comedie Francaise in the USSR.
30. L. Dollot, "International Cultural Relations," op. cit., pp 93-94. Contrary to what L. Dollot thinks, the USSR assesses the extent of conventional cultural exchange as a function of the number of students and trainees from the PVD in the USSR, the number of Soviet cooperative workers and the strategic interest of cooperation allowing the expansion of Soviet culture abroad. Now exchanges with the Western countries cover only limited cultural sectors, particularly for trainees.
31. Relations unilaterally interrupted by the Ivory Coast on 30 May 1969.
32. Relations established on the day of USSR recognition of the Angolan people, and prior to the proclamation of independence by the MPLA, whose rise to power on 11 November 1985 was encouraged by the USSR and its allies, the GDR and the Congo.
33. Nation under the protection of South Africa.
- 34.-35. Artificial states: South African Bantustans prohibited by South Africa from having relations with the USSR.
36. H. Bourges and C. Wauthier, "The 50 Africas," op. cit., Vol 1, pp 201-202.
37. ~~Reference to the neutrality declared by Nasser in the 1950s, different from the 1942 neutrality initiated by King Farouk.~~
38. H. Bourges and C. Wauthier, "The 50 Africas," op. cit., Vol 1, pp 199-202.
39. LA REPUBBLICA, 26 April 1980, File 63, Rome.
40. PROBLEMES POLITIQUES ET SOCIAUX, No 300, 24 December 1976, French Documentation, Paris, p 31.
41. See the Joint Soviet-Tanzanian Declaration, 27 March 1977; Joint Soviet-Zambian Declaration, Lusaka, 29 March 1977; Joint Soviet-Mozambican Declaration, Maputo, 31 March 1977. In PRAVDA, 27, 29 and 31 March 1977.

The concepts of colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, racism and exploitation are cultural in nature. They are taught to and inculcated in the African authorities by the Soviets as a means of understanding the social, economic and political situation in Africa and combatting these phenomena, which favor an unequal balance of forces.

42. See the Declarations on the Principles of Friendly Relations and Cooperation: USSR-Angola, Moscow, 26 May 1976; USSR-Sao Tome and Principe, Moscow, 5 October 1976; Moscow-Ethiopia, Moscow, 6 May 1977. In PRAVDA, 1 June and 13 October 1976 and 9 May 1977. PROBLEMES POLITIQUES ET SOCIAUX, No 300, 24 December 1976, op. cit., pp 35 and 40-41, and No 320, 30 September 1977, French Documentation, Paris, pp 30-31.
43. The nations which have signed treaties of friendship and cooperation can do without the declarations on the principles of friendly relations and cooperation, which impose the same obligations as the treaties.
44. The coincidence of political views must be distinguished from the coincidence of those of an ideological nature. The former has to do with the dictates of geostrategy, and may involve noncommunist African nations which temporarily defend interests analogous to those of the USSR. The latter has its basis in ideology, which may lead to full convergence of political views.
45. See the Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation: USSR-United Arab Republic, Cairo, 27 May 1971. USSR-Somalia, Mogadiscio, 11 July 1974. USSR-Angola, Moscow, 8 October 1976. USSR-Mozambique, Maputo, 31 March 1977. USSR-Ethiopia, Moscow, 20 November 1978. USSR-Congo, Moscow, 13 May 1981. In PRAVDA, 28 May 1971, 30 October 1974, 9 October 1976, and 3 April 1977. POLITICA INTERNATIONALE, No 1, January 1983, IPALMO [Institute for Italy's Relations With Africa, Latin America and the Middle East], Rome, 1983. PROBLEMES POLITIQUES ET SOCIAUX, No 78, 25 June 1971, French documentation, Paris, pp 45-46, No 248, 27 December 1974, pp 58-60, and Nos 300 and 320, op. cit., pp 36-37 and 29-30.
46. See Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation, op. cit.
47. JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1178, 3 August 1983, op. cit. CORRIERE DELLA SERA, 26 August 1981, Rome, p 1.
48. The Brezhnev Doctrine called for Soviet military intervention in the friendly countries appealing to the USSR for support of their revolutions.
49. JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1184, 14 September 1983, Paris.
50. LE COURRIER DES PAYS DE L'EST, No 235, December 1979, French Documentation, Paris, pp 18, 20-21 and 29.
51. PRAVDA, 14 October 1976. PROBLEMES POLITIQUES ET SOCIAUX, No 300, op. cit., p 38.
52. PRAVDA, 27, 29 and 31 March 1977, op. cit. PROBLEMES POLITIQUES ET SOCIAUX, No 320, op. cit., pp 25-29. LA REPUBBLICA, 29 December 1983, Rome, p 9.

53. Scientific socialism, the principles of internationalism and fraternal equality, national liberation, democracy, etc., are political concepts which are primarily of a cultural nature. They are a part of the political and communications culture of the Soviet and African authorities.
54. PROBLEMES POLITIQUES ET SOCIAUX, No 300, op. cit., p 37.
55. Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation Accord.
56. USSR-Algerian accord on the organization of the oil and gas institute and the Algiers Technical High School.
57. Accord on the establishment of a permanent Soviet-Algerian commission on economic, scientific and technical cooperation.
58. Cooperation accord in the radio and television broadcasting sector.
59. USSR-Algerian accord on conditions of life and missions of Soviet cooperative workers assigned to Algerian educational establishments.
60. Accord between the Unions of Journalists in the USSR and Algeria.
- 61.-62. Economic, Scientific, Technical and Cultural Cooperation Accord.
63. Accord on Fishing and the Training of Fishing Cadres.
64. Cooperation Accord Between the CPSU and the MPLA.
65. See No 58 above.
66. Ibid.
67. Cooperation Accord on the Construction and Equipping of the National Agricultural School in Dschang and the Forestry School in Mbalmayo.
68. See No 58 above.
69. Economic, Agricultural and Pedagogical Accord.
70. Cooperation Accord Between Press Agencies.
71. Cooperation Accord Between State Television Organs.
72. Cultural Protocol.
73. Accord on the General Principles of Economic, Scientific, Technical and Cultural Cooperation.
74. Accord on the Exchange of Information Between TASS and the Zairian Press Agency (AZAP).

75. Because of the suspension of diplomatic relations with the USSR on 30 May 1969, the Ivory Coast, an anticommunist nation, has not signed agreements with the Soviet state.
76. See No 58 above.
77. Ibid.
78. Accord on the Exchange of Students.
79. Cooperation Accord on Maritime Transportation and Navigation (training of Ghanaian seamen in the USSR).
80. Accord on Planning and Cadre and Specialist Training.
81. Technical Aid Accord.
82. See No 58 above.
83. Accord on the Construction of a Military Hospital and the Establishment of a Vocational School.
84. Medical Aid Accords With Kenya.
85. Not concluded with the (Bantustan) state controlled by South Africa.
86. See No 58 above.
- Accord on Credit for the Establishment of a Tractor Maintenance Center and the Training of Skilled Farm Mechanics.
87. Not concluded. State under the protection of South Africa.
88. Accord on the Exchange of Students, Professors, Doctors and Teachers.
89. See No 81 above.
90. Cooperation Accord on the Construction of a Farm Training Center, a Higher Administrative School and a Medical School.
91. Cooperation Accord in the Health Sector.
92. See No 58 above.
93. Ibid.
94. Ibid.
95. Ibid.
96. Ibid.
- 97.-98. Accord on Strengthening Political, Economic and Cultural Relations.

99. See No 78 above.
100. Accord on the Strengthening of the Training Center for Construction Workers.
101. Accord on the Development of Nigerian Military Aviation.
102. Aid Accord for the Creation of a Technical Institutes Complex.
103. Credit Accord for the Establishment of an Agricultural School.
- 104.-105. Cooperation and Technical Accord for the Equipping and Operation of a Military Hospital and a Polyclinic.
106. Cooperation and Exchange of Information Accord Among the TASS and Novosti agencies, the USSR Central Committee on Television and Radio Broadcasting and Sao Tome and Principe.
107. Accord on the Training of Sierra Leonean Cadres in the USSR.
108. See No 58 above.
109. See No 81 above.
110. Accord on the Construction of Two Military Hospitals, a Secondary School and a Printing Establishment in Somalia.
111. See No 58 above.
112. Soviet-Somali Friendship and Cooperation Treaty, unilaterally abrogated by Somalia on 13 November 1977.
113. See No 58 above.
114. Tanzania is a federation including Tanganyika and Zanzibar.
115. See No 58 above (accord between TASS and the Tanganyikan News Agency).
116. Ibid. (accord between TASS and the Tanzanian Ministry of Information and Tourism).
- 117.-118. General Economic, Technical, Scientific and Cultural Cooperation Accord.
119. See No 58 above.
120. Protocol on an Accord for the Training of Togolese Cadres in the USSR.
121. See No 58 above.
122. Ibid.

123. See Nos 34 and 35 above.
124. "International Public Law," op. cit., pp 28-29. R. David, "The Great Modern Systems of Law," Dalloz Publishing House, Paris, 1978, pp 155-156 and 211-213. M. Lesage, "Soviet Law," PUF, Paris, 1976, pp 9-17.
125. "International Public Law," op. cit., pp 30-31.
126. Ibid., pp 24 and 29.
127. Ibid., pp 33-34.
128. Ibid., p 532.
129. Ibid., p 34.
130. Ibid., p 532.
131. The current status of the Soviet concept of international law has to do with two interpretations of the concept of positive international law. One, which is more traditional in law in general, allows designation of the law in effect or applicable. The other, which is without a doubt more political, allows consideration of the international rules (conventions) in effect which are not consistent with the principles of proper state conduct and, in particular, elementary morality, as not positive and incontestible (by the USSR in particular) [sic].
132. This language, which is now a part of international law, includes political concepts which make it possible to distinguish the USSR from the Western nations in their relations with this system of interstate law.

5157
CSO: 3419/116

INDIAN OCEAN REGIONAL COOPERATION MEETING, COMMUNIST WALKOUT

Saint Denis TEMOIGNAGES in French 2 Oct 84 pp 2-3

[Text] The international conference began its first day of work yesterday at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Saint Denis.

Over 200 participants gathered at the chamber yesterday morning. About 70 from the neighboring islands of Madagascar, Mauritius, the Seychelles, and the Comoro Islands--but also from Paris and Brussels--and 130 from Reunion were there to represent the various sectors of activity interested in regional cooperation.

The foreign delegations and all the participants were greeted at the morning session with various speeches of welcome by the officials from Reunion and the European Community.

But the first morning was marked in particular by an incident whose ins and outs belie in fact the public speeches evoking the need to take regional cooperation down new paths.

That issue was raised by Paul Verges, who had been denied permission to speak in his capacity as an elected representative in Reunion.

Is regional cooperation among the islands to be an idea originating in Paris--or Brussels--or will it be the result of increased dialogue among politicians elected by their respective peoples?

That debate underlies every colonial situation and might therefore have been considered out of date, but it resurfaced yesterday.

It just shows that old demons die hard.

In the afternoon, the participants--with the exception of Reunion's elected Communist representatives--met again for committee work.

Features of Intraregional Trade

The debate on a number of general topics started with three reports. The first was a talk by Wanquet on the history of interisland relations over the past three centuries. It concentrated primarily on population movements, economic ties, and the relative importance of each of the countries in the zone since the 17th century.

A second report, presented by Chong-Ah-Yan, representing the Chazal du Mee research organization in Mauritius, described the chief characteristics of intraregional trade from the standpoint of recent trends.

The last report was by de Cambiaire, chairman of the IDR (Regional Development Institute--the organizer of the conference), who discussed the "different economic spaces: ACP and EEC" that characterize the region's economic context.

Recent trends in trade relations among the region's islands are characterized first of all by "the very low volume" of trade, as was emphasized in the Mauritian report on Monday morning.

"From 1980 to 1982, intraregional exports totaled an average of 133 million FF (French francs) per year, or 2.9 percent of total exports by the five countries." At the same time, the annual average of intraregional imports between 1979 and 1982 was 143 million FF, or 1.4 percent of the region's total imports.

The report also described the main reasons for that weakness in regional trade.

Each of the countries in the region has its own characteristics, which were explained in detail by Chong-Ah-Yan. He emphasized that with the exception of Mauritius and Madagascar, the countries in the region exported less than they imported within the zone itself.

Intraregional exports by the Comoro Islands, for example, declined considerably between 1979 and 1982--from a value of 4.8 million FF to 0.4 million FF--due to a drop in copra exports to Madagascar and Mauritius. Comorian exports to Reunion are negligible, while Comorian imports from that island have declined over the past 3 years. And the Comoro Islands have no trade at all with the Seychelles.

Over the past 5 years, Madagascar has reduced the volume of its intraregional exports--which fell from 75.5 million FF in 1979 to 51.6 million FF in 1982--while its intraregional imports have risen slightly to a total of 16.6 million FF. But the share of total imports represented by intraregional imports has remained quite stable at 0.5 percent.

Like Madagascar, Mauritius exports more to the region than it imports from it. Its intraregional exports, which accounted for an average of 2.5 percent of the total volume between 1979 and 1982, rose from 35.1 million FF in 1979 to 58.6 million in 1982. But it should be noted that 35 percent of those exports were reexports. Intraregional imports by Mauritius--accounting for 0.3 percent of its total imports--are declining, however. The only exceptions are its imports from Reunion and the Seychelles.

Reunion imports more from the region than it exports to it. During the period from 1980 to 1982, its intraregional exports averaged only 19 percent of its intraregional imports, and 70 percent of those imports came from Madagascar, while Mauritius and the Seychelles provided it with 24 percent and 5 percent respectively of its intraregional imports.

Intraregional exports by the Seychelles dropped by half between 1980 and 1981, then rose again in 1982, when they accounted for 6.6 percent of that country's total exports (for a value of 7.2 million FF). All of the country's imports from the region are supplied by Mauritius (25 percent of the total) and Reunion (75 percent of the total).

Speech by Mario Hoarau

The chairman of the Regional Council, which is the Reunion body sponsoring this conference, yesterday welcomed the participants by endeavoring to assure them that the elected representatives on Reunion's Regional Council have a firm political will to support the development of regional cooperation.

Emphasizing first of all that this conference was an unprecedented event spotlighting the great importance of budding cooperation among the islands in the Indian Ocean, Mario Hoarau said that the event was in keeping "both with a strong political will and with a legal framework that is now clearly defined."

He continued: "The political will is that of all Reunion officials who have become aware of the need to integrate regional cooperation with the problematics of development to a greater extent than in the past."

The legal framework referred to by the chairman of the Regional Council is that established in 1981 "as a result of the reforms concerned with decentralization and planning, since the French Government and Parliament included regional cooperation among the new prerogatives of the regions, particularly the overseas regions."

Lastly, Mario Hoarau emphasized that this new policy would achieve its full dimension by attaining the goal of "developing complementarities... while respecting diversities so as not to harm any of the parties involved" and strengthening "the natural ties of friendship and solidarity" among the islands in the region.

Communist Walkout

After the break that followed the welcoming speeches by officials, the participants reassembled for a debate on general topics.

It was then, following a few words of introduction by Blangy, that Paul Verges spoke to "set the record straight concerning procedure."

Reunion's representative at the European Parliament brought up the problem--basically political--that was posed by keeping him out of the morning debate and twice refusing, on the very morning that the conference started, to allow him to make "a Reunion voice" heard during the debate.

What secret events made it possible at the last minute to alter the program so carefully arranged by the organizers--particularly the officials of the Regional Development Institute? To learn the answer to that question someday, it will be necessary to keep one's ears open in the halls of the prefecture.

In any case, it had been agreed, as Paul Verges reminded his audience, that the morning's opening session could be followed by 1.5 hours of "debate on general topics," with speeches by the participants being limited to 10 minutes so as not to make the morning too long.

That principle had been accepted by everyone--until Monday morning, since, as Paul Verges also said, "this very morning I was twice refused time to speak."

Lucet Langenier had spoken to Delpierre, a trainee from the National School of Administration, yesterday morning to remind him that Paul Verges, as a regional representative and member of the European Parliament, intended to take part in that debate, and twice he had received a very curt reply from the prefecture's representative.

That unexplainable refusal was what caused the unexpected speech by Paul Verges on his own behalf and that of the Communist group on the Regional Council: to protest what he said could not have been a simple "misunderstanding."

"No one can argue the fact that for years, we have done everything in our power--in our region, at the conferences in Tananarive and Mahe, in contacts with various ministries in Paris and Brussels, and in the European Parliament--to promote the development of regional cooperation."

Paul Verges went on to recall that the entire Communist group on the Regional Council had arranged its schedule around this conference so as to be completely free for the 4 days of the meeting.

Paul Verges insisted: "No agenda--no procedure--is politically innocent. Regional development and cooperation are not only problems for technicians. There is a political will to be expressed."

The Communist council member insisted: "It would have been at least fair for a Reunion voice to be heard after the spokesmen for the committees."

Speaking then to all the participants, Paul Verges expressed apologies to all those present, adding:

"Our general will is for development, not just for trade. But in our countries, the question of dignity is an issue on which one does not compromise, especially if one is an elected representative in Reunion."

Noting that the refusal to allow him to speak was "an attack on the dignity of Reunion's elected representatives" and after again apologizing to those present, Paul Verges decided to withdraw along with all the Communists on the Regional Council.

"Drawing the conclusions from a procedure that is not innocent,"* Paul Verges, Elie Hoareau, Lucet Langenier, Laurent Verges, Bruny Payet, Claude Hoareau, and Roger Hoarau then left the room. [All personal names as published.]

Like their colleagues attending the opening session, the other Communist representatives on the Regional Council who were to participate in committee work and trips around the island and make their contribution to the proceedings will have to refrain from participation. It seems that participation by Reunion's elected representatives is considered undesirable when the development of their country is being debated.

The session resumed, without the "Reunion voice," with speeches by Wanquet, de Cambiaire, and Chong-Ah-Yan.

History will tell whether a country's development and regional cooperation are possible without (or in spite of) that country's elected representatives--regardless of who they are--and whether development and cooperation must be reduced to a question of markets won, the comparative profitability of capital, the repatriation of profits, and so on.

It will also tell whether the exclusion of Reunion's elected representatives is the way to create confidence or, on the contrary, to open the door to all kinds of conjecture and all kinds of mental reservations.

Main Obstacles to Regional Cooperation

In the afternoon, the participants were divided up among the three scheduled committees for group work. Those three committees will continue their work through today, and each will present a summary of its work on the last day of the meeting. Yesterday's topics covered the following points:

First committee: "The principal regulatory provisions governing trade among the ACP countries and the Reunion Overseas Department" (the legal and institutional framework and the main obstacles to the development of trade).

Second committee: "Principles of regional cooperation based on the strategy of complementarity within the framework of island economies with limited domestic markets." This committee also presented a review of contacts among professionals from the various islands.

Third committee: "Principles of regional cooperation at the Community level and the forms of EEC intervention in regional projects."

In a report presented to the first committee, Bhundun, deputy permanent secretary of the Mauritian Ministry of Commerce, and Montocchio of that same country's Chamber of Commerce and Industry explained some of the features of intraregional trade in the Southwest Indian Ocean.

* It can also be noted that this curiously exclusive procedure was repeated that evening, when Elie Hoarau was not invited to the cocktail party given at the prefecture yesterday evening.

They pointed out in particular that the states in the region "have been unable or unwilling so far to alter appreciably the needs and interests of the former home countries, which are often detrimental to their own."

The committee spokesmen also emphasized the benefits that the region could derive from intensified trade among the states making up the region.

"For a certain number of years, even the EEC, in its relations with the ACP countries through the Lome Convention, has advocated and promoted the development of regional cooperation in all its varied aspects. But while certain appreciable--though modest--results have been achieved elsewhere, intraregional trade in the Southwest Indian Ocean continues to be characterized by a compartmentalization of trade."

Considerable attention was therefore paid to the obstacles to regional cooperation that were inherited from the colonial period and to the compulsory relations among the various islands that are due to the policies of the various home countries, particularly Great Britain and France.

The report by Bhundun and Montocchio then discussed the main obstacles to the development of trade, emphasizing successively tariff conditions and the hindrances due to regulations, lack of familiarity with products and markets, bias in the countries concerned against their own products, difficulties in communication and transportation (air and sea), financial constraints, and marketing constraints.

"Perhaps we should add (to those obstacles) the pressures that can be exerted by certain groups importing products from outside the region.... It will be up to the representatives in the states in the region to undertake real dialogue if they want... to achieve more concrete results than those achieved to date."

PHOTO CAPTIONS

1. p 2. Seated on the official platform were Jeannette d'Offay, representing the Seychelles Ministry for Planning and External Relations; the heads of the official delegations from Madagascar, Mauritius, and the Comoro Islands; the EEC delegate; and the officials from Reunion. One individual was absent: Paul Benard, representing the General Council.
2. p 3. Thirty-three Malagasy representatives are participating in the conference that opened yesterday. The official Malagasy delegation, headed by Rodolphe Rambahiniarison, director of bilateral relations in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, consists of six members from various ministries.

They are accompanied by 27 professionals from the Malagasy private sector headed by the chairman of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Madagascar, Razanatsehenon. The Malagasy delegation from the private sector also includes the chairman of the Malagasy Businessmen's Group (FIFMPAMA), the secretary general of the Malagasy Enterprise Group (GEM), and members of the Union of Industries and Union of Starch Manufacturers and the National Council of Small and Medium-Sized Businesses.

COOPERATION WITH USSR CONTINUES

Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 9 Oct 84 p 2

[Text] On 8 October the Soviet and Angolan people celebrated the eighth anniversary of the signing of the treaty of friendship and cooperation.

The friendly relations between the Soviet and Angolan peoples were born during the struggle for liberation from the Portuguese colonizers. After Angola was proclaimed independent in 1975, a mutually advantageous cooperation, in the spirit of equality between the USSR and the RPA [People's Republic of Angola], has developed and has been reinforced in numerous areas.

As TASS has reported, more than 150 Soviet doctors are working in Angola. During the years of bilateral cooperation more than 2 million Angolan citizens have received medical assistance from the Soviet specialists, and the USSR has supplied Angola with a large number of aircraft and helicopters which are now carrying passengers and freight.

According to TASS, the war situation which continues to exist in Angola is impeding the solution of pressing social and economic problems, as well as the economic development of the republic. The South African aggression and the sabotage by the UNITA bands have caused Angola damages totaling \$12 million. Since August 1981 South African troops have continued to occupy some of the southern regions of the republic, despite Pretoria's promise to remove them.

The Soviet press agency stressed that the South African authorities are equipping, financing, and instructing the UNITA bands, which are attacking cities and villages, massacring the civil population, and capturing foreign workers who are helping in the national reconstruction of Angola.

The UNITA bandits are destroying economic installations and impeding the development of agriculture in a number of areas of the country, annihilating plantations. Meanwhile, despite the pressure and the maneuvers of the racists and their western protectors, the Angolan people, who have opted for socialist development, are determined to defend their victories.

In this noble cause the Angolan people are relying on the support of the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community, as well as all progressive forces throughout the world, TASS concluded.

TRADE COOPERATION WITH CUBA

Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 12 Oct 84 p 2

[Text] "The governments of the People's Republic of Angola and of the Republic of Cuba, in the desire to strengthen and develop commercial and economic relations between their two countries, based on equal rights and mutual benefit and the high level of fraternal relations and solidarity which has been achieved between their two peoples, signed an agreement on 5 May 1981 which governs commercial exchanges." The Angolan ambassador to Cuba, Mawete Joao Baptista, made this statement to the Cuban journal BOHEMIA.

The diplomat emphasized that the visit which the Cuban Minister of Foreign Trade, Ricardo Cabrisas Ruiz, made to Angola in October 1983, reinforced these relations, and led to meetings of mixed commissions in, alternately, Angola and Cuba.

He said that, among the products exchanged, Angola supplies wood, coffee, fish meal, sisal fiber, sisal twine and cord, etc.

In turn, in 1982-1985 Cuba is sending 70,000 metric tons of refined sugar per year, human and veterinary medicines, liquid chlorine, rum and liquor, clothing, reinforced-concrete boats, sporting goods, school books, etc.

"Through South Africa, imperialism is waging an undeclared war against Angola, making direct use of its regular armed forces and the puppet bands of UNITA to destabilize the country in all areas, particularly the economy. The goal is to cause us to yield on the political level," the ambassador said vigorously.

"Production of goods for export is increasing in both quality and quantity; this will contribute to equalizing the balance of trade." The Angolan representative added that during 1983 there had been an increase in commercial exchange between Angola and Cuba, which included the shipment of more than 12,000 boxes of eggs to promote poultry cultivation in Angola, as well as several varieties of beans to be planted experimentally in the province of Malanje. Angola for its part exported the excellent cabinda wood to Cuba, among other products.

Mawete Joao Baptista is optimistic concerning the prospects for this type of commercial exchange. He believes that the visit of Ismael Martins, the Minister of Foreign Trade, to Cuba will contribute to expanding trade, including sugar, tuna, and rum from Cuba and gas, lubricants, fish meal, sisal, etc. from Angola.

"This trade also includes technical assistance, since five of the six high-level Cuban technicians are already in Angola. They will aid their Angolan counterparts to improve their technical knowledge on an international scale," added the ambassador.

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CSO: 3442/45

PAULO JORGE DISMISSAL DISCUSSED

Forced Resignation

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 25 Oct 84 p 38

[Article by Costa Carneiro]

[Text] The forced resignation of Paulo Jorge as foreign relations minister of Angola may have been precipitated by the strong stand taken by the Luanda government regarding recent statements by Prime Minister Mario Soares, which it considered "gross interference in Angola's internal affairs."

Mario Soares was traveling with Portuguese businessmen on a visit to Mozambique, at the invitation of President Samora Machel. "What is happening in Mozambique," Soares told the businessmen, "will influence Angola to be realistic and not to run amok, in terms of ideology and sectarian orthodoxy."

Luanda reacted to the statements in a manner taken to be unjust, arrogant and extremely hostile, if we are to believe sources close to Mario Soares' office.

The virulence and inappropriateness of this posture may even have displeased the Angolan president and certain political sectors, notably (according to a source which we consider reliable) those which defend a more flexible and realistic policy toward the Lisbon government.

Paulo Jorge had been doomed for some time.

In the last meeting of Angolan ambassadors, chiefs of mission, diplomats and consular officers serving abroad, President Jose Eduardo dos Santos was broadly critical of Paulo Jorge's action. The president even declared that the country needed a diplomatic corps that supported his efforts to consolidate independence and to promote progress and peace in the country.

In a direct reference to Paulo Jorge's action, the Angolan president declared that a strict selection process was needed for public administration cadres, without protectionism, nepotism or favoritism, not only with regard to Angola's representatives abroad but also to cadres in the ministry itself, where the atmosphere is currently explosive.

'President's Men'

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 26 Oct 84 p 19

[Article by Antonio Duarte]

[Text] The resignation of Paulo Jorge, Angola's minister of foreign affairs, may have been demanded as a result of a meeting with President Eduardo dos Santos in which the Angolan chief of diplomacy sharply criticized the negotiations between the RPA [People's Republic of Angola] and the United States of America. This would be the proximate pretext for the internal reinforcement of the strategic line of the Angolan president, strong signs of which have already been seen in the participation and rise of men trusted by the president in missions and activities of major importance to the Luanda government.

Sources contacted by O JORNAL who, in one way or another, are in close contact with Paulo Jorge or who are friendly with him, point out that the former minister is not a man of the "hard line" of the MPLA (as the press reported immediately following his dismissal), although he has been linked to it strategically. Some of these sources rejected any ideological interpretation of Paulo Jorge's dismissal, adding that he is a moderate ideologically and a non-extremist politically, going back "historically" to the beginnings of the MPLA and closely linked to the late President Agostinho Neto.

What happened to Paulo Jorge, then, and why? What is altered in the balance of forces in the Angolan government with Paulo Jorge's dismissal? Who has gained and who comes out the loser?

The "president's men," who are now strengthening their undeniable position of power in Luanda: are they more or less nonaligned?

Paulo Jorge: Strong Sympathy with Cuba

Paulo Jorge lived for several years in Algeria (where he represented the MPLA and was acquainted with Portuguese political exiles) and in Havana (where he was married and where he maintains a family), and he is still influenced by Algerian and Cuban models of society. Hence his nonalignment in "solidarity" with the Soviet Union and his strong sympathy and emotional ties with Cuba.

An idealist and "historic" member of the MPLA, Paulo Jorge has never looked favorably on Angola's negotiations with the United States and South Africa to solve the Namibian problem and has always vehemently opposed the policy of "linkage" (tying Namibia's independence to the withdrawal of the Cubans from Angolan territory) defended by Washington. He has been even more opposed to any idea of dialogue with UNITA.

When Luanda entered into the discussions with Washington and Pretoria under the good auspices of the Cape Verdian authorities, the positions within the Angolan Government became more clearly defined.

The president must certainly have alluded to the ill-feeling in that department, where the minister is accused of despotism and of stripping Venancio Moura, his vice minister, of all authority for no apparent serious reasons. Moura, who has long since been relegated to the background, and the director general of political affairs are the only black cadres in high positions in the ministry.

The dismissal of Paulo Jorge, whose functions have temporarily been assumed by President dos Santos himself, may also have something to do with the fact that the president's recent visit to France was almost a total fiasco and with the frontal opposition to Jorge's actions by most of the ambassadors serving abroad, some of whom were appointed by the Angolan president.

Well-informed circles in Luanda are of the opinion that Paulo Jorge, who will be posted to the United Nations, will be replaced by Interior Minister Alexandre Rodrigues ("Kito") or by Professor Fernando Jose da France Van-Dunem, Angola's ambassador to Portugal, who is considered one of the "president's men."

Alexandre Rodrigues, a man trusted by the president, has been chief of several Angolan delegations in the discussions with the South African authorities in the tripartite Luanda-Pretoria-Washington discussions.

In this capacity, he was a signatory to the Lusaka Accord with the South African Government.

The public has never been duly informed as to why the foreign relations minister was not a party to these discussions, of such great importance to the foreign policy of the Luanda government.

With the dismissal of Paulo Jorge, Jose Eduardo strengthens his position inside and outside the state apparatus and the government, where he has the unwavering support of such politicians as Colonel N'Dalo, chief of staff of the armed forces, Dino Matross, minister of security, Kudi Payama, Benguela Province commissioner, and Col Alexandre Rodrigues ("Kito"), minister of the interior, all of whom are members of the MPLA-party Central Committee.

The image of the government and the regime has been eroding with time, and President Jose Eduardo dos Santos may have confided to his closest advisors that he needed a "shakeup" in the state apparatus. This would give him a free hand to initiate radical reforms, to prevent further deterioration of the political-military, economic and social situation and to guide Angola's foreign policy in new directions.

Thus the dismissal of Paulo Jorge was the first of a series which the Angolan leader has determined on, intending to remodel the government completely before long, to alter domestic policy, and to post new ambassadors to the major capitals (Paris, London and Rome, to start with), capable of initiating an improvement in the climate of the country's foreign relations.

Who Are the 'President's Men'?

Paulo Jorge also watched the young "discoveries" rise and gain prominence in the government, the party apparatus and the armed forces. Who are these figures? We have already mentioned Alexandre Rodrigues "Kito" and Venancio de Moura. Some say that Venancio de Moura is one of the most ambitious members of the "new" MPLA (although he is not on the Central Committee) and that he may be interested in occupying Paulo Jorge's post. At the party level, however, Roberto de Almeida, MPLA secretary for ideological affairs, is gaining great influence and prominence.

It was Roberto de Almeida who gave the go-ahead to Raymundo Sottomeyer, an editorial writer for the Angolan news agency ANGOP, to author and distribute an article (widely carried in the Portuguese press), in which the Portuguese prime minister was accused of "gross interference" in the affairs of the RPA.

The accusation (in exaggerated and not entirely respectful terms) has reference to a few words spoke by Mario Soares on 10 October to businessmen who accompanied him to Mozambique: if conditions for peace had been created by the Pretoria Declaration, "this might influence Angola to be realistic and not to run amok, in terms of ideology and sectarian orthodoxy."

Editorial

The controversial editorial was published on the eve of the decision to fire Paulo Jorge from the post of foreign affairs minister.

Diplomatic sources contacted by O JORNAL in Lisbon noted that the purpose of the editorial could be twofold: 1) to cover internally for the intensification of negotiations with the United States and South Africa by taking a hard line in relation to Portugal (it should always be remembered that Marxist-Leninist African countries have a language for domestic--and foreign--consumption which does not always reflect a foreign policy strategy); 2) to establish a backdrop for the dismissal of Paulo Jorge, held directly responsible for the foreign affairs office.

Thus it is not by chance that Roberto de Almeida, one of the President's "young Turks" and director of NOVEMBRO magazine, set the Ideological Sphere "rolling" with the ANGOP editorial.

According to U.S. diplomatic sources, Washington will continue to bet on Alexandre Rodrigues "Kito" and, evidently, on President Eduardo dos Santos. In view of the confusion of the lines and factions within the MPLA, the dos Santos line seems the clearest to the Americans, in the sense of real non-alignment, and the one which presents the fewest obstacles to the free play of the tripartite negotiations.

O JORNAL learned from diplomatic sources that Minister Paulo Jorge's resignation was demanded following a meeting with President Eduardo dos Santos in which the Angolan chief of diplomacy vehemently criticized the negotiations with the United States.

'Full Powers' to President

On 8 December 1982, the MPLA conferred "full powers" on President Eduardo dos Santos, a few hours before the first meeting in Cape Verde (Ilha de Sal) between the Angolans and South Africans with regard to Namibia.

Paulo Jorge felt he had even less power to impose his point of view. Denied the president's support, he has been increasingly isolated as the tripartite negotiations have progressed.

Witnessing the rise of the "young Turks" (black) of the dos Santos generation, supported by the president, the foreign affairs minister took refuge with the so-called hard line of the MPLA, which includes such figures as Lucio Lara (of mixed origins like Paulo Jorge), who are considered as aligned with Moscow and defenders of the Cuban presence in Angola.

Against Negotiations

Without any great decision-making autonomy in the government and the state, Paulo Jorge made a serious personal decision: he would not be a party to any of the discussions in Cape Verde and Lusaka with South Africa and the United States. At those meetings, the Angolan delegation was always led by Interior Minister Alexandre Rodrigues "Kito" and by Venancio de Moura, vice minister of foreign affairs.

Alexandre Rodrigues and Venancio de Moura, two men politically and personally trusted by President Eduardo dos Santos, have "spearheaded" the Angolan movement aimed at implementation of UN General Assembly Resolution 435 regarding Namibian independence and the withdrawal of South African troops from southern Angola.

The Angolan interior minister even went to Washington and had important meetings with Frank Wiesner, assistant undersecretary of state for African affairs. Wiesner received clear indications of Luanda's willingness to resolve the internal situation and to contribute to the final solution of the Namibian problem.

Americans Honor "Kito"

Frank Wiesner then went to Luanda. In the Angolan capital, this member of the Reagan administration assigned great value to his meetings with Alexandre Rodrigues "Kito," who was accompanied by Venancio de Moura.

In those discussions, the Angolan authorities agreed to the Cuban withdrawal on condition that South Africa end its support to UNITA and that Pretoria withdraw its troops from southern Angola, as well as the implementation of Resolution 435 regarding Namibia.

To Minister Paulo Jorge, it appeared as if Luanda had accepted the policy of "linkage" (which in fact is apparently admitted in the practical results of the negotiations with Washington). The chief of Angolan diplomacy hardened his stand: he argued that the RPA's bargaining power depended on the presence of the Cubans on Angolan territory. This is a point of honor, and he is unshakable on this.

On the other hand, the president himself accused Paulo Jorge of breaking his ministry's connections with the party structure, a criticism which was voiced publicly during a meeting of ambassadors, held in Luanda early this month.

Pragmatists in Power

Also reinforcing, although indirectly, the president's line, a so-called group of pragmatists has been gaining influence and fitting in with the political strategy of Jose Eduardo dos Santos.

The "group of pragmatists" is not important ideologically, but it is a group which gets things done, which organizes the nation's production, which gets the country moving. An outstanding example is Antonio Agante, who got the port of Luanda functioning. Last year, Lopo do Nascimento, Angola's minister of planning, told Pedro Vieira, O JORNAL special correspondent in Angola, that "the country needs several Agantes," referring to the progress at the port of Luanda (which had been paralyzed) and in the area of agricultural production.

During Eduardo dos Santos' tenure, it is the so-called "hard line" (Lucio Lara) and "Catete" groups within the MPLA which have been losing influence at the government level.

The "Catete group" is within the tradition of blackness. It is a "historic" group, notably including Mendes de Carvalho, former minister of health and currently the RPA ambassador to the GDR. Mendes de Carvalho was "rescued" by Agostinho Neto from charges of implication in the coup attempt by Nito Alves.

Ambassadors' Conduct Criticized

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 1 Nov 84 p 28

[Article by R.A.U.]

[Text] Luanda [TEMPO]--The unexpected dismissal of Foreign Affairs Minister Paulo Teixeira Jorge had [little] repercussion in Angola since, in generally well-informed circles, it was expected after the visit by President Eduardo dos Santos to Egypt, Italy, France and Spain. This "tour" was not all that had been hoped for it. Moreover, there had been unpardonable lapses by the Angolan ambassadors in those countries, primarily in France and Italy.

Months ago, however, the chief of state received a report emanating from Moscow, through the KGB, which described the private life of members of Angolan diplomatic missions in Europe and certain parts of Africa.

The Angolan diplomats were living like nabobs. They were considered the best clients of the nightclubs and discotheques, in the company of "high-priced call girls."

It was observed that the Foreign Relations Ministry did not require Angolan diplomats to render accounts; it had never drafted the Diplomatic Code, nor did it oversee appointments to insure that Angola was well represented abroad.

As for the inspection of embassies or consulates, there had been none since the country gained its independence.

Although Paulo Jorge was aware of the chaotic situation in his ministry, he took no steps to straighten it out.

The trust which he has enjoyed since the day he was appointed to the post, going on 9 years ago, has now been withdrawn.

On recommendation of the Party Central Committee, the president of the republic has determined that Jorge is to reside in Benguela, where he should go within a few days, accompanied by his wife, a native of Havana.

Water Shortage

The city of Luanda continues to suffer from a shortage of the precious liquid. The residents are being inadequately supplied from old wells that date back to Portuguese times. Because of the poor power supply from the Mabubas Dam, the Quifandongo Central station cannot function fully. There has not been enough power to start up the machines.

The people are openly protesting and harshly criticizing the government, which appears increasingly disorganized. Each [department] heaps the blame on the others, and this vicious circle has turned Angolan into a kind of pandemonium in which no one understands anyone else.

Scandal

Photocopies of the Parisian newspaper LE MATIN DE PARIS, containing an article entitled "Petroleum Scandal in Angola," have begun to circulate in this city. The article insinuates that two high officials of the government are shareholders in a company known as TRADEANGOL. The report claims--truthfully or not--that the government rewarded a foreign individual with a shipment of petroleum for having intervened in the matter.

6326

CS0: 3442/68

ANGOLA

CAPE VERDE TALKS, RECENT TRIAL RESULTS DISCUSSED

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 1 Nov 84 p 28

[Article by Costa Carreiro]

[Text] To recall his troops to Cuba or to strengthen his forces in Ethiopia: this appears to be Fidel Castro's current dilemma over the presence of some 30,000 Cuban soldiers in Angola, the major obstacle to the independence of Namibia, which South Africa continues to rule despite the protests and condemnations which have been registered many times in UN commissions and assemblies.

According to sources considered reliable, this is the principal topic of the discussions which began yesterday in Sal, Cape Verde, between Angolan, South African and U.S. delegations, led, respectively, by Angolan Interior Minister Alexandre Rodrigues (Kito), South African Foreign Affairs Minister Roelof "Pik" Botha and Chester Crocker, undersecretary of state for African affairs, of the U.S. Department of State.

According to our informant, Luanda is prepared to show greater "flexibility" regarding its demands for an end to the conflict with the Pretoria government over Namibian independence, bringing forward again the plan recommended by Agostinho Neto, to replace the Cubans with an international force which would oversee the creation of a demilitarized zone on the border with Namibia, in accordance with a proposal put forward at that time by the late president of Nigeria.

Meanwhile, seeking to gain time, Luanda is accelerating the training of new troops, with the aid of specialists from Russia (there are 10 Air Force specialists alone), North Korea, Bulgaria, Romania and the GDR, and also by Portuguese high military officers.

This solution appears to have won support from the North Americans, in the wake of the discussions which Frank Wiesner held very recently with government officials in Angola, discussions which the Angolan news agency described at the time as very "positive."

For its part, Pretoria may finally have agreed to some of the guarantees that the government of Jose Eduardo dos Santos has repeatedly demanded regarding the withdrawal of South African troops from Angolan territory.

The United States might, then, resume normal diplomatic relations with Angola, opening an embassy in Luanda, an item which has always been on the agenda of the many negotiations which have taken place between the two parties at various times.

It is noted that the Americans have always refused to establish relations with Angola until the former Portuguese colony has completely settled its differences with Pretoria, one of the key points for the establishment of a regional peace treaty which would put an end to the unrest in that area of the African continent.

If the Angolan proposal is accepted, it would be a serious reverse for the African policy of the Soviet Union, which, according to diplomatic sources, apparently would like to reduce its support to the Luanda regime, as it has already done in the case of Mozambique, although for other reasons and on a different level.

Political observers in Luanda are convinced that Moscow is now more concerned with the problems of the "Horn of Africa" because of emerging petroleum questions, and hence would be thinking about strengthening its influence there. In this regard, the Cuban troops now in Angola might offer a solution.

It is always easier to leave for Addis Ababa from Luanda than from Havana....

Diamond Traffic

Commander Adolfo Joao Pedro, presiding over the Angolan People's Revolutionary Court, has just conducted a lengthy trial of the so-called "Kamanga case," in which 124 individuals were implicated, including 58 Portuguese, 30 of whom were tried in absentia.

Angolan Francisco Fragata, accused of illegal traffic in diamonds and of working for the United States of America, was sentenced to death.

Four individuals, including Portuguese Licinio de Magalhaes, were acquitted. Several Portuguese defendants received prison sentences ranging from 1 to 16 years. Notable among them were Jose Manuel Correia Dias (16 years); Antonio Manuel de Oliveira Colles, Joao Baptista Lousa and Amilcar Augusto de Oliveira Dias (15 years); Fernando Antonio Pimentel Vilela, Fernando Margarido Pires, Manuel Silvino Botelo and Antonio de Cruz Matos Marques (14 years); and Antonio Augusto Pereira (10 years). Industrialist Farrobilha Guedes, who has lived in Angola for several years, was sentenced to 8 years.

The court decided not to rule immediately on the death sentence sought against Fernando Mendes da Silva ("Colorau"), Jose Alberto Ferreira Pinto (Zeca Siberia), Portuguese Antonio Simoes Durao (Tony Kafunto) and also some of the Portuguese defendants tried in absentia.

This is also the status of Lieutenant Colonel Mona and Major Kembo.

In the final phase of the trial, the court heard evidence on the existence of various networks for the diamond traffic, directed by the Sousa brothers, of Vila Nova de Famalicao, Eduardo da Silva Alcouce, Joaquim Manuel da Rocha and Jose Fernando Moreira Brito, all of Portuguese nationality.

Rights Association Intercedes

Meanwhile, in Lisbon, Dr Antonio Maria Pereira, president of the Portuguese Rights and Justice Section of the International Commission of Jurists, expressed the hope that the Angolan Government would not carry out the death sentence against Angolan defendant Francisco Fragata; he is convinced that the Luanda government will be magnanimous enough not to inflict this cruel punishment, which is incompatible with the basic values of contemporary society.

TEMPO is in a position to report that the sentence will not, in fact, be carried out, by intervention of President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, who wishes to present an image consistent with the style which he would like to imprint on his country's foreign policy from now on.

6362

CS0: 3442/67

ANGOLA

PLEA FOR MORE COOPERATION IN EDUCATION

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 28 Oct 84 p 4

[Text] Fernando Van-Dunen, Angolan ambassador in Lisbon, lamented that Portugal was "not making better use of the possibilities for cooperation, particularly in the training of my country's future leaders at Portuguese universities."

Speaking at a conference on cooperation sponsored by the Amaro da Costa Institute, attached to the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party], the diplomat said that Portugal was "not facilitating the admission of Angolan students arriving after the normal matriculation period, delaying their admission by several weeks."

In this regard, he added: "If these bureaucratic roadblocks are not removed, the Angolan students will be forced to go to the Soviet Union, Cuba or France." Recalling his own experience, he said that it had been "made easier for him to attend Portuguese universities 30 years ago than it is now for my sons." He added:

"This generation is going to lead my country, and if Portugal does not open its doors to them, they are going to trade Portuguese for other languages. They will make other friends."

Van Dunen said further that "Portugal's largest trade surplus is with Angola" and that the remittances of Portuguese who work in Angola and Mozambique exceed those of our countrymen employed in Germany.

Speaking in turn, Miguel Anacoreta Correia, of the Amaro da Costa Institute, agreed with Van Dunen's statements, adding that the public had "not been adequately informed of the more positive aspects of cooperation or the reality of life in Africa."

6362
CSO: 3442/67

4TH MILITARY REGION MEETING

Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 6 Oct 84 p 3

[Text] The regional council of the 4th Political Military Region meet on Thursday [4 October] with persons responsible for various sectors of the province of Huambo. The meeting analyzed the political, economic, and social situation which has developed during the first half of 1984.

The meeting was held under the leadership of the president of the regional military council, Col Joao Ernesto does Santos (Liberdade). This meeting, like the one held previously in the city of Kuito (Bie), discussed activities in agriculture, health, transport, industry, and internal trade, as well as social matters, construction, defense, and security.

In his address, the provincial commissar of Huambo stressed the benefits which could result in the future for the province of Huambo through the exchange of products among different regions.

"Liberdade" called on the representatives of the agencies present to devote particular attention to the priority group of three, and to give priority to the fulfillment of the planned programs.

2641

CSO: 3442/45

INTERNATIONAL UNION OF STUDENTS VISITS CAPE VERDE

Praia VOZ DI POVO in Portuguese 6 Oct 84 p 3

[Text] A delegation of the UIE (International Union of Students) will leave 6 October to visit our country. The 3-day visit, the VOZ DI POVO learned from a well-informed JAAC-CV [Amilcar Cabral African Youth-Cape Verde] source, is an expression of the friendly and cooperative relations existing between our Youth Organization and the International Union of Students.

According to the source, this delegation's main objective in visiting our country will be to become fully informed regarding the problems of the JAAC-CV and of youth in general and exchange impressions on an international level, specifically on plans for the Twelfth World Youth Festival to take place next year in Moscow and matters related to bilateral cooperation.

During their stay in Cape Verde, the delegation will have an interview with the JAAC-CV secretary general and also a meeting with our students to be followed by a cultural evening.

Ravane Kone, UIE vice president, will lead the visiting delegation. Also participating will be Rainer Arzinger, Organization treasurer, and Pedro Chaves, assistant secretary of the AASU (All African Students Union).

The Cape Verde delegation will be headed by Antonio Barbosa, member of the JAAC-CV Central Council. Also present will be Comrades Jose Augusto Sanchez and Pedro Graciano de Carvalho, respectively, head of the JAAC-CV Department of Foreign Affairs.

We must remember that the UIE has maintained friendly and cooperative relations with our Youth Organization since National Independence. This cooperation is involved mainly in the area of training cadres through the annual grant of study scholarship.

8870

CSO: 3442/43

CUBAN BUSINESS DELEGATION VISITS

Prais VOZ DI POVO in Portuguese 13 Oct 84 p 2

[Text] As a result of the talks held during the last week of last month and the beginning of this month between a Cuban and Cape Verde delegation headed by State Secretary of Commerce and Tourism Dr Virgilio Fernandes, a new commercial period between Cape Verde and Cuba began. In the delegations' last meetings, according to the Secretary of State source, they signed a document summarizing the conversations main points.

Commercial questions were raised in several areas. After showing their interest in the Cuban fishing fleet coming to utilize the infrastructures supporting ocean fishing located in Sao Vicente, the Cape Verde delegation entered into an agreement with the Cuban delegation.

Several other projects are under consideration, within the commercial interchange between the two countries. Cape Verde will be able to export products of Morabeza Company but will also be interested in importing cloth for making certain kinds of wearing apparel.

Regarding the prospects of strengthening relations, the head of the Cuban delegation, the deputy minister of Cuban commercial policy, Abdo Soto, remarked: "Our two countries have always had points in common, and a certain similarity in foreign politics, and now in the commercial area which we hope will be a success."

The commercial negotiations toward maritime unity between Cuba and Cape Verde must be regularized, since Cuba has promised to guarantee an annual supply of merchandise to the "Arca Verdes" shipping company which possibly assures the alliance.

It should be remembered that Cuba is one of the leading producers of sugar in the world, which can greatly enhance its economic relations with Cape Verde.

According to a State Secretary of Commerce source, the relations which previously existed between Cuba and Cape Verde were more favorable to the latter, in that a large profit resulted from the use of the Sal Airport by the Cuban aviation company.

However, after the talks, the bilateral commerce will be promoted on a large scale. Cuba suggested the sale of fishing boats to Cape Verde as the Cape Verde delegation had shown an interest in them as soon as the boats are adapted to our countries' needs.

During their stay in Cape Verde, the Cuban Commercial mission promoted the exposition of Cuban manufactured products, specifically home electrical equipment, textile products, and toys, so that our country's commercial workers, private and state, may see what it will be possible to import from Cuba.

The coming visit of the Cuban Minister of Foreign Commerce to Cape Verde was pointed out.

8870

CSO: 3442/43

ESTABLISHMENT OF DEFENSE, SECURITY DIVISION ANNOUNCED

Brazzaville MWETI in French 6 Nov 84 pp 1, 2

[Text] The president of the Central Committee of the Congolese Labor Party [PCT], president of the republic, chief of state, and head of the government on 2 October signed Act No 84/070 involving the establishment, powers, organization, and manner of functioning of the Division of Defense and Security under the Presidency of the Central Committee of the PCT. And by Act No 84/071 he appointed comrade Guy Pierre Garcia chief of the Division of Defense and Security.

Excerpts from Act No 84/070 follow:

Article 1 - Under the Presidency of the Central Committee of the Congolese Labor Party there shall be established a body with nation wide powers to be called the Division of Defense and Security.

Article 2 - The Division of Defense and Security shall have the role of assisting the president of the Central Committee in his task of directing, coordinating, and controlling political and military activity.

Article 3 - The Division of Defense and Security shall be directed by a member of the Central Committee playing the role of counselor of the president of the Central Committee on matters of military doctrine.

Article 4 - The chief of the Division of Defense and Security shall be appointed by an act of the president of the Central Committee of the Congolese Labor Party. He will report on his activities to the president of the Central Committee.

Article 5 - The Division of Defense and Security shall be made up of five sections:

- "Programming and Control";
- "Activities of the Armed Forces";
- "Management of Senior Cadre Affairs";
- "Documentation, Archives, and Library";
- "Secretariat."

Article 6 - The "Programming and Control" section shall be charged with:

- * Preparing all guidance and directives by the president of the Central Committee for the preparation of plans for the development of the armed forces;
- * Analyzing control reports on the political, economic, and technical level of the Ministry of Defense and Security and those from the secretary of the Central Committee, who is charged with the general political direction of the Army.

Article 7 - The "Activities of the Armed Forces" Section shall be charged with:

- * Studying all aspects of the activity of the armed forces;
- * Showing the political influences which result from all the activities of the armed forces and comparing them with the military policy of the party.

Article 8 - The "Management of Senior Cadre Affairs" Section shall be charged with:

- * Controlling and managing programs for the training and appointment of senior cadres of the armed forces;
- * Maintaining a file on the senior cadres of the armed forces assigned to the various areas of defense and security in order to permit the president of the Central Committee to follow their careers and to assign them to tasks suitable to their established competence.

Article 9 - The "Documentation, Archives, and Library" Section shall be charged with:

- * Maintaining a file of documents of continuing importance for reference use by the members of the Central Committee or by senior cadres of the National People's Army;
- * Preparing political and military reports for the attention of the comrade president of the Central Committee.

Article 10 - The "Secretariat" Section shall be charged with:

- * The reception, registration, handling, and consideration of correspondence;
- * The handling of secret questions and administrative, financial, and equipment matters for the division.
- * The management of the affairs of the military and civilian personnel who work in the division.

Article 11 - Each section shall be directed by a chief of section appointed under a decision by the member of the Political Bureau and permanent secretary, who is in charge of the organization, on the proposal of the chief of the division.

Article 12 - This act, which shall enter into effect on the date it is signed, will be registered and published in the JOURNAL DU PARTI and communicated wherever necessary.

BRIEFS

ID CARD RENEWAL—Jean Nguimbi of the ATC [Trans-Congolese Communications Agency] in Pointe Noire asks: "Why is the new national identity card renewable every 10 years? Is this a way of forcing the Congolese people to renew their nationality?" You should recall that it was in 1960 that a national identity card was introduced in the Congo by Decree No 60-35 of 17 February 1960, which was issued by the chief of state. Each Congolese citizen who has reached the age of 16 is required to obtain an identity card at an identification center. However, why should we need to renew our identity cards every 10 years? Clearly, this does not at all involve renewing our nationality, which may be acquired only once, in principle. Rather, this involves a basic question. You know that the cells of the body continuously undergo changes, to the point that the person who you were 10 years ago is no longer the same one that you are at present. And when you take two photographs of the same person at 10 year intervals, clearly you would have a great deal of difficulty in identifying or recognizing this person in the two photographs. This is because in one photograph or the other he would appear younger or older. It is only for this reason that each citizen is required to renew his national identity card every 10 years, in order to facilitate identity checks and, above all, to avoid complications at our national borders. [Excerpt] [Brazzaville MWETI in French 30 Oct 84 p 4] 5170

CSO: 3419/135

COOPERATION WITH PORTUGAL IN TRADE, NAVIGATION

Bissau NO PINTCHA in Portuguese 17 Oct 84 p 5

[Text] "Guinea-Bissau will soon be benefiting from a Portuguese ship which will undertake the transportation of products of prime necessity, as well as others which the domestic market requires." This statement was made by the director of the Commerce and Navigation Company, Mr Dilio Nunes, who was in the country recently to contact high-ranking officials and commercial enterprises here.

Speaking to the news media, the subject of our interview said that, upon the return of the ship, which will become Guinean, it would carry to Portugal products from our country, specifically, lumber, peanuts, coconuts, cashew nuts and other products.

According to the information obtained from the Commerce and Navigation Company director, the products are also to be sent to the agricultural company, which will facilitate the management of the country's supplies.

It should be stressed that this Commerce and Navigation Company is private, with mixed capital, and will fill a gap that exists both in supplies of products and ocean transportation; and that the priorities for the shipping will be decided by the Ministry of Commerce and Transportation.

In conclusion, Mr Dilio Nunes stated that this initiative would meet the requirements that might crop up in our country presently.

2909

CSO: 3442/56

CONSEQUENCES OF ARMED BANDIT ACTIVITIES ON NATION'S COMMERCE

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 30 Oct 84 p 6

[Text] Most of the countries in the "hinterland," western Mozambique, are largely dependent on Mozambique's rail transportation for their imports and exports.

The case of Malawi is a typical example of a country whose economy has been obviously stifled, particularly since 1981, by the sabotage and destruction of sections of the railroad lines of central and northern Mozambique and of trains with freight cars coming from and going to Malawi.

However, those railroad lines are still being kept operational, despite the sabotage of highway bridges, sections of line and cars.

Mozambique and Malawi have pledged mutually to avert, impede or eliminate each and every act capable of violating the principle of good neighbor relations or of jeopardizing peace, security and stability in either country.

The commitment has now been raised to the status of a legal instrument, inasmuch as it has been made express in the terms of the General Agreement on Cooperation signed on 23 October by Presidents Samora Machel and Kamuzu Banda, in Blantyre.

In it, the two countries declare that they will not allow the respective territories to be used as a base, a passage point or any other type of backup by organizations or groups of individuals who are planning or preparing to carry out acts of violence, terrorism or aggression against territorial integrity, or who could threaten the security of its inhabitants and respective assets, as well as infrastructures, equipment and goods.

To be sure, this type of commitment between two countries, especially when they are neighbors, can only be founded upon sufficiently strong reasons, the features and nature of which warrant their inclusion in a document which regulates the interstate relations, as in the case of the General Agreement on Cooperation between Mozambique and Malawi.

The leading routes for the economy of Malawi, a country contained within a large plateau in Southern Africa, lie in Mozambican territory. The railroad

lines of northern and central Mozambique are Malawi's gateway to the world. In the north, the line extends from Nacala, one of the largest ports in Africa, located on the coast of Mozambique, to Entre-Lagos, on the border with Malawi. There are 603 kilometers of track which, from the coast to the interior, pass through Monapo, Nampula, Cuamba and Entre-Lagos, and enter Malawi territory.

The final section runs from Cuamba to Entre-Lagos, which is the point of contact on the border of the two countries. Its length is 77 kilometers.

It is precisely along this stretch that most of the acts of sabotage committed by the armed bandits occur.

On 29 August of this year, the line was sabotaged at kilometer 67, 10 kilometers from the border with Malawi.

On the same section of the Cuamba/Entre-Lagos line, 39 kilometers from the border, a car activated a mine, and the locomotive was immediately attacked; two fuel tanks and a baggage car were burned as a result of this act by the armed bandits.

In the same location (39 kilometers from Malawi), there had already been an attack, during March, on a train, resulting in the death of one person, injuries to 13 and damage to the line. During the first week of February of this year, 1 kilometer from the border, two persons were injured and four cars were derailed.

These acts by the armed bandits relate only to the period between January and September 1984, on the Cuamba/Entre-Lagos line, which is the final section of the railroad line of northern Mozambique on the border with the Republic of Malawi.

Sabotage

During the first 4 months of this year, four locomotives of the Malawi Railway (Railroads of Malawi), leased by CFM [Mozambique Railroad]-North, were attacked on the aforementioned section, resulting in slight damage to two, considerable damage to one and the burning of another, without a chance of repair.

But the acts of sabotage near the border with Malawi in Mozambican territory have not been confined merely to the Nacala/Entre-Lagos line.

In the central part of the country, the Beira/Vila Nova da Fronteira line (a passage point for trains on the Mozambique-Malawi border) and the Moatize/V. Nova da Fronteira line, both of which serve Malawi directly, have not had any better luck. Let us observe what happened this year to the latter, which carries the coal from Moatize to Malawi.

On 18 August, the line was sabotaged at kilometer 162. One locomotive and seven cars were overturned.

During the third quarter of this year, lines were attacked and communications were sabotaged on kilometer 229.

During the first half, the line was sabotaged on at least three occasions; two cars and one locomotive were derailed, a train on the track was attacked, and two cars and a tank car were overturned.

The incidents took place inside Mozambique, in Tete Province, at the site where the railroad line runs 10 kilometers from the border with Malawi.

While, on the one hand, it is a fact that human lives, infrastructure of the rail transport system, and trains and cars with their respective goods destroyed have seriously hurt the economy of Mozambique, nevertheless they have not failed to have negative results on the economy of Malawi, which cannot be considered exempt from the erosion caused by these acts of banditry.

A country considered to be self-sufficient in agricultural products, with considerable food reserves, one of the few such in Africa, it is starting to introduce the terminology of economic austerity.

The asphyxia stemming from these acts of banditry in Mozambican territory, particularly during the past 3 years, a period with the greatest incidence of sabotage on the border with Malawi, has been blurring the fragile crystallinity of its economy, despite the use of other methods for exporting and importing as "alternatives" to those located inside Mozambique.

Malawi is paying, both on the Beira railroad line and the one from Nacala to its territory, 45.22 kwachas per ton of tobacco transported over each kilometer; for every tone of sugar, per kilometer, it pays 39.45 kwachas; for gasoline, the rate of 72.36 kwachas is applied; and for diesel, it is 44.19.

These routes of Malawi's economy, starting from the ports of Beira and Nacala, are twice as advantageous and four times cheaper than the route from Durban, in South Africa, which Malawi has been using.

Of the 70,000 tons of tobacco produced by Malawi this year, 40,000 were exported. Only 8,229 tons went via Nacala, and the rest by highway to Harare or Lusaka, and from there by train to the port of Durban.

In addition to being more expensive, the Durban route is considerably slower.

From 1981 to the present, the freight carried from and to Malawi via Beira showed the following performance: 463,000 tons in 1980, 450,000 in 1981, reduced to 319,700 the following year, and declining to 62,400 tons last year. As of September of this year, there was no freight carried.

Damage to Malawi

Using the Nacala route, in 1980 the freight carried bound for or coming from Malawi totaled 229,500 tons. During the following years, a precipitous decline started to appear.

During 1981, 4,400 fewer tons were transported than in the previous year; and, in 1982, the statistical data cited 35,400 fewer tons of freight carried along the Nacala route to Malawi.

During 1983, there was a recovery over 1982. Nevertheless, by September 1984 there was another decline of 56,100 tons in comparison with 1983.

Taking for comparative purposes the total freight carried in 1980 by the two Mozambican routes to Malawi, with respect to the total as of the end of September of this year, the deficit in freight transported during 1984 is close to the total volume carried in 1980.

This means that the difference in the freight not passing through our ports and railroads is being carried on the Durban route.

Hence, Malawi is forced to pay four times more in transportation costs, in spite of the special rates offered by South Africa.

Although it has been attempted to depict this route as an alternative to the Mozambican routes, the high prices that Malawi has to withstand negate that attempt.

This is reflected in the purchasing power of the citizens of Malawi which has declined nearly fivefold from 1980 to the present.

In a country wherein budget austerity has not been part of the vocabulary, it is currently the mark not only of the government, but of the ordinary citizen as well.

Finally, we need only note that, in order to reduce the deficit in the operating budget, the public authorities intend to increase the taxes levied on exports and pass a surtax of between 4 and 5 percent on imports.

In other words, all the products and consumer goods are tending to become increasingly expensive, at a rate of nearly 25 percent.

In a country wherein the minimal wage is 30 kwachas per month, it is starting to become intolerable to pay housing rent of 17 kwachas; in other words, more than 56 percent of that wage; and to purchase a kilogram of meat, the price of which increased from 1 to 4 kwachas, is within the means of only the most well-to-do class.

Roughly speaking, these are some of the consequences for life in Malawi, in the economic realm alone, of the sabotage which the armed bandits have inflicted on the railroad lines in northern and central Mozambique, along the border with that country.

To simplify, I would only say that, in 1980, a total of 692,500 tons of export and import products were transported to and from Malawi on Mozambique's two railroad lines.

Now, at an average price of 45 kwachas for every ton transported, per kilometer, along the Mozambican routes, Malawi paid a total rate, per kilometer, of nearly 31 million kwachas. Today, that same freight, carried on the current Durban route, costs four times more.

It is the awareness of an imminent economic and social calamity that is starting to appear explosively in Malawi, as a direct result of the sabotage to which I have referred, adjoining its borders, that unquestionably prompted the political commitment to prevent or eliminate the acts of banditry along the 1,400 kilometers of common border.

If they should continue, not even its most "faithful and generous" friends will be able to prevent the complete collapse of the "example" of stability and abundance that Malawi had boasted at least until the end of the 1970's.

2909

CSO: 3442/64

ITALY DONATES GIFT OF FREEZE-DRIED FOOD

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 24 Oct 84 p 1

[Text] The Italian ambassador to Mozambique, Patrizio Schmidlin, reasserted Italy's determination to continue with the food and economic aid to our country, which at this time is facing various difficulties, in a statement made in Maputo yesterday morning. Patrizio Schmidlin spoke at the ceremony at which a part of a gift of 200 tons of freeze-dried products, mainly soups, was delivered. He also announced that 10,000 tons of rice in food aid to the RPM [People's Republic of Mozambique] will be delivered in November. Mozambique was represented by Minister of Mineral Resources Abdul Magid Osman, and Secretary of State for Supply Francisco Masquil was also present.

The first portion of the gift includes 37 tons of freeze-dried products, and is intended as a contribution to the victims of the natural catastrophes which have occurred in various provinces of Mozambique, including those which were seriously affected by the prolonged drought. Also it was expected that a cargo plane carrying the second part of the gift would arrive in Maputo yesterday.

It was also announced that a shipment of 10,000 tons of rice offered as food aid to our country will arrive in Maputo next month. This gift comes within the general cooperation agreement on food aid between Mozambique and Italy.

In the ceremony at which the gift was presented, Ambassador Patrizio Schmidlin confirmed the determination of his country to continue the food and economic aid being offered to Mozambique, particularly in this phase in which "you are experiencing difficulties." He said that it has been the concern of Italy to provide aid making it possible to resolve various both long- and medium-term problems. Italy has made a great contribution with a view to offsetting the serious effects of natural catastrophes, in particular the tropical storm Domoina and the prolonged drought.

"Our aid to Mozambique is intended to resolve short- and long-term problems, especially those caused by the serious effects of natural catastrophes and another calamity, which is the armed bandits.

"We also support the implementation of major economic projects, which will contribute greatly to increasing farm production, as is the case with construction of the Corumane and Little Libombo dams and irrigation projects," the ambassador said.

Minister of Mineral Resources Abdul Magid Osman said in his speech that Italy is one of the most important economic partners of Mozambique, and that it has contributed greatly to resolving some of the difficulties the country is experiencing in almost all sectors. Italy is placing special stress on the food aid sector and on the implementation of programs of great importance to agriculture. Magid Osman mentioned, among other instances, the construction of the Corumane and Little Libombo dams, and the role played by Italy in other projects in connection with agriculture, one of which should be noted especially: the agroindustrial development of Sabie-Incomati.

The minister of natural resources praised the Italian government for its high level of understanding in its contribution to the resolution of various Mozambican problems, particularly in the realm of food aid.

"Italy has been one of the countries which has provided the most support to offset some of our difficulties. At the time of the tropical storm Domoina, we received tremendous support from Italy, including among other things medicines, trucks and substantial quantities of rice and freeze-dried products," Magid Osman said.

It should be noted that in talks held with an Italian government delegation recently, the minister of mineral resources, who is the president of the Mozambican representation in the Mixed Mozambique-Italy Commission, defined the implementation of farm programs to strengthen food production, an aspect to which Italy is devoting special attention, as a new area for cooperation with that European country.

Last June, Mozambique and Italy signed an agreement calling for provision of 10,000 tons of rice, freeze-dried products including 90 tons of green beans, 5 tons of canned meat, tomato and other vegetable soups, and 300 tons of canned sardines.

5157

CSO: 3442/52

REPORTER ANALYZES RECENT PRETORIA ACCORD

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 6 Oct 84 p 7

[Article by Eduardo Cintra Torres: "The New Accord in Mozambique"]

[Text] This week, Mozambique gave the world another surprise. The Mozambican Government and the RENAMO [Mozambican National Resistance] rebels announced their willingness to negotiate a cease-fire.

It is a rare phenomenon in Africa, which should not be dimmed by the possible continuation of the fighting.

In fact, what the South African president, Pieter Botha, announced on Wednesday in the presence of representatives from the government and resistance in Mozambique, was a statement of intent and not a signed agreement for the cessation of hostilities.

Both Jacinto Veloso, from the government, and Evo Fernandes, from RENAMO, stated a few hours later that the war would continue; both sides certainly want the cease-fire in the most favorable military situation.

Victories and Defeats

The first lesson to be learned from this agreement on principles is that the situation of the Mozambican Government is extremely weak, despite all the international backing that it has available. First, it found itself forced to sign an agreement with South Africa (the number one foreign enemy), and now it finds itself forced to hold dialogue on the country's future with RENAMO, the enemy at home.

The "excessive" pragmatism that the Mozambican authorities have now been forced to adopt is a result of the "little" pragmatism that they failed to use in the past.

Political and economic mistakes enabled RENAMO, with an impetus and outside assistance, first from Rhodesia and later from South Africa, to achieve a speaking role.

RENAMO has undoubtedly won a first victory, by sitting down at the official negotiating table on an equal footing with the legitimate Mozambican authorities.

The serious internal situation and the direct or indirect interference by South Africa in Mozambique's internal affairs prompted Maputo to sign the Nkomati accord on 16 March, with the foreign enemy.

Mozambique could depict that accord as a victory of its own. But the agreement with RENAMO obviously smacks of defeat, even though the movement has acknowledged the authority of Samora Machel. And in both, meanwhile, there is a winner: South Africa.

The 'Peace Hawks'

The Mozambican Government attempted to transfer the resolution on civil war to the realm of the Nkomati accord, holding the South Africans responsible for it.

The latter fulfilled their role: they said "yes" to that plan and announced their intention of trying to put an end to RENAMO's activities; realizing that the movement had the capacity for continuing the battle despite the closing of the border to the guerrillas.

The results are obvious: It was Botha who announced the preliminary agreement on a cease-fire. The head of the regime most fought against by black Africa, the president of the country which uses the racial segregation system, appears before the world as the mediator between the two sides in a war being waged in a neighboring front line country.

The agreement represents a political victory for South Africa on the international scene. There was no intervention by Portugal, or Zambia, or Zimbabwe, or Cape Verde or the United States. It was all decided between Maputo, Gongo-rosa and Pretoria. Pieter Botha and Roelf Botha could appear as "peace hawks."

Sources familiar with the progress of the negotiations remark that it was the Mozambican Government which, from the outset, requested South Africa as a mediator and a guarantor of the results of the talks.

Hence, this paradoxical situation was reached: It is RENAMO, through its leader, Evo Fernandes, that has stated that it does not want the movement of South African troops to guarantee a future cease-fire in Mozambique. A year ago, no one would have believed this outcome, not even facetiously.

An Example for Angola

Indirectly, this preliminary agreement in Mozambique shows that it is the foreign presence in Angola that has postponed the start of the peaceful solution to the Angolan internal conflict.

RENAMO, created after independence and waging a battle with little international impact, achieved more in 8 years than UNITA [National Union for the Total

Independence of Angola] did (and far more than the disbanded FNLA [Angolan National Liberation Front] did); liberation movements founded 2 decades ago, and legitimized by the OAU [Organization of African Unity] and by the Alvor accords.

It would not be surprising if South Africa's victory in Mozambique, instead of pushing Pretoria toward a negotiated solution with Luanda, were to cause the reaffirmation of the need for the Cubans' withdrawal.

What South Africa achieved in Mozambique is an invitation to that hard line.

But, on the other hand, the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] leaders might take it out on the leaders of FRELIMO [Mozambican Liberation Front]. Without the Cubans, they would by now have probably been prompted to make another Incomati accord, and to the need to negotiate the end of the war with UNITA.

In any event, Mozambique has set an example. And examples such as this are capable of pressuring for the development of events in the other countries of the region; and not only in Angola. It is also possible that Robert Mugabe might see the advantage of being able to control his enemies under democracy over having them armed in the jungle.

2909

CSO: 3442/56

ANALYSIS OF EVENTS SINCE 'PRETORIA DECLARATION'

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 25 Oct 84 p 38

[Article by correspondent Silva Ramalho: "Peace or the 'Third War of Liberation'"]

[Text] Johannesburg--Yesterday, it was exactly 3 weeks since the world rejoiced at the so-called "Pretoria Declaration," announcing peace for Mozambique. What has happened since then? The war is dragging on throughout the entire country. Maputo is suffering the hardships of a tight encirclement. Mozambique is on the brink of chaos.

The optimism created by the Pretoria peace talks in which the government of Mozambique and RENAMO [Mozambican National Resistance] participated, with South Africa acting as mediator, has been followed by a deepseated unrest.

After a few smiles for the photographer and some fitting remarks, the conflicting sides assumed positions marked by a hardness that does not bode anything good. It is not with FRELIMO's [Mozambique Liberation Front] insistence upon calling the members of RENAMO "bandits", and the latter's giving justification for the charges of its assassinating defenseless civilians, that peace can be made.

In fact, never in the 8-year duration of this so-called "second war of liberation" wherein Mozambican National Resistance has struggled to win power, has such brutality been reached in the military action, and such a deep hatred by one side for the other been evoked as at the present time.

Amid the official secrecy, it is guessed that the Pretoria talks are continuing and that there is still a ray of hope,amid the disbelief that is increasing from one day to the next, regarding a cease-fire agreement, the first step toward discussing peace.

Meanwhile, with the passage of time, there is heightening of the risk that Mozambique may "erupt--like a volcano," an image heard a few days ago in Swaziland from the remark of an influential person with international projection.

The irony of the situation is that observers, both friend and foe, agree that it is in the charismatic figure of Samora Machel that the options for a genuine peace or an escalation of a war which it is even feared may not be the one that is under way now are concentrated at present.

In Mozambique, South Africa and Swaziland, the informed and conscious sectors of public opinion foresee several possible scenarios which could decide Mozambique's future. Whatever the outcome proves to be, one thing is certain: Every day that passes hastens the outbreak of one of those situations.

The main scenario, desired by much of the outside world and deemed acceptable by the majority of the Mozambican people, would be the implementation of the "Pretoria Declaration": the establishment of Machel as a national leader, a cease-fire, national reconciliation and consolidation of the peace through moral and material backing from the rest of the world.

All the others that get rid of Machel, by mere ouster or by means of his physical elimination, would lead to that "eruption" which someone has now termed "the third war of liberation," which is even more dangerous because it could give rise to armed intervention from abroad.

While the politicians talk, sulk and exchange mutual threats, Mozambique and its people are suffering unnecessarily and in obscurity. Since the Nkomati Accord, both public and private institutions all over the world have been waiting for peace to come to the victimized Mozambican nation, so as to launch a gigantic operation to assist that country.

In this instance, it is not a matter of compassionate intentions merely to impress the naive. The structures have been set up, the financing has been obtained and the technical and human facilities have been made available.

They are only waiting for good sense and clear thinking to win the game, so as to start the exciting task of rebuilding Mozambique and putting the country on the path of progress, ensured by its prodigious potential.

2909

CSO: 3442/64

MINISTER OF STATE ACCUSED OF MEETING WITH EVO FERNANDES

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 26 Oct 84 p 19

[Text] Official circles in Maputo insist upon linking Minister of State Almeida Santos with a telephone call reportedly made in Lisbon to Evo Fernandes, secretary general of RENAMO [Mozambican National Resistance]. According to O JORNAL's correspondent in Maputo, Fernando Lima, Mozambican sources associated with those circles would be willing, "if necessary," to disclose the location at which the telephone call was made to Evo Fernandes.

Yesterday, we attempted to contact Minister Almeida Santos, to confirm this report. It was impossible to get in touch with Almeida Santos, because he was away from the office (because of the arrival of Prime Minister Pedro Pires and an official banquet).

However, we recall that yesterday, Thursday, the minister of state remarked, in an interview with JORNAL DE NOTICIAS regarding his involvement in the negotiations of what is now termed "N'Komati II," that, "I have nothing to do with them, except for the hope that I place in them."

The connection which certain sectors made between Almeida Santos and the current negotiations for peace in Mozambique resulted directly from the contacts between the minister of state and certain Portuguese businessmen, including Manuel Bulhosa (recently received by Samora Machel), who are attempting to invest in that former Portuguese colony; but only at the time when "security" is guaranteed for the respective investments. This requirement had also been made previously by South African economic groups and conveyed through official channels in Pretoria to the Mozambican authorities.

The refusal by the "Portuguese" component of RENAMO to sign the cease-fire without the establishment of an agreement on "political reforms" in Mozambique, a decision made last week, actually caused some "surprise" in Lisbon government circles, with virtually no contacts within RENAMO and at a great disadvantage in view of the "intimacy" that exists between the South African secret services and RENAMO's military structures, and hence with greater dependence on the Pretoria authorities.

On the other hand, experts on South African affairs underscore the present correlation of forces between Pretoria's political and military forces,

which is currently favorable for an agreement with Samora Machel and RENAMO, aimed at immediate peace in the region; a correlation of forces which could be upset within a short time.

Well placed sources in Maputo nevertheless assured Fernando Lima, O JORNAL's correspondent in the Mozambican capital, that the problem involving the cessation of organized violence in that country might be solved within the next few days.

This optimism has emerged following intense contacts made during the past few days between government missions from Mozambique and South Africa, from the standpoint of putting an end to RENAMO's activity.

Yesterday, there was news of an unannounced meeting between Samora Machel and Pieter Botha, who traveled to Lusaka, where the Mozambican president was located, attending the celebrations marking the 25th anniversary of the founding of the party headed by President Kenneth Kaunda.

It should be remembered that a high-level delegation from Pretoria was in Maputo very recently, bringing further details of a plan of action against RENAMO which might be implemented shortly.

Samora Machel, in an attempt to tighten the encirclement around RENAMO's activities, also signed an agreement with Malawi Wednesday, on defense and security.

With this background, RENAMO, in Lisbon, released a communique this week in which it announced an "important military offensive on the national level, with the code name 'Trovao'[Thunder]." The communique, signed by RENAMO's new spokesman in Lisbon, journalist Paulo Oliveira of O DIA, notes that this operation is to be triggered starting in November.

2909

CSO: 3442/64

OIL PROSPECTING ACTIVITY PURSUED IN ZAMBEZE DELTA


Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 23 Oct 84 p 2

[Text] Oil prospecting will be carried out for an initial period of 3 years in four blocks in the Zambeze delta on the coast of Mozambique. The work will be carried out over an area of 21 square kilometers, where similar activities were successfully pursued, but to a more limited extent, by the Hunt International and ELF [Gasoline and Lubricants Company of France] Aquitaine companies between 1968 and 1973.

A contract was signed for this purpose on the 17th of this month in London between AMOCO, an oil-producing company, and the Mozambique State Oil Company, the National Hydrocarbons Enterprise, on a production-sharing basis. AMOCO, the oil exploitation company, which is a subsidiary of Standard Oil of Indiana, in the United States, will carry out oil exploration work for an initial period of 3 years, and the contract provides for two optional extension periods of 2 years each.

After Mozambique won its independence in 1975, seismic prospecting work was done along the coast of Mozambique, and when the results were analyzed, the coastal sector was divided into blocks. At that point, international bids for exploration contracts were solicited.

AMOCO was involved in the search for oil in Mozambique in 1958, when the company was granted a joint concession with the Gulf Oil Company covering more than 100 square kilometers between Quelimane, in the northern part of Mozambique, and Inhambane, in the southern part.



The gray blocks on the chart (M4, M5, M6 and M8) are the areas in which oil exploration is to be pursued in the Zambeze delta.

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CSO: 3442/52

PROGRESS IN INHAMBANE CASHEW MARKETING CAMPAIGN REPORTED

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 23 Oct 84 p 3

[Text] On 15 October, the campaign to market cashews, which will end in May of next year, began in Inhambane Province. Incentive products were provided to the peasants in connection with this campaign, textile and food products and articles for household use, to be specific, totaling an estimated 13 million meticals. These products had already been made available to the participants on the district level, to ensure success in the initial phase of the campaign.

The distribution of the quotas of the products supplied to the participants in this marketing campaign was carried out on the basis of the volume of cashews each delivered to the plant for the processing of this product in Inhambane during the first 9 months of this year.

The Inhambane provincial government set 4500 tons of cashews as the minimum goal to be marketed during this campaign, while the maximum figure was set at 6,000 tons. A commission was created on the provincial level to take responsibility for the marketing process, and similar organs will be established in the districts.

Aggressive AGRICOM Action

At the recent quarterly meeting of the AGRICOM held in the city of Maxixe, in Inhambane, the president of the commission, who is the provincial party secretary for the economy in Inhambane, said that "the AGRICOM should be more aggressive in marketing, in order to be able to reach the goals assigned to it." He stressed that the AGRICOM delegates must begin to acquire the spirit typical of a businessman, because essentially this is what they are too.

The provincial secretary for the economy in Inhambane said further that the volume of goods to be provided each participant should be approximately equal to the volume of cashews to be purchased from the peasants, in order to offset the amount the state is putting into their purchase. He criticized the AGRICOM for tolerating as normal the practice of allowing peasants to bring insignificant quantities of cashews or other surplus farm products in for sale, thus acquiring the right to purchase any product or article of first necessity without any supplement in money being required for their purchase.

In this connection, he cited by way of example the fact that a producer can bring in only 5 kilograms of cashews (corresponding to 50 MT at the current

price) to purchase a Xirico radio which costs 3,500. "It is because of this that, although there are few products for incentives to the peasantry, we are unable to make efficient use of them, because the quantities of surplus products we are buying are laughable," the provincial secretary for the economy said.

The participants in the quarterly AGRICOM meeting, representatives and storekeepers at the district stores and warehouses, spoke out about the main problems affecting the marketing of cashews, such as the shortage of support products, producers' reluctance to make one single delivery of the cashews in their possession, and the low cashew production yield resulting from weather factors. In addition to this, the disparity in the criteria for the marketing of this product, which vary from district to district, as was emphasized by the speakers at the meeting, should be noted.

It was recommended at the quarterly AGRICOM meeting that the peasants be made aware of the importance of this product to the economic life of the country, with a view to the success of this cashew marketing campaign, with the involvement of party and state structures and the mass democratic organizations, and also that they be informed about the rise in the purchase price from the producer.

On the other hand, in a step designed to ensure better results in the marketing process, the provincial commission in charge thereof will establish control mechanisms for the incentive products provided to each participant based on the delivery of cashews made by each to the plant for the processing of this product in Inhambane.

Cashew Marketing

During this year's marketing campaign, running from January to September, 1400 tons of cashews were purchased, representing 70 percent of the goal set for the province.

The AGRICOM in Inhambane purchased 273 tons direct from producers, while 1,127 tons were marketed through other participants in the campaign, including private merchants, consumer cooperatives and state enterprises--the Cashew Enterprise, Processing Plant, Cotton Enterprise, Hortofruticola and MADEMO.

Merchants Benjamim Alfredo Miranda, Aqbal Aly Momade and Ibraimo Cassamo together marketed 517 tons, while the state enterprises purchased 200 tons.

The marketing of cashews in the province of Inhambane, a region which has suffered from the effects of drought in recent years, was affected not only by the passage of Hurricane Domoína, which destroyed the existing production as well as some hundreds of cashew trees, but by the activities of armed bandits as well. No marketing took place in Govuro, including the locality of Mabote, a phenomenon also true of certain zones in various other districts of the province, such as, for example, the locality of Pembe, in Homoine, the interior regions of Vilanculo, and the localities of Macavelane and Jojo, in Panda.

However, the volume of cashews purchased this year shows an advance in the province over the past 2 years, a rather significant fact. This development is the result of the activities pursued in recent months by the FAM-FPLM [Popular Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique], within the campaign to eliminate the armed bandits, making it possible this year for the marketing brigades to reach zones which they previously could not.

The 1400-ton total is less than the 8,750 tons reached in 1981. The percentage is high because the goal of 18,000 tons in 1981, which was 48.6 percent fulfilled, dropped to 2,000 tons this year. However, the real needs of the industry have increased, and the 1400 tons is not enough for the cashew processing plant, which can accommodate about 8,000 tons per year. This means that the 1400 tons purchased represent only 17.5 percent of the raw material needed for the full operation of this factory unit. This production unit has received 12,770 [sic] tons of the volume of cashews marketed this year.

Moreover, the cashew processing plant in Inhambane, in operation from March until last month, processed 1231 tons of the product, yielding 121 tons of No 1 (whole) cashews, 110 tons of No 2 (broken) cashews and 106 tons of cashew oil. The production plan established for this year called for the processing of 1100 tons of cashews and the production of 95 tons of No 1 cashews, 125 tons of No 2 cashews and 88 tons of cashew oil.

Other Products Marketed

Within the context of the most recent marketing campaign for surplus products of the population in the province of Inhambane, 2,743 tons of mafura, 935 tons of copra, 300 of corn and 49 of nhemba beans were also obtained.

A goal of 4,000 tons was set for mafura, while the totals to be marketed for copra, corn and nhemba beans were 3500, 382 and 250 tons, respectively.

The district of Zavala led in marketing the largest quantity of mafura, 578 tons, while the district of Morrumbene stood out in turn in purchases of copra, reaching the 484-ton level.

The mafura and copra purchased during this year went to the soap factory in Inhambane and the Maputo oils and soaps unit, while the corn and nhemba beans were stored to provide seed for the 1984-85 farm season.

Within this period from January to September, the soap factory in Inhambane received 1776 tons of mafura for its normal processing operations, and 393 tons of copra for the same purpose. During that same period of time, 947 tons of mafura and 518 tons of copra were sent to the plants in Maputo.

Overall, it can be said that the quantities of mafura, copra, corn and nhemba beans purchased this year still fall below the figures for the preceding season. However, it should be emphasized that the marketing of these products has not ended yet, and will only do so next December, such that it is still possible that the mafura goal will be reached. The same is no longer true for copra, corn and nhemba beans.

Again within the framework of the marketing of the surplus products of the population, the AGRICOM in Inhambane and other participants in the process have also purchased 23 tons of sunflower seed, 351 tons of fresh cassava and 2 tons of yams, in addition to varying quantities of fresh coconut, beeswax, coffee and piri-piri, among other products.

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CSO: 3442/52

BEIRA AWAITS DELIVERY OF SPINNING EQUIPMENT FROM INDIA

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 16 Oct 84 p 3

[Text] A (design) project for a vertical spinning machine manufactured in the United States and four different cotton fiber-processing machines made in India will arrive in Beira shortly. They will be copied and used in the clothing and fiber program of the Rural Development Center (CDR), a body being created in the province of Sofala, the Beira morning newspaper DIARIO DE MOCAMBIQUE reported in yesterday's issue.

That same source said that the original machine for the project which will be copied in Mozambique is on display in a museum in New York, was designed for home use in that country, and was used during the last century. Its basically simple structures are made of wood and make it possible to produce a good quantity of cotton thread in a short time.

Both the design and the four cotton fiber processing machines, DIARIO DE MOCAMBIQUE was told by Bonni Carryer, who is in charge of the CDR program mentioned above, were purchased by FAO officials, who are members of the "1 Percent for Development" body created to support rural development in the country in the clothing and fiber sector.

The FAO officials will also pay the salary of an Indian technician from the Gandhigram Trust, the institution from which the four processing machines were purchased. This technician will come to Mozambique to teach Mozambicans the techniques essential for the use of the machinery.

The copying of the machines will be done by the carpentry section of the CDR in supplementary premises in the Manga zone.

The copies of the machines will be made using local materials, the same source also said.

The "1 Percent for Development" body is in fact a group of FAO officials who annually contribute 1 percent of their salaries to support the developing countries, in Africa and Latin America in particular.

The group learned of the work which is being done in Mozambique in the rural growth sector within the context of Project FO-7, and as a result decided to channel their aid to our country this season.

Moreover, DIARIO DE MOCAMBIQUE, citing the same source again, has reported that the CDR clothing and fiber program has this month begun training young people at the primary school in the communal settlement of Mutua in the district of Dondo, in this work sector. An effort will be made to provide instruction to continuing workers, in particular fourth-grade students, despite the fact that there is not a permanent group operating as yet.

"We would like to work eventually with a group of between 10 and 15 continuing workers in the clothing and fiber program, in order to guarantee the development of this activity," Bonni Carryer told DIARIO DE MOCAMBIQUE.

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CSO: 3442/52

NEW STATE COTTON ENTERPRISE CREATED IN MOCUBA

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 19 Oct 84 p 2

[Text] With a view to making cotton production more dynamic in the province of Zambezia and developing support of the family sector to keep pace with the textile industry development projects in that zone, the Mocuba-Namagoa State Cotton Enterprise was recently established in that province on the basis of a joint document signed by the ministers of planning, finance and agriculture, which was published in the BOLETIM DA REPUBLICA last September. The new enterprise will have its headquarters in Mocuba and will enjoy administrative and financial autonomy.

The creation of a state enterprise devoted to the cotton sector came about pursuant to the economic and social directives approved by the Fourth Congress of the FRELIMO Party, calling for making state enterprises responsible for the task of dynamizing the development of the cotton production sector and increasing support to the family sector, regarded as the basis of balanced and autonomous development.

According to Ministerial Order 46/84 signed by the ministers of planning, finance and agriculture, the new state cotton units will further have the duty of promoting the production of seed cotton, sisal and food crops in the state sector, and providing support to the family sector for the production of seed cotton and foodstuffs.

Parallel with this, the enterprise will market seed cotton produced by the family sector, private enterprises and cooperatives, and will further centralize the ginning of seed cotton and the shredding of sisal, such as to guarantee a supply of these products in the future to the largest textile plant in the country, which is being built in the district of Mocuba.

The building of the textile plant in Mocuba is the top priority among the various industrial projects, according to the economic and social directives issued by the Fourth FRELIMO Party Congress. In addition to responding to the needs of this future plant, the new Mocuba-Namagoa State Cotton Enterprise has been established with a view to the future implementation of an agroindustrial project in the province of Zambezia.

According to Ministerial Order 46/84 which created the new state cotton enterprise in Zambezia, this unit will integrate the farm production subunits in Namagoa and Mocuba-Sisal, the cotton ginning plants in Mocuba, and the Mocuba-Sisal and Namagoa shredding plants.

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CSO: 3442/52

HIDROMOC PLANS DOMESTIC ASSEMBLY OF IMPORTED PUMPS

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 16 Oct 84 p 3

[Text] Beginning this month, HIDROMOC will import electric pump parts for later assembly at its workshops, the director general of that enterprise announced last Saturday in Maputo during the inauguration of a workshop for the repair of motor-driven pumps, electrical pumps, drainage pumps and water treatment equipment. Andre Mapanzene further announced that the workshop will specialize in the repair of five diesel engine makes, to wit MWM, Styer, Faryman, Maritza and Lister.

The import of electric pump parts for later assembly in our country will make possible a relative saving in foreign exchange on the purchase and transport of this type of hydraulic equipment, officials at that enterprise say. Our interlocutor said further that this will contribute on the one hand to increasing the value of our work, and on the other, to an increase in equipment of other types to be imported.

Aurelio Manhica, a member of the Central Committee of the FRELIMO Party and defense secretary of the city committee, presided at the ceremony held to inaugurate the workshop mentioned, which is provided with equipment using modern technology in order to render efficient service.

Speaking to the workers during this ceremony, Aurelia Manhica reviewed the most burning issues in the country, in particular the negotiations between the governments of Mozambique and South Africa resulting in the issuance of the Pretoria statement on the 3rd of this month.

"This is a decisive moment for us. We must therefore become even more vigilant in order to neutralize any effort at enemy infiltration," Aurelio Manhica said at a certain point. He urged the workers to join the popular militia units "in order to defend our labor site," and also the vigilance groups, "so that we can denounce any strange conduct."

Nature of the Workshop

The workshop was established with the support of the DANIDA, a Danish state body. In this connection, a technical expert in diesel engines spent about a year and a half working on the workshop installation project and on the training and instruction of the personnel in mechanics, electrical and other specialized courses.

This workshop, equipped with a test laboratory and a sector for the manufacture of starters, is ready for the assembly of electric pumps and also the repair of the five brands of diesel engines which do not have agencies representing them in the country as yet.

The workshop further includes a section for the winding of electrical motors hooked to pumps, a machine section, a classroom for the training and instruction of workers and also a dining hall.

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CSO: 3442/52

ROMANIA PROVIDES AID TO MOZAMBIKAN RED CROSS

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 20 Oct 84 p 3

[Text] Fifty-three bundles of blankets and eight cases of medicine worth a total of \$50,000 (more than 2,000 contos) were delivered yesterday morning to the Mozambican Red Cross by Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Vasile Musat of the Socialist Republic of Romania.

The ceremony at which this gift from the Romanian people was presented took place in the headquarters building of the Mozambican Red Cross, and was attended by the secretary general of that humanitarian organization, Adelino Mahoze.

Speaking at the ceremony, the ambassador from the Socialist Republic of Romania said that this gift reflects the excellent relations between the peoples and governments of the two countries.

Vasile Musat emphasized that the people of the Socialist Republic of Romania have maintained relations of friendship and aid with the Mozambican people since the days of our country's war of liberation.

"Therefore, the blankets and medicine we are providing to the Mozambican Red Cross today are related to our traditional relations of friendship and mutual aid, because we are aware of the sad results caused by the drought which has been such a heavy burden upon your country," he said.

The secretary general of the Mozambican Red Cross, Adelino Mahoze, for his part, thanked the Romanian people for this gesture. He said that it came at just the right time because currently, there are many people in our country sleeping without any cover and dying for lack of medication.

He said that the situation is particularly keenly felt in the rural zones of Mozambique, where armed bandits have destroyed, plundered and burned the possessions of the defenseless people.

Adelino Mahoze explained that the articles delivered to the Mozambican Red Cross yesterday will be distributed to the people living in the areas most seriously affected by the activities of the armed bandits and by the drought.

CHERIMONIO CANAL TO BE REHABILITATED

Beira DIARIO DE MOCAMBIQUE in Portuguese 24 Oct 84 p 16

[Text] Brought to a standstill 4 years ago, as a result of the armed bandits' action, it is planned to recover the irrigation canal serving an area of 600 hectares, assigned to the state, cooperative and family sectors for growing rice in Cherimonio, in the Buzi district of Sofala. The undertaking will have technical backing from the Democratic Republic of Korea.

For this purpose, our country's minister of agriculture, Joao Ferreira, and the Korean vice minister of economic affairs abroad, Li Ju Son, traveled yesterday to that section of Sofala Province, to assess the present condition of the canal.

The Cherimonio irrigation canal is about 6 kilometers long, consisting of two parts, one of which, surfaced with cement, covers an expanse of nearly 2 kilometers, as far as the Buzi River.

On this occasion, the minister of agriculture remarked that the work on that canal was supposed to have started last year, but that the lack of cadres had prevented it from being initiated until now.

The ministerial party reached Beira yesterday, where it received a welcome from the provincial directors of agriculture, and industry and energy, in Sofala, Teotonio Fevereiro dos Muchangos and Gama Afonso, respectively, among other officials.

After spending a few minutes at Beira airport, the delegation departed for Buzi, where it was met by the first secretary and administrator of the district, Chivavice Muchangage, as well as by several officials on that level; later proceeding to the section of Cherimonio, which is nearly 15 kilometers from the town.

At the end of the visit, the administrator offered the vice minister from the Democratic Republic of Korea a bottle of pure alcohol made in that district from sugar cane molasses. Minister Joao Ferreira and the visiting party continued on yesterday bound for Quelimane, the provincial capital of Zambezia.

2909

CSO; 3442/57

NOVA MAMBONE SALTWORKS TO BE REOPENED

Beira DIARIO DE MOCAMBIQUE in Portuguese 24 Oct 84 p 3

[Text] The Nova Mambone Saltworks in the district of Govuro, in Inhambane, will resume its production again this month, after a standstill since the beginning of the year due to damage to machinery.

In fact, a technical team of Koreans was recently in that part of Inhambane Province, where it performed work aimed at repairing the damage which had occurred last March.

Those technicians also engaged in action associated with the minimal training of workers from that complex in the area of equipment maintenance, and made a general inspection of the entire salt production system.

At the present time, the feeding of the vaporization tank is under way, lacking only the crystallization, the final phase for the manufacture of that product.

However, the prospects for the complete fulfillment of the annual plan, which was for 6,200 tons, are very gloomy, inasmuch as, during the first quarter alone, the production was 511 tons.

As we were told, at that salt complex, upon the resumption of the salt production, the problems associated with removal, one of the serious problems for years, have become more marked.

Ricardo Nhabete, one of the members of that complex's management and secretary of the party cell, told us: "At present, we have over 5,000 tons of salt stored, because of difficulties related to transportation. All the warehouses are completely full, and the product is at risk."

Concurrently, we also noted the efforts being made to ensure the removal of all the product currently being stored, and we were informed that contacts are being made now with Sofala Province, in order to guarantee that the ships which have often removed fish to Sofala will remove some of the salt production, for example, that relating to Inhassoro and Vilanculo.

Along with these efforts, aimed at providing an outlet for the removal of the over 5 tons of salt being stored, we learned from the administrator of Govuro,

Afonso Francisco, that an agreement was recently signed with the district of Vilanculo which, among other things, acknowledged the need for a more rational utilization of the ocean fleet.

Ricardo Nhabele told us: "The bag problem has now been solved," adding that "the Cogropa enterprise in Sofala Province sent us a sufficient quantity for the production accrued to date."

With regard to the construction of a district for the workers, one of the most important instructions given by President Samora Machel during his recent visit to this part of the country, up until now five houses out of the 60 called for have been built.

According to the secretary of the party cell at the Nova Mambone Saltworks, the delay in the work on the district is due to the lack of certain construction materials. However, some significance has now been attached to the complex, and it is hoped that, this year, half of the houses planned will be built.

2909

CSO: 3442/57

PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED BY MAPUTO'S FISHING COOPERATIVES

Beira DIARIO DE MOCAMBIQUE in Portuguese 24 Oct 84 pp 8-9

[Text] Maputo--The production of the industrial fishermen in this city, most particularly that of the fishing cooperatives which exist along the bay of Maputo, has not been commensurate lately with the effort of their members, nor the production capacity of these collective organizations from the standpoint of the catch of shellfish products.

From the proclamation of independence to the present, in the nation's capital there have been eight cooperatives in operation, some of which are located on the island of Inhaca, and others in the sun coast area. Two out of the total are engaged in catching *Holothurians* (commonly known as "magajaja" [a variety of sea slug]), and the others catch non-shell fish.

Unfortunately, despite the fact that there are many of them, their total production has not yet carried any great weight in the supply to the population, as was to be expected at present. Last year, for example, the indexes on production from those fishing organizations, including that of individual fishermen, was only 462 tons, 31 of which consisted of clams and 10 *Holothurias*.

This production volume is obviously rather low, if we consider that the aforementioned cooperatives have a large supply of labor capable of producing more than is recorded here.

So what could be happening?

First of all, we must cite as one of the causes of the situation in question the problem of the small fleet of fishing boats in the cooperative sector, which is a fact, and the latter's state of preservation; not to mention that of other fishing equipment used by fishermen, such as dragging nets and others, for they are by now quite old.

Moreover, these shortcomings are part of the main obstacles to the development of industrial fishing per se in Maputo Province.

However, speaking of other reasons causing the low production rate of the cooperatives, we should mention the lack of organization among their members, as well as the lack of planning and control of production.

Example of Disorganization

During the trip to the island of Inhaca, our reporter talked about the subject with Luis Martins, director of the Sulpesca enterprise's agency, who, sharing this conviction of ours, cited as an example of the disorganization the state that the 7 April Enterprise has been in, commenting:

"A few days ago a meeting took place with this fishing organization's leaders, so that we could analyze and debate the reasons for its meager production. One of the conclusions that we reached was that, ultimately, the production was harmed because most of its members were systematically missing from service, in addition to which the others, perhaps out of neglect, were producing beneath their capacity; this being a result of the absence of supervision."

From this standpoint, certain corrective measures were decided upon, aimed at punishing those who were absent and neglectful. The penalties range from the reduction in the amount of certain products of prime necessity sold monthly to the industrial fishermen for the purpose of giving an impetus to their activity, to the adoption of administrative measures.

According to statistical data collected from the division for backup of industrial fishing on Inhaca, the 7 April Enterprise produced only 4 tons and 200 kilograms of fish during the first half of this year; which is quite inadequate in comparison with the production from the other cooperatives.

Punishments Do Not Suffice

In our opinion, the organizational problems besetting the cooperative sector cannot be solved merely by punitive measures. It is also necessary to study viable methods for reorganizing these collective organizations, and training their leadership organs.

In this connection, it has become essential to sponsor short-term management courses similar to what is being done in the consumer cooperatives, which have not required large financial costs for the state.

Furthermore, an official from the city of Maputo's industry and energy directorate, more specifically, from the fishing sector, said in this regard that this institution has now stopped orders for the opening of fishing cooperatives so as to engage in a reorganization effort among those already in existence.

May Day the Best in Maputo

Nevertheless, in a subsequent meeting at the headquarters of the Sulpesca Enterprise in Maputo, our reporter learned that, out of the eight cooperatives along Maputo Bay, the May Day, located on the island of Inhaca, is the best one in the nation's capital.

It is outstanding for both the organizational status of its members and for production.

To illustrate this fact, Francisco Gomes, an individual associated with the sector to back up industrial fishing, remarked that 80 percent of the 107 tons of fish caught last year in the Inhaca area belonged to this fishing organization.

This distinction was also confirmed by the industry and energy directorate.

Jose Botua Chalala, head of the aforementioned cooperative, aged 58 and a native of Inhaca, in talking with our newspaper about the operation of the May Day Cooperative, made the following statements:

"In the first place, I would say that here in our cooperative everyone benefits from the fruit of his labor. That is, the ones who produce a large amount receive incentives commensurate with their effort, in the form of foodstuffs and items for household use; and the lazy ones also receive what they deserve."

He added: "This system, which has been in effect for a long time, was adopted at a certain time when we noted that some of our comrades were becoming unproductive but that, on the other hand, they were continuing to enjoy the same rights as the others."

That fishing cooperative consists of 57 members, who are distributed among six boats. Each one of the groups has a chief, who supervises and checks the daily production.

"At the end of the month, each group of members is paid, consistent with the amount of fish that he has caught during the 30 days; and it is noteworthy that we deposit a certain percentage of the money in the bank."

When the Owner Fled We Continued Working

DIARIO DE MOCAMBIQUE: Since your bank account was opened, how much money have you deposited?

Head of the cooperative: I have no idea of the date, but I know that it was during the past few years. As for the balance, I don't know that for certain either, but it should be close to 100 contos. This fund has been used primarily to purchase fishing equipment and material for repairing the boats.

The May Day Cooperative was founded in 1978, and the overwhelming majority of its members belonged to a private fishing company which existed at the time of the Portuguese colonial rule, on the island of Inhaca, in Maputo.

Jose Botua Chalala comments: "After the proclamation of independence, when our owner fled to Lisbon, we inherited the fishing equipment and continued the fishing work. Filled with a desire and a determination, and also with backing given by the then National Fishing Directorate, we formed the cooperative."

Of the six vessels that this fishing organization has, only one sails with an engine, and the others float with the use of oars. Moreover, two of the boats are inoperative because of the lack of material (particularly lumber and contact cement) for their repair. Despite this, many efforts are being expended

by both the members of that cooperative and the structural organizations associated with the activity for backing industrial fishing, aimed at making it possible to rehabilitate these two fishing boats.

Sulpesca Opens New Branches

Expanding its area of activity associated with the industrial fishermen, the Sulpesca Enterprise should by now have completed the construction work on two branches (in the localities of Machangule and Macaneta, respectively, in the Matutuine and Marracuene districts), aimed at receiving fish products, and also at providing support to the fishermen in these sections of Maputo Province.

The work consisted of establishing infrastructures, such as facilities for the administrative services and the installation of exothermic chambers with an estimated capacity to hold 2 or 3 tons of shellfish.

Concurrently, an activity is under way to survey the work force in the fishing sector of the two aforementioned localities, so as to make it possible to monitor and provide planned backing for the fishermen's activities, with a view toward giving an incentive for their production.

It should be stressed that the Sulpesca Enterprise has backup and fish purchasing stations in the sections on the sun coast and the island of Inhaca, as well.

2909

CSO: 3442/57

VOCATIONAL COURSES OFFERED FOR CHILDREN OF FISHERMEN

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 25 Oct 84 p 10

[Article by Abdul Carimo: "Future Fishermen May Be Trained in Matola"]

[Text] The children of fishermen who live in Matola, in Maputo, among other places, may enroll in courses offered by the Matola Fishing Training Center, provided they have completed the fourth grade. This undertaking is designed to allow their continued theoretical and technical training in the fishing sector. The center, which is receiving FAO aid, has already trained a large number of cadres for the fishing industry in the engine and deck duty sectors, as well as launch operators. On the other hand, courses will be offered on an experimental basis in naval carpentry and fishing techniques.

Children of fishermen are being given access to courses provided by the Matola Fishing Training Center with a view to adapting their practical experience to theoretical and scientific education which will allow them to pursue fishing activities more efficiently, keeping up with the new techniques introduced as fishing has developed, in Mozambique in particular.

Within the plan with the theme "Young Fish Know How To Swim," the director of the center, Eusebio Siquela, told NOTICIAS that many fishermen are training and teaching their children fishing, but they lack the theoretical and scientific knowledge for the proper pursuit of the activity. The educational level for access to the center, which is operating currently on a boarding school basis, is fourth grade.

The Matola Fishing Training Center began operation in 1978, with courses lasting a year. At the beginning, there were more than a hundred students in engine room and deck operations and the level of achievement was to a certain extent positive.

In the second year of the operation of the Matola Fishing Training Center, the courses were extended to 2 years, and in 1982, annual enrollments and graduations began, and also a course for launch operators, which will cease to exist this year, was introduced.

The director of the center said moreover that courses of short duration for sailors and engine room personnel, among others, are now being given. Currently, the Matola Fishing Training Center has 65 workers, 85 students, 14 Mozambican teachers and nine foreign teachers working on contract with the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization.

On the other hand, new courses have been introduced on an experimental basis, specifically to teach naval carpentry and fishing techniques. These courses provide the students with a more profound understanding of fishing activities.

We also learned that meteorological equipment which has just been purchased by the UN Development Program will shortly be installed at the Matola Fishing Training Center.

"The training center is becoming very important for the training of cadres for the fishing industry in the country. This is our function, moreover. Initially, we began with students who, although they attended the courses available then, did not adapt to the reality of the sea. Today this problem is practically nonexistent. Apart from this, we are focusing our efforts on ensuring that the children of fishermen, particularly those who live in the Matola region, are provided with theoretical and scientific training so that they can pursue fishing activities more efficiently, for to speak the truth, ~~"young fish know how to swim,"~~ Eusebio Siquela said.

Foreign Support

The FAO is the international organization which provides technical aid, and teachers as well, to the Matola Fishing Training Center, following the signing of an agreement between Mozambique and the UN Development Program. The term of the contract ends next year.

Information obtained by NOTICIAS indicates that the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations has supplied this center with various equipment, including a ship (where the students pursue their practical training) and other infrastructure items, which will remain in Mozambique when the contract term ends.

"The effort the Mozambican government is making to train cadres who will be capable of realizing the prospects for the development of the domestic fishing industry is a great one. In the colonial era, according to our information, fish consumption depended on imports, and Mozambican fishing was not suitably exploited," Sergio Basulto, an FAO expert, said.

He stressed that the new Mozambican undertakings, including the experimental fishing for tuna off the coasts of this country, the development of networks of fishing combines and the use of sail vessels on Lake Niassa, will lead to the better development of the Mozambican fishing industry.

5157

CSO: 3442/52

DROUGHT VICTIM FAMILIES INTEGRATED INTO COMMUNAL VILLAGES

Beira DIARIO DE MOCAMBIQUE in Portuguese 25 Oct 84 p 4

[Text] Over 1,500 families victimized by the drought are now being reintegrated into communal villages in the locality of Inhassoro, in Govuro district of Inhambane Province.

These people, many of whom have already been rehabilitated, were forced to abandon their villages owing to the intensity of the drought which struck the interior of Inhambane Province, affecting the localities of Nhapele, Buchane, Macovane, Save and Pande.

Because of the increasing influx of refugee populations from these and other areas, and because, owing to its geographical features, Inhassoro offers better conditions, since it is located in the coastal zone, the party and state structural organizations in that locality created two pre-settlement centers.

In these centers, where nearly 1,500 family groups were settled, the death rate declined considerably, because of the increasing support provided by the World Food Program and other international organizations, in the form of food and medicines.

In fact, the diseases which had been most common among the aged and children have also been checked, despite the fact that there are still problems relating to the lack of certain pharmaceuticals, regardless of the efforts that are being expended to make the health situation in particular more stable.

Although the specter of hunger still hovers over that population, because the solution to this disaster does not depend solely on the backing arriving from abroad, the party and state structural organizations in that region of Inhambane Province have locally demarcated safer regions, particularly from the agricultural standpoint, to be assigned for final settlement of those stricken.

Priority to Three Villages

Concurrent. with this action, and as we were told by the first secretary and administrator in that locality, Volunjane, Chibo and Colongue, the communal

villages were decided upon in a first phase, for reconstruction, and the three can house the population currently settled in the two pre-settlement centers.

The three communities, in regions that are quite favorable from an agricultural standpoint, are already in the reconstruction phase, after having been destroyed by the armed bandits in their murderous rage.

Hence the work at present lies in accumulating construction materials, with a process of relocating the population in those future rural communities under reconstruction by now in an advanced phase.

As the reintegration process progresses, the party and state structural organizations in the locality of Inhassoro are undertaking action to divide the land into plots, based on 1 hectare per family. In these areas, priority has been given to the most drought-resistant crops, although the lack of certain kinds of seed is the main problem at present.

However, with the idea of using their own forces to solve some problems, efforts are being made through agreements that are being signed with districts able to supply seed giving top priority to cassava, a crop the importance of which is considered supreme, ~~because it resists drought, with the advantage that its utilization is varied.~~

In the interview with the first secretary and administrator in that locality, we were told that, despite the efforts being made to mitigate the effects of this natural disaster, serious problems still remain, because the locality is continuing to take in more refugees from the areas in which there has been no rain for over 4 years.

According to the subject of our interview, the action of the armed bandits in that region of Inhambane Province has made the situation even worse, because even in the safest areas the population has been forced to leave its possessions because of the threat from the bandits.

This situation has heightened the concern in the locality because, as our interviewee remarked, the products that the district has are very far short of meeting the current requirements.

In this regard, he noted that the rainfall has been irregular, and the vegetative condition of the plants is weak. He also added that the influx of refugees from the areas previously stricken by the armed bandits' action has been greater; malnutrition is still decimating children, and the lack of medicines is also serious.

This depiction, from what we have been able to learn, prompts the belief that support from the international community, not only in the form of food, but also with medicines and other items, is still very badly needed.

2909

CSO: 3442/57

BRIEFS

SWEDISH FORESTRY AID--The Mozambican forestry industry is benefiting from a regular supply of European-manufactured supplies and spare parts, through a line of credit granted by the Swedish Agency for Development (SIDA). The shipping of the equipment to Mozambique is being handled by an international firm known as HIFAB, based on a contract that is renewable with the beneficiaries. At present, the agreement is being implemented with IFLOMA (Forest Industries of Manica), an enterprise considered to be strategic. According to information gathered by our newspaper, ~~HIFAB is one of the few efficient~~ companies shipping equipment to our country, mainly because of its system of organization, speed, and contacts with the client. In M'sica, Manica Province, the chief of IFLOMA's Central Supply Warehouse, Augusto Mabor Pita, attested: "For example, within a period of 2 consecutive weeks after the order was placed, we managed to receive the shipments." [Text] [Beira DIARIO DE MOCAMBIQUE in Portuguese 24 Oct 84 p 16] 2909

CSO: 3442/57

BRIEFS

UDISTP DENOUNCES REGIME--The Independent Democratic Union of Sao Tome and Principe (UDISTP) has issued a warning to the people of Sao Tome advising them to say "no" to Pinto da Costa's candidacy for the presidency, which is occurring for the fourth time. The organization, which is combating the Sao Tome regime, considers it essential for Pinto da Costa to accept the presence and the participation in the country's destiny of "all the historical ones who fought for independence," as well as "the democratic organizations, currently in the opposition, so that there will be true democracy in Sao Tome." In the document, which was sent to us, UDISTP expresses the view that MLSTP [~~Movement for the Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe~~], a movement inspiring the government in power, "lacks legitimacy at present for directing the nation's destiny." This is because (it adds) "Mr Manuel Pinto da Costa, after seizing power, expelled all the MLSTP historical elements." Depicting the Sao Tome regime as "terrorist" and "dictatorial," the organization also alerts "all the children of Sao Tome and Principe, and the international public, lovers of peace and progress," to the "violation of human rights being committed at present in Sao Tome by the current regime." It also scores the trampling of "human values and rights of the people of Sao Tome, for the benefit of Soviet and Cuban interests." [Text] [Lisbon O DIA in Portuguese 25 Oct 84 p 24] 2909

CSO: 3442/56

COMMENT BY LESS COURA ON DECISION BY LEADER OF MOURIDES

Dakar LE POLITICIEN in French 8 Nov 84 pp 1, 8

[Text] The caliph general of the Mourides brotherhood has decided he will no longer receive a government delegation on the occasion of the feast of the Grand Magal de Touba.

In the future, exchanges of greetings between the government and the Mourides brotherhood will be handled at another level. This year Serigne Moustapha Mbacke, in his capacity as president of the organizing committee for the feast of the Grand Magal de Touba, will receive the representatives of the state.

~~Some people have interpreted this decision by the caliph as based on a desire to withdraw further from the temporal authorities and leave the state free to continue along the path of laicizing the administration.~~

Other people consider that this involves an insult, a slap in the face of the Socialist Party. This procedure has been used to avoid having this insult regarded as such.

We reported in our issue No 109 last September that the Mourides brotherhood "was calling for a new type of relationship between the state and the Grand Touba, based on the fact that the era of acting as a protege of the government is now over." Perhaps events are showing that we were right.

Basically, the retreat by the authorities over the Pape Sy affair, involving the former director of the Radio Service, who was dismissed for having delayed carrying a communique from the Grand Touba, has not served to mend the breach between the government and the Mourides brotherhood.

Even if a formal divorce has not taken place, it is clear that a crisis of confidence has developed, which seems to block prospects for a reconciliation between the Socialist Party government and the best organized and most dynamic element of the Senegalese Muslim clergy.

One of the principal complaints against the government felt by the Mourides community is that the authorities have never honored the memory of the very wealthy Ndiouga Kebe, a fervent follower of the Grand Touba but also a great Senegalese

who performed extensive services on behalf of his country and more especially of his government, as well as to the poor farmers of the nation.

In effect, this neglect by the government is seen by the Grand Touba as a lack of consideration, particularly as the remains of Ndiouga Kebe are buried there.

A posthumous decoration for this distinguished Senegalese, in the absence of officially dedicating a street, a hospital, or a public square with his name, was expected, even so. At most it might be said that this simply involved an act of omission or culpable negligence by the government.

However, there are steps which a government in Senegal should not forget to take.

5170
CSO:3419/135

SOUTH AFRICA

NEW MULTIRACIAL CABINET SHOWS SIGNS OF DISUNITY

Pretoria DIE AFRIKANER in Afrikaans 10 Oct 84 p 5

[Text] South Africa's new multiracial cabinet has begun to show signs of serious discord--only a few weeks after its inauguration.

According to reports, the two non-white members of the cabinet, Rev Allan Hendrickse and Mr Amichand Rajbansi, spoke out critically on the decision of the government not to bring back to this country the four South Africans who are to stand trial in Great Britain on charges of arms-smuggling.

Rev Hendrickse told the Johannesburg newspaper, the SUNDAY EXPRESS, that there had been no full cabinet meeting at which such a decision was confirmed. Rev Hendrickse told the newspaper that he knew nothing about the government decision to abrogate the agreement that had been made with Great Britain. "There was no cabinet meeting, and I was not consulted. I do not concur with this decision. I think that the two affairs (the six people in the British consulate in Durban and the trial in question) must be kept separate."

Rev Hendrickse's opinion is supported by Mr Amichand Rajbansi, the leader of the National Peoples' Party and the other non-white cabinet member.

The difference of opinion in the cabinet brings up once again the question of collective responsibility. When the national president, Mr P.W. Botha, was asked about this at a recent Cape Town press conference, he said that members of the cabinet cannot be allowed to express public criticism of a government decision. Ministers must settle their differences with the chairman of the house of which they are members. They need not, however, resign from the cabinet if they differ with cabinet decisions.

President Botha made the additional observation that solutions are found in many other nations where coalitions are running the government. South Africa might possibly follow the example of one of these.

Political spokespersons, however, have told DIE AFRIKANER that such a model exists nowhere in the world. Coalitions come into being only after one or two parties have entered into detailed negotiations on points of policy and have come to an agreement on how policy differences are to be handled. A coalition cannot possibly be the solution if serious differences of principle exist.

In the case of the NP, the Workers' Party and the National Peoples' Party, such negotiations are not now ongoing, and thus no mutual agreement exists, the above-mentioned spokespersons explained. On the contrary, the two non-white parties have undertaken, before their elections and in opposition to the desires of many of their constituents, to remove from the code certain laws that are now part of NP political programs.

Shortly after the colored election, for example, Rev Hendrickse said that his party planned to call for a committee which would plan and monitor the systematic dismanteling of apartheid. Laws that must be repealed on the short term are the law concerning the veto of political integration, the question of preferential districts for coloreds, the immorality law and the law concerning separate public conveniences. Laws that must be repealed on the long term include the tribal registration law and the group districting law. Meanwhile, proclamations concerning compliance with the law must be terminated, said Rev Hendrickse.

Indicative of the lack of consensus in the cabinet is the clever calculation whereby the Workers' Party has thus far evaded the prohibition on political integration by means of clever calculation! That law forbids members of one racial group to take part in the political activities of another group. Not only has the Workers' Party named a number of its Indian members as candidates for the Indian House, but it has enrolled as members a large number of whites and blacks as well. The Transvaal leader of the Workers' Party, Mr Jac Rabie, also announced his party's intention to name some of these Whites as candidates in by-elections for the white peoples' council.

The minister of domestic affairs, Mr F.W. de Klerk, even after lengthy negotiations with the Workers' Party, could not induce its members to leave off their deliberate transgression of the law. Still not a single charge has been made against anyone in compliance with this law.

The talk in rightist political circles is that the only way in which the NP can prevent the approaching schism in the cabinet is to give in to the demands of the two non-white parties. An indication of this trend is the recent decision of the government to grant quitrent rights to blacks in West Cape Province. That decision, which was announced at the Cape Province NP Congress, is a complete turnabout from the policy that had been followed until then, and in accordance with which West Cape Province was considered a preferential district for Coloreds. It is significant that that measure appears on the list of priorities the Workers' Party has set up for dismantling apartheid. The current talk in political circles is that Article 16 of the immorality law and the law prohibiting mixed marriages will have their turn early next year.

8117

CSO: 3401/35

SOUTH AFRICA

BLACK INCOMES INCREASING IN NEW POWER SHARING SYSTEM

Pretoria DIE AFRIKANER in Afrikaans 17 Oct 84 p 2

[Text] If the present redistribution of incomes continues, the Blacks will be receiving the greatest share of the total of personal incomes in South Africa by the beginning of the next century.

So writes Dr Hazel Suchard, economics professor at the University of Witwatersrand in the most recent issue of AFRICA INSIGHT, a journal of the Afrika-Instituut.

Dr Suchard writes that black incomes have undergone a change in financial as well as real terms. Although there is still a significant gap between white and non-white incomes, this gap has narrowed.

The wage gap has narrowed considerably in all sectors. In mining, for example, the proportion of Whites to non-whites in 1960 was 1 : 15.5, in 1975, 1 : 8.0 and in 1977, 1 : 7.6. In the manufacturing sector the figures are 1 : 5.5 in 1960, 1 : 4.8 in 1975 and 1 : 4.4 in 1977. In the construction industry the gap narrowed from 1 : 5.6 in 1960 to 1 : 4.9 in 1975 and to 1 : 5.2 in 1977.

This narrowing of the wage gap has come to mean that Blacks receive an ever greater percentage of the total incomes of the country, while the Whites' share keeps decreasing. Dr Suchard found that in 1960 and 1970 Whites earned 74 percent of the total revenue, 71 percent in 1973 and 68 percent in 1975. The high birth rate and attendant joblessness among Blacks do cause a slow-down in this trend, however.

The Blacks were the only racial group whose real revenue increased every year between 1971 and 1982. This increase was even as high as 13.1 percent in 1974, 11.4 percent in 1975 and 7.4 percent in 1976.

AVERAGE REAL INCOMES OF WHITES AND BLACKS, EXCLUSIVE OF AGRICULTURE

1970 TO 1982

YEARS 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982

WHITES

Real Incomes (in rands)	5097	5282	5276	5323	5421	5400	5270	5152	5082	5026	5200	5541	5635
Changes in Real Incomes (by percentage)	3.6	(0.1)	0.9	1.8	(0.4)	(2.4)	(2.2)	(1.4)	(1.1)	3.5	6.6	1.7	

BLACKS

Real Incomes (in rands)	752	762	799	867	981	1092	1172	1198	1215	1239	1297	1335	1414
Changes in Real Incomes (by percentage)	1.3	4.8	8.5	13.1	11.4	7.4	2.2	1.4	1.9	4.8	3.0	5.9	

On the other hand, the average real incomes of Whites have often decreased. Decreases show up, for example, in 1972 (0.1 percent), 1975 (0.4 percent), 1976 (2.4 percent), 1977 (2.2 percent), 1978 (1.4 percent) and 1979 (1.1 percent). The greatest increase in white real incomes was 6.6 percent in 1981.

Prof Jill Natrass has noted that an increasing share of the purchasing power is being concentrated in the hands of Blacks, says Dr Suchard. In 1981 Blacks earned 40 percent of the total revenue as opposed to 26 percent in 1971. In 1970 the average earnings of Blacks amounted to 14.8 percent of those of Whites. This figure increased to 25 percent in 1982, according to Dr Suchard.

The redistribution of wealth now being brought to light by Dr Suchard is a direct consequence of the government policy to narrow the wage gap. The former premier, Mr John Vorster, told an American newspaper as far back as 1977 that black salaries were steadily rising, faster than those of Whites. Mr Vorster also took that opportunity to refer to the "abolition of inequality in our social and economic system," adding that it would require significant sacrifices of whites in terms of living standards and material expectations."

One of the most important governmental advisers, Prof Sampie Terreblanche, wrote in December 1982 in a Sunday newspaper: "The white man in South Africa is defensive about his high level of income, and the time has come that some of his money will have to be given to non-whites. Power sharing will work on the political level only to the extent that it is implemented as well on the economic level. The only way to manage this is to reduce the revenues of whites and prepare them for a lowering of their standard of living."

8117

CSO: 3401/35

STATUS OF BLACKS IN PRETORIA

Johannesburg DIE TRANSVALER in Afrikaans 22 Oct 84 p 12

[Text] The position of blacks in the Pretoria context was subjected to a penetrating examination last weekend at a meeting of Nationalists from Pretoria, and a decision was made that may not only be to the advantage of future racial relationships in the city, but also serve the interests of relationships in general.

Of special importance is the fact that for the first time a practical and feasible starting place is now available, from which the problem--and it is a substantial one for Pretoria--can be tackled.

The fact is that the government has been asked to look into all aspects of the living conditions of blacks in and around Pretoria. Mention is made in particular of the blacks' working conditions, housing, transportation and recreation facilities.

DIE TRANSVALER believes that the heart of this problem especially prevalent in the Pretoria region--although other metropolitan areas are not free of problems on this score--is pithily summed up in the petition to the government.

Collectively, all these factors create a condition that lends itself par excellence to fears of supplantation, to decisions that are made on the basis of unproven allegations, and the potential implication of friction and incidents that may altogether play havoc with white-black relations.

In his address at the meeting, the Transvaal NP leader, Mr F.W. de Klerk, mentioned among other things the need for consultation between the different racial groups, in order to work out a plan for peaceful coexistence.

While provision is made in the new constitutional dispensation for a process of self-government for the coloreds and Indians, it has clearly become necessary for communication between white and black--and more particularly in the case of black urban dwellers--to be treated as a matter deserving of the highest priority.

It naturally implies, too, that with the analysis of the Pretoria situation, the black community leaders will be called upon to make a contribution to the talks. Thus not only the problems of whites will come to the table, but also those of the black communities.

Both sides can come to understand the problems and can then work together to rid the Pretoria situation of all potential for conflict.

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CSO: 3401/12

SOUTH AFRICA

ARMY AID TO POLICE IN BLACK TOWNSHIPS

Bloemfontein DIE VOLKSBLAD in Afrikaans 24 Oct 84 p 20

[Text] The unrest that is smoldering in a number of black townships, particularly in the Transvaal, has led to various outbursts. Normal life is disrupted, schools are under boycott, millions of rands worth of property damage is being done, and a number of people have lost their lives. It is an important duty of the government to protect human lives and property and to give law-observant citizens the opportunity to carry out the activities of their daily lives undisturbed.

With this goal in mind, the army was called in to stand by the South African police in a cleanup operation in the townships of Sebokeng, Sharpeville and Boipatong. The enormous undertaking proceeded without incident, and conditions were created under which other government departments can function normally once again. For the conditions of unrest had also created a miscreant's paradise in which a number of crimes were committed with impunity.

From this point of view, Operation Palmiet was an unqualified success, and it may be assumed that great numbers of citizens are grateful that calm and order have been restored.

But the reverse side of the coin is that the use of the army has exposed South Africa to sharp criticism, both from within and outside the country. Of course, there are those spokesmen and organizations that would prefer the unrest to continue, and who hope that the whole country will become ungovernable, but there are also criticisms or comments from regions that cannot be considered anything other than malevolent.

The exaggerated cries of "War declared against the blacks," "Siege" and "Oppression" can find acceptance with the unsophisticated masses and create future problems. The impression may also be given that the police are no longer capable of handling

the situation. For many people cannot understand that the army was used solely as an element of protection, while the police went about their normal duties.

One can accept the fact that advantages and disadvantages are weighed against one another beforehand, for in the first place conflicts are born in the hearts and minds of people. And it will not immediately come to light whether the silent majority does not perhaps regard protection as intimidation.

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CSO: 3401/12

PROBLEM OF RESIDENCE OF BLACK DIPLOMATS

Johannesburg DIE TRANSVALER in Afrikaans 25 Oct 84 p 22

[Text] It is a pity that an unfortunate situation has now left an unsavory aftertaste: we refer to the plans to purchase dwelling sites in Monument Park for diplomatic personnel from Transkei.

A pity, especially because the turmoil it keeps making of people's emotions and the hurtful reactions, which this newspaper also mentioned yesterday, are really so unnecessary.

That provision must be made for the accommodation of diplomatic personnel from our independent black nations is a practical reality that is accepted because those nations are taking their first steps toward self-government.

The fact that these diplomats cannot be treated as third-class guests here is an equally logical assumption, based on the same principle. Is it not also the greatest piece of foolishness to expect that nations must first enjoy international recognition --for which we have been hoping now since the Transkei became independent--if we ourselves, the fathers of the policy, are not ready to accept the logical implications of their sovereignty?

There has been general consensus on these matters for the past 30 years--since the government's acceptance of the report on the recommendations made by the Tomlinson Commission.

And we can also withhold our confidence from those strangers, who with hurtful placards and banners gave evidence of their opposition to the settlement of people from Transkei in Monument Park.

But together with this fact, the local option--in other words the wishes and dispositions of those who live in established communities--has been respectful over the years.

We do not believe that the government is laboring under a delusion about the sensitivity attached to the settling of non-whites within a white district. (Although the same measure of sensitivity obviously does not exist so long as the non-whites live in the back yards of white dwellings).

Therefore we believe that the government must approach this matter with the greatest caution.

The local option should be thoroughly made known, and the people with interests that may be affected ought to be informed and made aware.

The impression must not be created that the local community's wishes are being overlooked, or that a dark plot is going on under wraps. DIE TRANSVALER believes that in general our people understand the necessity of retaining our own policy.

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CSO: 3401/12

DEPRESSED PRICES, AGING TECHNOLOGY IMPERIL COPPER MINING

Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 23 Oct 84 p 3

[Article by Stefan Klein: "Breathless From the Copper Girdle"]

[Text] We follow the green-yellow double cable. Whether we pass with our heads bent through a low tunnel cut out of rock or whether we force ourselves on metal ladders through oppressively narrow chimneys -- the cable always comes along. Somehow the green-yellow marking has something calming about it in this gloomy labyrinth of passageways and shafts where we have long ago lost our orientation and are fighting against the sultry heat 500 meters under the earth's surface -- quite in contrast to Peter Chileshe, chief climber, who is as much at home here in the Nkana mine as in his own home. Under his direction and still accompanied by the green-yellow cable, we reach a place where the mountain range seems to quiver under awe-inspiring, shrill shrieking. It is as if the mountain were screaming under the force of the electric borer that is, operated by two men, slowly eating into the stone. We are at the face, as one would say in the Ruhr valley. But here not coal, but ore is being mined. Ore that contains that valuable material that gleams yellowish in the light of the mining lamp -- copper.

Into the hole that the two men are boring one will later shove the explosive charge -- a brown cardboard sausage that contains the explosive material. It is the last hole on this wall. The others are already finished and filled. The fuzes are hanging out. "They are then connected to the detonator," Peter says, as he points to the green-yellow double cable that has followed us here. "Gulp" would stand at this point in a comic strip: the whole time we have been following along an explosive cable and even found it calming. But one does not actually have to be shocked about this. More shocking are the conditions under which these two men have to work here. Secured only to a thin rope, they handle the heavy boring apparatus at the edge of a darkly gaping abyss that opened up after past explosions. "They have to have safety belts," the chief of the miner's union, Timothy Walamba, will lament in a conversation, "but there are none." So he won't go to the barricades, for of course he knows: There is a lack of almost everything.

The Locomotives -- Ready for the Junkyard

For example, there is no reliable underground transportation system. Thus the train that was to bring us to the depth of 466 meters from the shaft to the

working area was again out of order. But where the workers have to walk long stretches and -- as we saw on the walk we took -- push railroad cars over the tracks, work-time and effort are crudely wasted. But what can one do? The locomotives are more than 30 years old, worn out and ready for the junkyard and should, according to Brian Eastwood, the manager of the Nkana mine, have been replaced five years ago -- and the rest of the technical equipment, too. Fortheloader or borer, work is done with much too old and often hastily patched up material, the usefulness of which is also severely limited because the fuel supply is also limited. Since the compressors are no longer in good condition, there is a lack of the necessary compressed air.

The grotesque extent reached by these lacks is seen in the example of the storage container for the prepared ore. It came from the 1930's, broke down in 1980, and has since not been replaced. The result: Whenever the refining installation is closed for overhaul or repairs for a time, the work in the mine must be stopped as well -- simply because there is no storage capacity. On the other hand: When repairs are being carried out in the mine, the flow to the refining installation stops, for a steady supply is not possible without a storage container. However it is not just in Nkana that one suffers with such narrow passageways and difficulties, but also in all 16 copper mines (nine below ground and seven above ground) included in Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM). The fact that the responsible people improvise everywhere and must deal with annoying difficulties could be regarded as the internal problems of a mining company, if it were not a matter of a very special undertaking in ZCCM.

ZCCM stands to a certain extent for a ticket on which one has in Zambia risked everything -- including the future of the country. They have criminally neglected agriculture and instead made themselves completely dependent upon the export of copper, from which they receive 95 percent of their foreign exchange. One single undertaking therefore decides what Zambia can accomplish economically, what it can import, and what it can spend in hard currency. It was an all or nothing game that went well as long as high prices were paid on the London metal exchange for the "red gold." But these times are long past. Today, when one takes buying power as a measure, "less is paid for a ton of copper than ever before in the past 30 years" (manager Eastwood) -- about 1,000 British pounds. In value this is only a third of what one could get from a ton of copper 28 years ago. And so one comes right now, just when Zambia is getting ready to celebrate its twentieth birthday, to the gloomy conclusion that it was a bad mistake to set everything on copper.

And as it is when a poor devil has played for too high stakes, one can't get along in any way. One must go into debt and tighten one's belt, and one does not even have any money left for absolute necessities. In Zambia's case the country was soon so broke that it could not even provide the necessary maintenance for the one foreign exchange winner in the country, so that it gradually ran down and its technical condition decayed more and more. At the present level of copper prices, at least half of the yearly income would have to go to the upkeep of the mines, which have a high import requirement (machines, spare parts). In fact, however, the mining managers often went

for months without any hard currency at their disposal, so that one even had to give up the most pressing acquisitions. At the moment, to be sure, a third of the exchange intake flows into the copper mines -- more than for a long time now -- but even this is far too little to cover the normal need, let alone to fill the need for overhaul.

At this point, one must clearly pause a moment and begin to talk about the operational structure of ZCCM as well as the question of whether there might not be other reasons for the decline of the mines than just the poor price of copper. The copper industry in Zambia is an inheritance from colonial days when, among others, the South African mining firm, Anglo American Corporation (AAC), was exploiting the copper deposits of what was at the time northern Rhodesia. When the British protectorate achieved its independence, AAC and the other private companies went from mining to despoilation of the mines. In anticipation of the nationalization of their firms, they drove up production and minimized the possible opening up of more inaccessible veins. The nationalization did not come then, but only five years later.

By then the relation between mining and opening up new areas was better, but as the state assured itself control over its own ore and forced the previous owners into the position of minor stockholders, the latter seem again to have started a policy of despoilation and done everything to get as much money as possible from the mines rapidly and ruthlessly. They were able to do this, for the new owners had neither know-how nor experience -- hardly surprising when one considers that in 1961, three years before independence, the first Zambian with a university education worked in the mines. And so the new masters in the copper mines had to continue to depend upon the special knowledge of the ones they had just thrown out. Anglo American, now in possession of a third of the stock capital of ZCCM, clearly knew how to take advantage of this situation.

At any rate, high dividends are said to have been paid while the necessary investments were greatly neglected, or -- where they could not be avoided -- directed more in the interest of the South African delivery firms connected to Anglo American than toward the needs of the mines. The way things were this could only mean the purchase of expensive and technologically complicated equipment that was hard to use and even harder to repair and was therefore well suited to increase the dependence upon South African replacement parts and South African know-how. Thus what would have been in the interest of the Zambians, namely to build up a small supply industry to gradually decrease the need for imports, was undermined by the South Africans, who, according to the words of an insider, tried above all to compensate for their formal loss of influence by an even closer meshing of the Zambian copper industry with the republic at the cape.

Such machinations (which, according to those who know the mining scene, "would not have been possible without the purchased agreement from high Zambian positions") are easily presented by the South Africans as benefits, for they deliver, as is praised everywhere, "punctually and rapidly." And the mining

minister, Basil Kabwe, says that "common sense" dictates that it is "cheaper to import from South Africa than from overseas." But precisely this supposed advantage makes the dependence ever clearer to him, and he therefore often asks himself whether the copper industry "is not more of a curse than a blessing for us." Probably it is more of a curse, for here a whole country is dependent upon a single commodity, the production of which cannot be effectively controlled and the price of which one cannot influence in the least way.

To be sure, it is impressive after the climbing expedition underground and after the tour through the preparation installation, the foundry and the refinery to see the finished product in the loading area -- shining red, 99.96 percent pure copper that is exported in the form of sheets and ingots. In the last business year one had produced 55,021 tons, and in the previous year 575,518 tons. But these handsome figures dazzle just like the metal. In coming years one will have to reduce production considerably, because in relation to the low price of copper, the production costs are much too high. This is related partially to the poor technical equipment of the mines, but also to the geological difficulties and to the fact that many of the veins that have been opened up are exhausted and others are only to be dug out at great depths, making the process unprofitable. Mufulira, Nchanga, and Luanshya -- the names of these three ZCCM mines represent the downward trend. It is a foregone conclusion that they will be closed within the next 15 years.

Not that they have no worthwhile reserves -- but they have not yet been opened up. The latest business report indicates, for example, for Nchanga, an above ground mining area, which belongs to the four largest in the world, reserves of more than 100 million tons of ore -- but the figure is stamped with the title, "undeveloped." Now it seems that the price is being paid for the years of forced production when opening up new veins was neglected and for which there is now no longer any money left. Brian Eastwood may regard as exaggerated estimates that predict the end of the Zambian copper industry at the latest by the millenium, but there are many indications that this will actually happen -- unless the price of copper goes up or the production costs can be significantly lowered by new techniques. But at present no one is counting on this. Now some of the metallurgical plants are not being fully utilized, because not enough ore is coming out of the mines.

Back to the Land?

Dark shadows over the copper zone: Upon its existence depends not only the country's economy but also the future of more than 50,000 workers and their families. If it were merely a capitalistic matter, one would probably already have closed those ZCCM mines operating at a loss or at just about a loss. But there is of course also the "social responsibility" that one often speaks of now. What this means becomes clear in the example of the Nkana mine, which employs 12,000 men, but all in all -- when one counts the families as well -- provides for 130,000 people: with houses, electricity, water, hospitals, and schools. What is to happen when the copper industry is finished and can no longer maintain all this? Timothy Walamba, the powerful boss of the miners'

union is not well prepared to answer this question. He says that the older workers are to be sent into early retirement and back to the land, and the skilled workers are to be retrained and placed in small industry. But actually Timothy Walamba finds that this is not a union problem but one for the government in Lusaka.

And the government? Mining Minister Basil Kabwe is not very well prepared to answer the question either. "The people have to go back to the land," he says, "There is no alternative." But how is this going to work when one sends people who have gotten used to city life back into the round huts in far away villages? The minister isn't so sure about this either. He just knows that there is no alternative. Perhaps this is one of the moments when he again asks himself whether the copper industry is not more of a curse than a blessing for Zambia.

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DATE FILMED

14 Dec 1984